[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-58437":30,"landing-articles":100},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":52,"technologies":55,"references":57,"score":67,"epss_score":68,"epss_percentile":69,"is_kev":70,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":71,"attack_mappings":81,"exploits":98},69220,"CVE-2025-58437","EUVD-2025-27069","Coder vulnerable to privilege escalation could lead to a cross workspace compromise\n\n## Summary\n\nInsecure session handling opened room for a privilege escalation scenario in which [prebuilt workspaces](https:\u002F\u002Fcoder.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fadmin\u002Ftemplates\u002Fextending-templates\u002Fprebuilt-workspaces) could be compromised by abusing a shared system identity.\n\n## Details\n\nCoder automatically generates a session token for a user when a workspace is started. It is automatically exposed via [`coder_workspace_owner.session_token`](https:\u002F\u002Fregistry.terraform.io\u002Fproviders\u002Fcoder\u002Fcoder\u002Flatest\u002Fdocs\u002Fdata-sources\u002Fworkspace_owner#session_token-1). Prebuilt workspaces are initially owned by a built-in `prebuilds` system user. \n\nWhen a prebuilt workspace is claimed, a new session token is generated for the user that claimed the workspace, but the previous session token for the `prebuilds` user was not expired. Any Coder workspace templates that persist this automatically generated session token are potentially impacted. \n\nFor example, the [coder-login module](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcoder\u002Fregistry\u002Fblob\u002F8677e7d52b374b025c4820d09049dc6b008beee8\u002Fregistry\u002Fcoder\u002Fmodules\u002Fcoder-login\u002Frun.sh) allows template authors to automatically configure the coder CLI to be authenticated with the Coder deployment.\n\nThis causes a script to be run on workspace startup that runs the command `coder login` using the automatically generated user session token c.f. [https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcoder\u002Fregistry\u002Fblob\u002F8677e7d52b374b025c4820d09049dc6b008beee8\u002Fregistry\u002Fcoder\u002Fmodules\u002Fcoder-login\u002Fmain.tf#L23](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcoder\u002Fregistry\u002Fblob\u002F8677e7d52b374b025c4820d09049dc6b008beee8\u002Fregistry\u002Fcoder\u002Fmodules\u002Fcoder-login\u002Fmain.tf#L23)\n\nThis module was originally written before the inception of the [prebuilds](https:\u002F\u002Fcoder.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fadmin\u002Ftemplates\u002Fextending-templates\u002Fprebuilt-workspaces) feature in Coder, which essentially creates a \"pre-warmed\" pool of workspaces owned by a particular `prebuilds` system user.\n\nWhen this module is invoked on a prebuilt workspace, it causes the Coder CLI inside the workspace to persist the session token for the `prebuilds` user to disk. Because the `coder-login` module checks if the CLI is authenticated, the script exits early before updating the session token, leaving the Coder CLI authenticated as the `prebuilds`user upon claim:\n\n## Impact\n\n> Important: **Deployments that have never utilized the [prebuilds](https:\u002F\u002Fcoder.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fadmin\u002Ftemplates\u002Fextending-templates\u002Fprebuilt-workspaces) feature are not affected by this vulnerability.**\n\n\nThis vulnerability requires a previously authenticated user to claim a prebuilt workspace from a template configured to store the prebuilds user session token as described above.\n\nThe `prebuilds` user has no specific roles, so its credential has the same level of access as a regular member user, meaning a user with the `prebuilds` user's credential can move laterally to any other prebuilt workspace, or create new workspaces as the `prebuilds` user.\n\nThis means that a malicious authenticated actor can potentially execute code on other workspaces owned by the `prebuilds` user and potentially access information of other users once they claim a previously poisoned workspace.\n\n\n## Remediation\n\nFixed in https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcoder\u002Fcoder\u002Fpull\u002F19667\n\nNote that prebuilt workspaces claimed previous to the fix may have been affected by this vulnerability. It is recommended that users re-create their workspace if it was created from a prebuild.\n\nTo identify potentially affected workspaces, run the following SQL query against the Coder database:\n\n```sql\nSELECT w.id, w.name, w.owner_id, u.email\nFROM workspaces w\nLEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = w.owner_id\nWHERE w.owner_id \u003C> 'c42fdf75-3097-471c-8c33-fb52454d81c0'::uuid\n  AND NOT w.deleted\n  AND EXISTS (\n    SELECT 1\n    FROM workspace_builds AS wb\n    WHERE wb.workspace_id = w.id\n      AND wb.initiator_id = 'c42fdf75-3097-471c-8c33-fb52454d81c0'::uuid\n  );\n```\n\n> Previous manually created tokens for the prebuilds user are left as-is. You may wish to review these via `coder tokens list --all`\n\n---\n\n[Premium license](https:\u002F\u002Fcoder.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fadmin\u002Flicensing) customers can also take advantage of the [audit logs](https:\u002F\u002Fcoder.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fadmin\u002Fsecurity\u002Faudit-logs) feature to query actions performed by the `prebuilds` user.\n\nFollowing [filter](https:\u002F\u002Fcoder.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fadmin\u002Fsecurity\u002Faudit-logs#how-to-filter-audit-logs) can be used to verify if no [API keys](https:\u002F\u002Fcoder.com\u002Fdocs\u002Freference\u002Fapi\u002Fusers#create-token-api-key) were created by the `prebuilds` user\n> would indicate a potentially malicious action aimed at achieving [persistence](https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Ftactics\u002FTA0003\u002F)\n```\nusername:prebuilds resource_type:api_key\n```\n\nFollowing [filter](https:\u002F\u002Fcoder.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fadmin\u002Fsecurity\u002Faudit-logs#how-to-filter-audit-logs) can be used to list all *write* operations performed by the `prebuilds` user (including failed attempts to update various settings)\n```\nusername:prebuilds action:write\n```\n\n### Patched versions\n- [2.24.4](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcoder\u002Fcoder\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv2.24.4)\n- [2.25.2](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcoder\u002Fcoder\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv2.25.2)\n- [2.26.0](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcoder\u002Fcoder\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv2.26.0)","2025-09-05T20:19:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":42},"UNCHANGED","3.1",8.1,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:N","NONE","LOW",true,[48,49,50,51],"CWE-277","CWE-613","CWE-279","CWE-269",[53,54],"cpe:2.3:a:coder:coder:*:*:*:*:*:go:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:coder:coder:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[56],"Coder Coder",[58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcoder\u002Fcoder\u002Fcommit\u002F06cbb2890f453cd522bb2158a6549afa3419c276","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcoder\u002Fcoder\u002Fcommit\u002F20d67d7d7191a4fd5d36a61c6fc1e23ab59befc0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcoder\u002Fcoder\u002Fcommit\u002Fec660907faa0b0eae20fa2ba58ce1733f5f4b35a","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcoder\u002Fcoder\u002Fpull\u002F19667","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcoder\u002Fcoder\u002Fpull\u002F19668","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcoder\u002Fcoder\u002Fpull\u002F19669","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcoder\u002Fcoder\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-j6xf-jwrj-v5qp","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-58437","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcoder\u002Fcoder",0.76,0.00382,0.31959,false,{"timestamp":72,"automatable":73,"tech_impact":74,"exploitation":75,"cisa_decision":76,"cisa_remediation_timeline":80},"2025-09-08T16:45:07.417468Z","no","total","none",{"vector":77,"decision":78,"priority":79},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:N\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T04:48:41.982205\u002F","track_star","medium","14D",[82,88],{"name":83,"source":84,"tactics":85,"technique_id":87},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[86],"initial-access","T1190",{"name":89,"source":90,"cwe_ids":91,"tactics":92,"capec_ids":94,"technique_id":97},"Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism","capec",[51],[93],"privilege-escalation",[95,96],"CAPEC-122","CAPEC-233","T1548",[99],{"link":64},{"count":101,"next":102,"previous":6,"results":103},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[104,112,120],{"id":105,"title":106,"summary":107,"published_at":108,"type":109,"link":110,"image_url":111},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":113,"title":114,"summary":115,"published_at":116,"type":117,"link":118,"image_url":119},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":121,"title":122,"summary":123,"published_at":124,"type":125,"link":126,"image_url":127},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]