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CVE-2025-59426

ExploitedNVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2025-31072 · Published Sep 24, 2025

lobe-chat has an Open Redirect

Description

Vulnerability Overview

The project's OIDC redirect handling logic constructs the host and protocol of the final redirect URL based on the X-Forwarded-Host or Host headers and the X-Forwarded-Proto value. In deployments where a reverse proxy forwards client-supplied X-Forwarded-* headers to the origin as-is, or where the origin trusts them without validation, an attacker can inject an arbitrary host and trigger an open redirect that sends users to a malicious domain.

Vulnerable Code Analysis

const internalRedirectUrlString = await oidcService.getInteractionResult(uid, result);
log('OIDC Provider internal redirect URL string: %s', internalRedirectUrlString);

let finalRedirectUrl;
try {
  finalRedirectUrl = correctOIDCUrl(request, new URL(internalRedirectUrlString));
} catch {
  finalRedirectUrl = new URL(internalRedirectUrlString);
  log('Warning: Could not parse redirect URL, using as-is: %s', internalRedirectUrlString);
}

return NextResponse.redirect(finalRedirectUrl, {
  headers: request.headers,
  status: 303,
});

https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/blob/aa841a3879c30142720485182ad62aa0dbd74edc/src/app/(backend)/oidc/consent/route.ts#L113-L127

PoC

curl Example

curl -i 'http://localhost:3210/oidc/callback/desktop?code=abc&state=test123' \
  -H 'X-Forwarded-Host: google.com' \
  -H 'X-Forwarded-Proto: https'

<img width="1504" height="304" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b71d937d-7be2-49db-8f3d-e07371912800" />

Impact

  • It can force users to redirect to untrusted external domains, leading to subsequent attacks such as phishing, credential harvesting, and session fixation.
  • It can disrupt the OAuth/OIDC flow user experience by redirecting users to malicious domains disguised as legitimate pages (even though this path doesn't directly include tokens, it can be exploited for social engineering attacks through redirect chains).
  • The impact can be amplified when redirect chains are combined with other vulnerabilities such as CSP bypass or cache poisoning.

Technologies

Lobehub Lobe ChatLobehub Chat

Weaknesses

CWE-601

CVSS scores

  • v3.14.3CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Initial Access

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticalyesterday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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