[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-53621":30,"landing-articles":85},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":48,"cwes":49,"cpes":51,"technologies":52,"references":53,"score":63,"epss_score":64,"epss_percentile":65,"is_kev":66,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":67,"attack_mappings":77,"exploits":84},83073,"CVE-2025-53621","EUVD-2025-21447","DSpace is vulnerable to XML External Entity injection during archive imports \n\n### Impact\n\nTwo related XXE injection possibilities have been discovered, **impacting all versions of DSpace prior to 7.6.4, 8.2 and 9.1**.\n\n1. External entities are not disabled when parsing XML files during import of an archive (in [Simple Archive Format](https:\u002F\u002Fwiki.lyrasis.org\u002Fpages\u002Fviewpage.action?pageId=104566653)), either from command-line (`.\u002Fdspace import` command) or from the \"Batch Import (Zip)\" user interface feature.  _(Likely impacts all versions of DSpace 1.x \u003C= 7.6.3, 8.0 \u003C= 8.1, and 9.0)_\n2. External entities are also not explicitly disabled when parsing XML responses from some upstream services (ArXiv, Crossref, OpenAIRE, Creative Commons) used in [import from external sources](https:\u002F\u002Fwiki.lyrasis.org\u002Fpages\u002Fviewpage.action?pageId=104566672) via the user interface or REST API. _(Impacts all versions of DSpace 7.0 \u003C= 7.6.3, 8.0 \u003C= 8.1 and 9.0)_\n\nAn XXE injection in these files may result in a connection being made to an attacker's site or a local path readable by the Tomcat user, with content potentially being injected into a metadata field. In the latter case, this may result in sensitive content disclosure, including retrieving arbitrary files or configurations from the server where DSpace is running or content from remote URLs. The ability to include content from a remote URL could result in a request forgery attack, and disclosure of sensitive information in the  response.\n\n**The Simple Archive Format (SAF) importer \u002F Batch Import (Zip) is only usable by site administrators** (from user interface \u002F REST API) or system administrators (from command-line).  Therefore, to exploit this vulnerability, the malicious payload would have to be provided by an attacker and trusted by an administrator (who would trigger the import).\n* **The most severe practical impact** is a case where an attacker obtains DSpace administrator credentials and uses the Batch Import feature with a malicious SAF archive to expose sensitive local files readable by the Tomcat user, or secrets and access tokens from an authenticated service via request forgery.\n* An attacker without administrative credentials might use some other tactic to convince an administrator to import a malicious SAF archive they have supplied.\n\n**The Import from External Sources feature has a narrower attack vector**.  While this feature is usable by any DSpace Submitter, the malicious payload must be provided *by the external source* (e.g. arXiv, Crossref, OpenAIRE, or Creative Commons).  No known method exists for an attacker to inject XXE via content uploads. Instead, the service itself would need to be compromised in such a way that it would inject a malicious payload into its API response.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix is included in DSpace 7.6.4, 8.2 and 9.1. Please upgrade to one of these versions.\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, it is possible to manually patch your DSpace backend. (No changes are necessary to the frontend.)  A pull request exists which can be used to patch systems running DSpace 7.6.x, 8.x or 9.0. This pull request provides central methods to retrieve Java XML, SAX, JAXB XML document builders with safe default settings, including XXE protection.\n* Pull request for 7.x: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDSpace\u002FDSpace\u002Fpull\u002F11032 ([Downloadable patch file](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDSpace\u002FDSpace\u002Fpull\u002F11032.patch))\n* Pull request for 8.x: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDSpace\u002FDSpace\u002Fpull\u002F11034 ([Downloadable patch file](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDSpace\u002FDSpace\u002Fpull\u002F11034.patch))\n* Pull request for 9.0: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDSpace\u002FDSpace\u002Fpull\u002F11035 ([Downloadable patch file](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDSpace\u002FDSpace\u002Fpull\u002F11035.patch))\n\n#### Apply the patch to your DSpace\nIf at all possible, we recommend upgrading your DSpace site based on the upgrade instructions. However, if you are unable to do so, you can manually apply the above patches to your DSpace backend as follows:\n1. Download the appropriate patch file to the machine where DSpace backend is running\n2. From the `[dspace-src]` folder, apply the patch, e.g. `git apply [name-of-file].patch`\n3. Now, update your DSpace site (based loosely on the Upgrade instructions). This generally involves three steps:\n    1. Rebuild DSpace, e.g. `mvn -U clean package`  (This will recompile all DSpace backend code)\n    2. Redeploy DSpace, e.g. `ant update`  (This will copy all newly built code to your installation directory). Depending on your setup you also may need to copy the updated \"server\" webapp over to your Tomcat webapps folder.\n    3. Restart Tomcat (or runnable JAR)\n\n### Workarounds\n**Patching the system is the recommended fix.** It is not possible to fully protect your system via workarounds.\n\nThat said, until you are able to patch your system or upgrade, you can apply these best practices:\n* Administrators must carefully inspect any SAF archives (they did not construct themselves) before importing.  If SAF archives are too large to manually inspect, you should avoid importing them until your site is patched.\n* As necessary, affected external services can be disabled (see [documentation](https:\u002F\u002Fwiki.lyrasis.org\u002Fpages\u002Fviewpage.action?pageId=104566672)) to mitigate the ability for a malicious payload to be delivered via external service APIs.\n\n\n### Credits\nDiscovered & reported by Pablo Picurelli Ortiz (@superpegaso2703)\nCode fix developed by Kim Shepherd (@kshepherd) of The Library Code\n\n### For more information\n* [XXE Cheat Sheet \u002F Explanations](https:\u002F\u002Fcheatsheetseries.owasp.org\u002Fcheatsheets\u002FXML_External_Entity_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html)\n* If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact us at [security@dspace.org](mailto:security@dspace.org)","2025-07-15T18:04:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":46,"availabilityImpact":46,"privilegesRequired":47,"confidentialityImpact":47},"CHANGED","3.1",6.9,"NETWORK","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:H\u002FUI:R\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:N\u002FA:L","NONE","REQUIRED","LOW","HIGH",true,[50],"CWE-611",[],[],[54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDSpace\u002FDSpace\u002Fpull\u002F11032","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDSpace\u002FDSpace\u002Fpull\u002F11032.patch","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDSpace\u002FDSpace\u002Fpull\u002F11034","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDSpace\u002FDSpace\u002Fpull\u002F11034.patch","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDSpace\u002FDSpace\u002Fpull\u002F11035","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDSpace\u002FDSpace\u002Fpull\u002F11035.patch","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDSpace\u002FDSpace\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-jjwr-5cfh-7xwh","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-53621","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDSpace\u002FDSpace",0.55,0.0044,0.37946,false,{"timestamp":68,"automatable":69,"tech_impact":70,"exploitation":71,"cisa_decision":72,"cisa_remediation_timeline":76},"2025-07-15T14:57:02.900623Z","no","partial","none",{"vector":73,"decision":74,"priority":75},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T10:13:28.089315\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[78],{"name":79,"source":80,"tactics":81,"technique_id":83},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[82],"initial-access","T1190",[],{"count":86,"next":87,"previous":6,"results":88},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[89,97,105],{"id":90,"title":91,"summary":92,"published_at":93,"type":94,"link":95,"image_url":96},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":98,"title":99,"summary":100,"published_at":101,"type":102,"link":103,"image_url":104},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":106,"title":107,"summary":108,"published_at":109,"type":110,"link":111,"image_url":112},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]