[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-55746":30,"landing-articles":124},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":51,"technologies":55,"references":59,"score":64,"epss_score":65,"epss_percentile":66,"is_kev":67,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":68,"attack_mappings":78,"exploits":122},66659,"CVE-2025-55746","EUVD-2025-25355","Directus allows unauthenticated file upload and file modification due to lacking input sanitization\n\n## Summary\n\nA vulnerability exists in the file update mechanism which allows an unauthenticated actor to modify existing files with arbitrary contents (without changes being applied to the files' database-resident metadata) and \u002F or upload new files, with arbitrary content and extensions, which won't show up in the Directus UI.\n\n## Details\n\nDirectus exposes the CRUD operations for uploading or handling files under the `\u002Ffiles` route.\n\nThe endpoint handler is responsible for updating an existing file identified by the provided primary key specified through the `pk` parameter. Primary keys are UUID values such as `\u002Ffiles\u002F927b3abf-fb4b-4c66-bdaa-eb7dc48a51cb`. Here the `filename_disk` value is never sanitized, it's possible to pass a path containing traversal sequences (`..\u002F`) through it, but a fully arbitrary file write is not possible in case the \"local\" storage handler is used. (Other storage implementations haven't been checked during the research process). The `packages\u002Fstorage-driver-local\u002Fsrc\u002Findex.ts` file defines two relevant functions: `write` and `fullpath`.\n\nThe `write` method uses the `fullPath` method to create the absolute path for the to-be-created file. The `join` method is used to create the final path string. As the `fullPath` method uses `join` to create a relative path starting with the separator to be added under the download dir, this call normalizes the path and further upwards traversal is not possible during the write operation. With that being said, it is still possible, to make the system \"ignore\" the `temp_` prefix given to the file, resulting in an arbitrarily named file being placed in the upload folder.\n\nAs a summary for the vulnerability:\n\n- It is possible, to change the contents of an existing file, as an existing UUID can be specified as the file name\n        - The metadata won't change, so the mime type cannot be modified\n        - This also makes the changes happen \"silently\", without directus knowing about the changes\n- A new, previously non-existent file can be created with arbitrary contents\n        - The file won't show up in on the Directus UI, it can only be seen through other means (such as shell access)\n- An extension MUST be defined for the file to be modified\n        - This prevents us from uploading executables or malware with no extensions, but these wouldn't be executable either way\n\nRecommendations for fixing the vulnerability can be found in later chapters.\n\n## Requirements \n\nAs providing a primary key is required for successful exploitation, at least one asset with a known UUID must be available for an attacker. This can usually be achieved by browsing an application that uses the given Directus instance to provide images. \n\nNaturally, the instance needs to be accessible over the network used by the attacker as well.\n\nOnce network access and knowledge of at least one file UUID is available for the attacker, exploitation can be done by sending a single request.\n\n## Potential impacts\n\nThe impact of successful exploitation is highly dependent on how Directus is set up to be used by a different application. Many different configurations can be created, but the following are likely the most noteworthy:\n\n1. Setting up a phishing site\n\nSVGs can be used to set up very sophisticated looking pages, as it allows the embedding of HTML, CSS and scripts. The issue is once again with the `default-src: none` CSP settings. This setting prevents the use of CSS in the SVG file, so the created page will look strange.\n\nWhile the page obviously looks strange, it's important to notice that since the domain checks out, the browser could fill out the login forms, making for a much more convincing page as shown below:\n\nAn error message can be used to make it look like an error in the system!\n\n2. Server serves files directly from the upload directory:\n\nIn this setup, a server such ash nginx serves files in a static manner. The served files are loaded from a \"public\" folder made accessible through Directus as it's recommended in the files API docs. Quoting: \"make a public folder and allow access to this\", except the upload folder is directly served by the server:\n\nSince the files loaded by the server are sourced directly from the file storage, the arbitrary file write might allow an attacker to upload a webshell into the folder, giving it an arbitrary file extension. As the extension checks out as a valid PHP file for instance, and the contents are correct code, an attacker can achieve unauthenticated code execution on the server.\n\n3. Poisoning hosted files\n\nThe previous examples focused on active exploitation, but it's important to mention that the vulnerability allows for arbitrary changes in files. This can be used for many different attack primitives. Let's consider the following scenario: Directus is used not only to serve contents on a company's web page, but internally as well. Onboarding documents for new entries are hosted on the instance. Manuals with links to internal services are provided through PDF files. If the file can be accessed and modified by an attacker, it would be trivial to set up a spoofed instance which receives credentials for internal services but redirects to the original, internal service right after. \n\n## Credits\n\nThe bug was discovered by Zombor Máté, a security researcher at PCA Cyber Security (https:\u002F\u002Fpcacybersecurity.com\u002F)","2025-08-20T19:08:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":46,"availabilityImpact":46,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":45},"CHANGED","3.1",9.3,"NETWORK","CRITICAL","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:N\u002FI:H\u002FA:L","HIGH","NONE","LOW",true,[49,50],"CWE-434","CWE-73",[52,53,54],"cpe:2.3:a:monospace:directus:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:directus:api:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:directus:directus:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[56,57,58],"Monospace Directus","Directus Directus","Directus Api",[60,61,62,63],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdirectus\u002Fdirectus\u002Fcommit\u002Fd84dcc36f75fc5c858d43746b8f9c426c38d696b","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdirectus\u002Fdirectus\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-mv33-9f6j-pfmc","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-55746","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdirectus\u002Fdirectus",0.82,0.014,0.72303,false,{"timestamp":69,"automatable":70,"tech_impact":71,"exploitation":72,"cisa_decision":73,"cisa_remediation_timeline":77},"2025-08-20T18:19:49.537443Z","yes","partial","none",{"vector":74,"decision":75,"priority":76},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:Y\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T01:39:31.215915\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[79,85,94,102,108,115],{"name":80,"source":81,"tactics":82,"technique_id":84},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[83],"initial-access","T1190",{"name":86,"source":87,"cwe_ids":88,"tactics":89,"capec_ids":91,"technique_id":93},"Obfuscated Files or Information","capec",[50],[90],"stealth",[92],"CAPEC-267","T1027",{"name":95,"source":87,"cwe_ids":96,"tactics":97,"capec_ids":99,"technique_id":101},"Dynamic Linker Hijacking",[50],[98,90],"execution",[100],"CAPEC-13","T1574.006",{"name":103,"source":87,"cwe_ids":104,"tactics":105,"capec_ids":106,"technique_id":107},"Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable",[50],[98,90],[100],"T1574.007",{"name":109,"source":87,"cwe_ids":110,"tactics":111,"capec_ids":112,"technique_id":114},"Services File Permissions Weakness",[49],[98,90],[113],"CAPEC-1","T1574.010",{"name":116,"source":87,"cwe_ids":117,"tactics":118,"capec_ids":120,"technique_id":121},"Prevent Command History Logging",[50],[119],"defense-impairment",[100],"T1690",[123],{"link":61},{"count":125,"next":126,"previous":6,"results":127},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[128,136,144],{"id":129,"title":130,"summary":131,"published_at":132,"type":133,"link":134,"image_url":135},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":137,"title":138,"summary":139,"published_at":140,"type":141,"link":142,"image_url":143},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":145,"title":146,"summary":147,"published_at":148,"type":149,"link":150,"image_url":151},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]