[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-53101":30,"landing-articles":119},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":45,"cwes":46,"cpes":48,"technologies":68,"references":88,"score":96,"epss_score":97,"epss_percentile":98,"is_kev":99,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":100,"attack_mappings":110,"exploits":117},85778,"CVE-2025-53101","EUVD-2025-21389","ImageMagick has a Stack Buffer Overflow in image.c\n\nHi, we have found a stack buffer overflow and would like to report this issue.\nCould you confirm if this qualifies as a security vulnerability? I am happy to provide any additional information needed.\n\n## Summary\n\nIn ImageMagick's `magick mogrify` command, specifying multiple consecutive `%d` format specifiers in a filename template causes internal pointer arithmetic to generate an address below the beginning of the stack buffer, resulting in a stack overflow through `vsnprintf()`.\n\n### Additional information\n\n Upon further investigation, we found that the same issue occurs not only with mogrify but also with the following subcommands: compare, composite, conjure, convert, identify, mogrify, and montage.\n\nFurthermore, we confirmed that this vulnerability has the potential to lead to RCE. RCE is possible when ASLR is disabled and there is a suitable one_gadget in libc, provided that options and filenames can be controlled.\n\n## Details\n\n- **Vulnerability Type:** CWE-124: Buffer Underwrite\n- **Affected Component:** MagickCore\u002Fimage.c - Format processing within InterpretImageFilename()\n- **Affected Version:** ImageMagick 7.1.1-47 (as of commit 82572afc, June 2025)\n- **CWE-124: Buffer Underwrite:** A vulnerability where writing occurs to memory addresses before the beginning of a buffer. This is caused by a design flaw in fixed offset correction, resulting in negative pointer arithmetic during consecutive format specifier processing.\n\n## Reproduction\n\n### Tested Environment\n\n- **Operating System:** Ubuntu 22.04 LTS\n- **Architecture:** x86_64\n- **Compiler:** gcc with AddressSanitizer (gcc version: 11.4.0)\n\n### Reproduction Steps\n\n```bash\n# Clone source\ngit clone --depth 1 --branch 7.1.1-47 https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FImageMagick\u002FImageMagick.git ImageMagick-7.1.1\ncd ImageMagick-7.1.1\n\n# Build with ASan\nCFLAGS=\"-g -O0 -fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer\" CXXFLAGS=\"$CFLAGS\" LDFLAGS=\"-fsanitize=address\" .\u002Fconfigure --enable-maintainer-mode --enable-shared && make -j$(nproc) && make install\n\n# Trigger crash\n.\u002Futilities\u002Fmagick mogrify %d%d\n```\n\n### Output\n\n```plaintext\n==4155==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffda834caae at pc 0x7f1ea367fb27 bp 0x7ffda834b680 sp 0x7ffda834ae10\nWRITE of size 2 at 0x7ffda834caae thread T0\n    #0 0x7f1ea367fb26 in __interceptor_vsnprintf ..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fsrc\u002Flibsanitizer\u002Fsanitizer_common\u002Fsanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:1668\n    #1 0x7f1ea2dc9e3e in FormatLocaleStringList MagickCore\u002Flocale.c:470\n    #2 0x7f1ea2dc9fd9 in FormatLocaleString MagickCore\u002Flocale.c:495\n    #3 0x7f1ea2da0ad5 in InterpretImageFilename MagickCore\u002Fimage.c:1696\n    #4 0x7f1ea2c6126b in ReadImages MagickCore\u002Fconstitute.c:1051\n    #5 0x7f1ea27ef29b in MogrifyImageCommand MagickWand\u002Fmogrify.c:3858\n    #6 0x7f1ea278e95d in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand\u002Fmagick-cli.c:177\n    #7 0x560813499a0c in MagickMain utilities\u002Fmagick.c:153\n    #8 0x560813499cba in main utilities\u002Fmagick.c:184\n    #9 0x7f1ea1c0bd8f in __libc_start_call_main ..\u002Fsysdeps\u002Fnptl\u002Flibc_start_call_main.h:58\n    #10 0x7f1ea1c0be3f in __libc_start_main_impl ..\u002Fcsu\u002Flibc-start.c:392\n    #11 0x560813499404 in _start (\u002Froot\u002Fworkdir\u002FImageMagick\u002Futilities\u002F.libs\u002Fmagick+0x2404)\n\nAddress 0x7ffda834caae is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 62 in frame\n    #0 0x7f1ea2c60f62 in ReadImages MagickCore\u002Fconstitute.c:1027\n\n  This frame has 2 object(s):\n    [32, 40) 'images' (line 1033)\n    [64, 4160) 'read_filename' (line 1029) \u003C== Memory access at offset 62 underflows this variable\nHINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork\n      (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow ..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fsrc\u002Flibsanitizer\u002Fsanitizer_common\u002Fsanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:1668 in __interceptor_vsnprintf\nShadow bytes around the buggy address:\n  0x100035061900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n  0x100035061910: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n  0x100035061920: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3\n  0x100035061930: f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n  0x100035061940: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n=>0x100035061950: f1 f1 00 f2 f2[f2]00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n  0x100035061960: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n  0x100035061970: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n  0x100035061980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n  0x100035061990: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n  0x1000350619a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\nShadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):\n  Addressable:           00\n  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 \n  Heap left redzone:       fa\n  Freed heap region:       fd\n  Stack left redzone:      f1\n  Stack mid redzone:       f2\n  Stack right redzone:     f3\n  Stack after return:      f5\n  Stack use after scope:   f8\n  Global redzone:          f9\n  Global init order:       f6\n  Poisoned by user:        f7\n  Container overflow:      fc\n  Array cookie:            ac\n  Intra object redzone:    bb\n  ASan internal:           fe\n  Left alloca redzone:     ca\n  Right alloca redzone:    cb\n  Shadow gap:              cc\n==4155==ABORTING\n```\n\n### Affected Code\n\nIn `MagickCore\u002Fimage.c`, within the `InterpretImageFilename()` function:\n\n```c\nMagickExport size_t InterpretImageFilename(const ImageInfo *image_info,\n  Image *image,const char *format,int value,char *filename,\n  ExceptionInfo *exception)\n{\n...\n  for (p=strchr(format,'%'); p != (char *) NULL; p=strchr(p+1,'%'))\n  {\n    q=(char *) p+1;\n    if (*q == '%')\n      {\n        p=q+1;\n        continue;\n      }\n    field_width=0;\n    if (*q == '0')\n      field_width=(ssize_t) strtol(q,&q,10);\n    switch (*q)\n    {\n      case 'd':\n      case 'o':\n      case 'x':\n      {\n        q++;\n        c=(*q);\n        *q='\\0';\n        \u002F*--------Affected--------*\u002F\n        (void) FormatLocaleString(filename+(p-format-offset),(size_t)\n          (MagickPathExtent-(p-format-offset)),p,value);\n        offset+=(4-field_width);\n        \u002F*--------Affected--------*\u002F\n        *q=c;\n        (void) ConcatenateMagickString(filename,q,MagickPathExtent);\n        canonical=MagickTrue;\n        if (*(q-1) != '%')\n          break;\n        p++;\n        break;\n      }\n      case '[':\n      {\n        ...\n      }\n      default:\n        break;\n    }\n  }\n```\n\n## Technical Analysis\n\nThis vulnerability is caused by an inconsistency in the template expansion processing within `InterpretImageFilename()`.\n\nThe format specifiers `%d`, `%o`, and `%x` in templates are replaced with integer values by `FormatLocaleString()`, but the output buffer position is calculated by `filename + (p - format - offset)`.\n\nThe `offset` variable is cumulatively incremented to correct the output length of `%d` etc., but the design using a static `offset += (4 - field_width)` causes `offset` to increase excessively when `%` specifiers are consecutive in the template, creating a dangerous state where the write destination address points before `filename`.\n\nThe constant `4` was likely chosen based on the character count of typical format specifiers like `%03d` (total of 4 characters: `%`, `0`, `3`, `d`). However, in reality, there are formats with only 2 characters like `%d`, and formats with longer width specifications (e.g., `%010d`), so this uniform constant-based correction is inconsistent with actual template structures.\n\nAs a result, when the correction value becomes excessive, `offset` exceeds the relative position `p - format` within the template, generating a negative index. This static and template-independent design of the correction processing is the root cause of this vulnerability.\n\nThis causes `vsnprintf()` to write outside the stack buffer range, which is detected by AddressSanitizer as a `stack-buffer-overflow`.\n\n## Proposed Fix\n\nIn `MagickCore\u002Fimage.c`, within the `InterpretImageFilename()` function:\n\n```c\nMagickExport size_t InterpretImageFilename(const ImageInfo *image_info,\n  Image *image,const char *format,int value,char *filename,\n  ExceptionInfo *exception)\n{\n...\n  \u002F*--------Changed--------*\u002F\n  ssize_t\n    field_width,\n    offset,\n    written; \u002F\u002F Added\n  \u002F*--------Changed--------*\u002F\n...\n  for (p=strchr(format,'%'); p != (char *) NULL; p=strchr(p+1,'%'))\n  {\n    q=(char *) p+1;\n    if (*q == '%')\n      {\n        p=q+1;\n        continue;\n      }\n    field_width=0;\n    if (*q == '0')\n      field_width=(ssize_t) strtol(q,&q,10);\n    switch (*q)\n    {\n      case 'd':\n      case 'o':\n      case 'x':\n      {\n        q++;\n        c=(*q);\n        *q='\\0';\n        written = FormatLocaleString(filename+(p-format-offset),(size_t)\n          (MagickPathExtent-(p-format-offset)),p,value);\n        \u002F*--------Changed--------*\u002F\n        if (written \u003C= 0 || written > (MagickPathExtent - (p - format - offset)))\n          return 0;\n        offset += (ssize_t)((q - p) - written);\n        \u002F*--------Changed--------*\u002F\n        *q=c;\n        (void) ConcatenateMagickString(filename,q,MagickPathExtent);\n        canonical=MagickTrue;\n        if (*(q-1) != '%')\n          break;\n        p++;\n        break;\n      }\n      case '[':\n      {\n        ...\n      }\n      default:\n        break;\n    }\n  }\n```\n- By updating `offset` based on the difference between template description length `(q - p)` and the number of output bytes `written`, buffer position consistency is maintained.\n- Correction is performed according to the actual template structure, ensuring stable behavior regardless of format length without relying on static constants.\n- Range checking of `written` allows detection of vsnprintf failures and excessive writes.\n\n### Commits\nFixed in https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FImageMagick\u002FImageMagick\u002Fcommit\u002F66dc8f51c11b0ae1f1cdeacd381c3e9a4de69774 and https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FImageMagick\u002FImageMagick6\u002Fcommit\u002F643deeb60803488373cd4799b24d5786af90972e","2025-08-25T15:43:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":42,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",7.4,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","NONE",true,[47],"CWE-124",[49,50,51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67],"cpe:2.3:a:imagemagick:imagemagick:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-openmp-x64:magick.net-q16-hdri-openmp-x64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-x64:magick.net-q16-hdri-x64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-x86:magick.net-q16-hdri-x86:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-x86:magick.net-q16-x86:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-openmp-arm64:magick.net-q8-openmp-arm64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-openmp-x64:magick.net-q16-openmp-x64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-arm64:magick.net-q8-arm64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-anycpu:magick.net-q8-anycpu:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-x86:magick.net-q8-x86:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-anycpu:magick.net-q16-hdri-anycpu:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-arm64:magick.net-q16-hdri-arm64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-anycpu:magick.net-q16-anycpu:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-openmp-arm64:magick.net-q16-openmp-arm64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-arm64:magick.net-q16-arm64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-openmp-x64:magick.net-q8-openmp-x64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-x64:magick.net-q16-x64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-openmp-arm64:magick.net-q16-hdri-openmp-arm64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-x64:magick.net-q8-x64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87],"Imagemagick Imagemagick","Magick.Net-Q8-Anycpu Magick.Net-Q8-Anycpu","Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-X86 Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-X86","Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-X64 Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-X64","Magick.Net-Q16-Openmp-Arm64 Magick.Net-Q16-Openmp-Arm64","Magick.Net-Q16-Anycpu Magick.Net-Q16-Anycpu","Magick.Net-Q16-X86 Magick.Net-Q16-X86","Magick.Net-Q8-X86 Magick.Net-Q8-X86","Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Openmp-Arm64 Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Openmp-Arm64","Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Arm64 Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Arm64","Magick.Net-Q16-Openmp-X64 Magick.Net-Q16-Openmp-X64","Magick.Net-Q8-Openmp-Arm64 Magick.Net-Q8-Openmp-Arm64","Magick.Net-Q16-Arm64 Magick.Net-Q16-Arm64","Magick.Net-Q8-Openmp-X64 Magick.Net-Q8-Openmp-X64","Magick.Net-Q8-X64 Magick.Net-Q8-X64","Magick.Net-Q8-Arm64 Magick.Net-Q8-Arm64","Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Anycpu Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Anycpu","Magick.Net-Q16-X64 Magick.Net-Q16-X64","Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Openmp-X64 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Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[115],"initial-access","T1190",[118],{"link":90},{"count":120,"next":121,"previous":6,"results":122},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[123,131,139],{"id":124,"title":125,"summary":126,"published_at":127,"type":128,"link":129,"image_url":130},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":132,"title":133,"summary":134,"published_at":135,"type":136,"link":137,"image_url":138},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":140,"title":141,"summary":142,"published_at":143,"type":144,"link":145,"image_url":146},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]