[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-59154":30,"landing-articles":81},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":50,"references":51,"score":59,"epss_score":60,"epss_percentile":61,"is_kev":62,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":63,"attack_mappings":73,"exploits":80},99866,"CVE-2025-59154","EUVD-2025-29235","Openfire has potential identity spoofing issue via unsafe CN parsing\n\n## Summary\n\nIdentity spoofing in X.509 client certificate authentication in Openfire allows internal attackers to impersonate other users via crafted certificate subject attributes, due to regex-based extraction of CN from an unescaped, provider-dependent DN string.\n\n## Analysis\n\nOpenfire’s SASL EXTERNAL mechanism for client TLS authentication contains a vulnerability in how it extracts user identities from X.509 certificates. Instead of parsing the structured ASN.1 data, the code calls `X509Certificate.getSubjectDN().getName()` and applies a regex to look for `CN=`. This method produces a provider-dependent string that does not escape special characters. In SunJSSE (`sun.security.x509.X500Name`), for example, commas and equals signs inside attribute values are not escaped.\n\nAs a result, a malicious certificate can embed `CN=` inside another attribute value (e.g. `OU=\"CN=admin,\"`). The regex will incorrectly interpret this as a legitimate Common Name and extract admin. If SASL EXTERNAL is enabled and configured to map CNs to user accounts, this allows the attacker to impersonate another user.\n\n## Impact\n\nWhen there is no explicit configuration override, Openfire defaults to using certificate attributes as follows:\n\n- Server-to-server certificates: first the Subject Alternative Name (SAN), and if that is not available, the Common Name (CN).\n- Client-to-server certificates: only the Common Name (CN).\n\nUse of CN for identity mapping was phased out by the CA\u002FBrowser Forum. CAB Forum-compliant CAs no longer allow arbitrary Subject RDNs and always include SANs. As a result, certificates issued by public CAs for use on the open Internet are unlikely to be exploitable, though older certificates still within their validity period could theoretically be abused.\n\nThe primary risks exist in private CA environments and client certificate authentication, where identity mapping may rely solely on the CN. Both of these are niche deployment scenarios.\n\n## Patches\n\nThe path has been prepared by replacing the use of `getSubjectDN().getName()` with standards-compliant `LdapName` parsing of the RFC2253 representation of `X500Principal`. This avoids unescaped provider-dependent strings and prevents regex from matching malicious substrings.  \n\nThe fix is included in Openfire 5.0.2 and 5.1.0. Users should upgrade to this version as soon as it becomes available.  \n\nStarting in Openfire 5.0.2, Openfire will by default prefer a Subject Alternative Name-based identity over a Common Name based one for client-to-server authentication (issue OF-3123). For server-to-server authentication, this already is the case.\n\nIn Openfire 5.1.0, Openfire will no longer, by default, use Common Name based identities, although this functionality can be restored through configuration changes (issue OF-3122).\n \n## Workarounds\n\nThe vulnerability is fixed in the upcoming release, but there are operational mitigations you can apply today.\n\n### Full workaround (drop-in replacement JAR using the fixed mapper)\n _This is a complete workaround:_\n1. Take the fixed mapper implementation (the code that uses LdapName \u002F RFC2253 parsing) from the patched Openfire source.\n2. Create a new Java class in your proprietary namespace (for example `com.acme.openfire.SafeCNCertificateIdentityMapping`) that implements the same Openfire certificate-identity mapping interface and contains the fixed parsing logic. Ensure the logic exactly mirrors the patched behavior (use `X500Principal.getName()` with RFC2253 and `javax.naming.ldap.LdapName` to parse RDNs, do not rely on `getSubjectDN().getName()` or provider-dependent strings).\n3. Package the class into a JAR file.\n4. Place the JAR into Openfire’s lib\u002F directory (e.g. `$OPENFIRE_HOME\u002Flib\u002Fyour-fixed-mapper.jar`).\n5. Configure Openfire to use your class for mapping by setting the following properties (in the admin console \u002F system properties). Note that it remains advisable to configure Openfire to keep preferring SAN-based identities:\n```\n# For server-to-server identity mapping\nprovider.serverCertIdentityMap.classList=org.jivesoftware.util.cert.SANCertificateIdentityMapping,com.acme.openfire.SafeCNCertificateIdentityMapping\n\n# For client-to-server identity mapping\nprovider.clientCertIdentityMap.classList=org.jivesoftware.util.cert.SANCertificateIdentityMapping,com.acme.openfire.SafeCNCertificateIdentityMapping\n```\nBoth properties accept a comma-separated list of fully-qualified class names; listing only your safe mapper forces Openfire to use your implementation instead of the vulnerable built-in mapper. After placing the JAR and updating properties, *restart Openfire*.\n\n**Notes & caveats for the full workaround**\n\n- This is effectively a complete mitigation for the vulnerable CN-extraction behavior without deploying a new official release.\n- Maintain the JAR: you are responsible for keeping the custom class updated if you upgrade Openfire to newer major versions.\n- Ensure your custom mapper truly implements the patched parsing (do not copy the vulnerable `getSubjectDN().getName()` + regex approach). Use `X500Principal` → `getName(RFC2253)` → `new LdapName(...)` → iterate RDNs in a robust way.\n- Because this runs in the Openfire JVM, follow your organization’s binary-signing and review policies before deploying.\n\n### Other, lesser workarounds\n\n#### Use SAN-only mapping\nConfigure the mapper list to only include Openfire’s SAN mapper: `org.jivesoftware.util.cert.SANCertificateIdentityMapping`. This prevents CN parsing-based spoofing but breaks authentication for certificates that contain only a CN and no SAN.\n\n#### Disable certificate-based authentication:\n- For server-to-server, disabling certificate auth leaves only Server Dialback, which is less secure; depending on your environment, this may be a worse trade-off.\n- For client-to-server, disable “mutual authentication” in the admin console to stop client cert authentication altogether.\n\n## References\n\n- Openfire issue tracker: [OF-3124: Potential identity spoofing via unsafe CN parsing](https:\u002F\u002Figniterealtime.atlassian.net\u002Fbrowse\u002FOF-3124)\n- Affected code: [CNCertificateIdentityMapping.java#L43](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Figniterealtime\u002FOpenfire\u002Fblob\u002F8d073dda36905da0fdee7cb623c025a01a5cbf6b\u002Fxmppserver\u002Fsrc\u002Fmain\u002Fjava\u002Forg\u002Fjivesoftware\u002Futil\u002Fcert\u002FCNCertificateIdentityMapping.java#L43)  \n- Openfire issue tracker: [OF-3122: Stop by default using Common Name based identities](https:\u002F\u002Figniterealtime.atlassian.net\u002Fbrowse\u002FOF-3122)\n- Openfire issue tracker: [OF-3123: For client mutual authentication, prefer Subject Alternative Name for identities](https:\u002F\u002Figniterealtime.atlassian.net\u002Fbrowse\u002FOF-3123)","2025-09-16T01:54:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":44,"availabilityImpact":45,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",5.9,"NETWORK","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:H\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:N","HIGH","NONE",true,[48],"CWE-290",[],[],[52,53,54,55,56,57,58],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Figniterealtime\u002FOpenfire\u002Fblob\u002F8d073dda36905da0fdee7cb623c025a01a5cbf6b\u002Fxmppserver\u002Fsrc\u002Fmain\u002Fjava\u002Forg\u002Fjivesoftware\u002Futil\u002Fcert\u002FCNCertificateIdentityMapping.java#L43","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Figniterealtime\u002FOpenfire\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-w252-645g-87mp","https:\u002F\u002Figniterealtime.atlassian.net\u002Fbrowse\u002FOF-3122","https:\u002F\u002Figniterealtime.atlassian.net\u002Fbrowse\u002FOF-3123","https:\u002F\u002Figniterealtime.atlassian.net\u002Fbrowse\u002FOF-3124","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-59154","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Figniterealtime\u002FOpenfire",0.5,0.00234,0.14167,false,{"timestamp":64,"automatable":65,"tech_impact":66,"exploitation":67,"cisa_decision":68,"cisa_remediation_timeline":72},"2025-09-15T20:11:37.246059Z","no","partial","none",{"vector":69,"decision":70,"priority":71},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T07:13:18.598712\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[74],{"name":75,"source":76,"tactics":77,"technique_id":79},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[78],"initial-access","T1190",[],{"count":82,"next":83,"previous":6,"results":84},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[85,93,101],{"id":86,"title":87,"summary":88,"published_at":89,"type":90,"link":91,"image_url":92},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":94,"title":95,"summary":96,"published_at":97,"type":98,"link":99,"image_url":100},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":102,"title":103,"summary":104,"published_at":105,"type":106,"link":107,"image_url":108},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]