[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-62594":30,"landing-articles":119},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":52,"technologies":78,"references":92,"score":97,"epss_score":98,"epss_percentile":99,"is_kev":47,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":100,"attack_mappings":110,"exploits":117},86299,"CVE-2025-62594","EUVD-2025-36365","ImageMagick CLAHE : Unsigned underflow and division-by-zero lead to OOB pointer arithmetic and process crash (DoS)\n\n## Summary\n\nA single root cause in the CLAHE implementation — tile width\u002Fheight becoming zero — produces two distinct but related unsafe behaviors.\nVulnerabilities exists in the `CLAHEImage()` function of ImageMagick’s `MagickCore\u002Fenhance.c`.\n\n1. Unsigned integer underflow → out-of-bounds pointer arithmetic (OOB): when `tile_info.height == 0`, the expression `tile_info.height - 1` (unsigned) wraps to a very large value; using that value in pointer arithmetic yields a huge offset and OOB memory access (leading to memory corruption, SIGSEGV, or resource exhaustion).\n2. **Division\u002Fmodulus by zero**: where code performs `... \u002F tile_info.width` or `... % tile_info.height` without re-checking for zero, causing immediate division-by-zero crashes under sanitizers or `abort` at runtime.\n\nBoth behaviors are triggered by the same invalid tile condition (e.g., CLI exact `-clahe 0x0!` or automatic tile derivation `dim >> 3 == 0` for very small images). \n\n---\n\n## Details\n\n### **Unsigned underflow(can lea to OOB)**\n\n- Location: `MagickCore\u002Fenhance.c`, around line 609\n- Version tested: 7.1.2-8 (local ASan(undefined). \u002FUBSan build)\n- Vulnerable code\n    \n    enhance.c: 609\n    \n    ```c\n    p += (ptrdiff_t) clahe_info->width * (tile.height - 1);\n    ```\n    \n- Root Cause\n    - If `tile.height == 0`, then `(tile.height - 1)` underflows to `UINT_MAX`.\n    - Multiplication with `clahe_info->width` yields a huge value close to `SIZE_MAX`.\n    - Adding this to `p` causes pointer arithmetic underflow.\n\n### **Division-by-zero**\n\n- File \u002F Location: `MagickCore\u002Fenhance.c`, around line 669\n- Version tested: 7.1.2-8 (local ASan(undefined). \u002FUBSan build)\n- vulnerable code\n    \n    enhance.c: 669-673\n    \n    ```c\n     if ((image->columns % tile_info.width) != 0)\n        tile_info.x=(ssize_t) (tile_info.width-(image->columns % tile_info.width));\n      tile_info.y=0;\n      if ((image->rows % tile_info.height) != 0)\n        tile_info.y=(ssize_t) (tile_info.height-(image->rows % tile_info.height));\n    ```\n    \n- Root cause\n    \n    Missing input validation \u002F bounds checks after computing default tile dimensions:\n    \n    If either `tile_info.width` or `tile_info.height` is 0, this triggers a division by zero. Zeros can reach this point through:\n    \n    1. Exact tiles: CLI `clahe 0x0!` (the `!` forces zero to be used verbatim).\n    2. Auto tiles on tiny images: When a requested tile is `0` (no `!`), the code derives a default from the image size (e.g., `dim >> 3`). For images with `dim \u003C 8`, this result is 0 unless clamped.\n\n---\n\n## Reproduction\n\n### **Unsigned underflow**\n\n**Environment**\n\nBuilt with AddressSanitizer and UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer enabled.\n\n```c\nexport UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1\nexport ASAN_OPTIONS=abort_on_error=1:allocator_may_return_null=1:detect_leaks=0\n```\n\n**Command**\n\n```bash\n.\u002Fmagick xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:\n```\n\n**Output**\n\n```\nMagickCore\u002Fenhance.c:609:6: runtime error: addition of unsigned offset overflowed\nSUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior MagickCore\u002Fenhance.c:609:6 in CLAHEImage\n```\n\n`.\u002Fmagick -size 10x10 xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:`\n\n\u003Cimg width=\"1068\" height=\"64\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002Fcd9637ee-1d03-4066-834d-fda22410dd8b\" \u002F>\n\nmemory region corruption.\n\n`.\u002Fmagick -size 2000x2000 xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:`\n\n\u003Cimg width=\"1069\" height=\"70\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002Fecbab79c-a3c2-4e8c-96c9-8e2aa8f0d2b2\" \u002F>\n\n→ Significant memory consumption and evidence of memory region corruption.\n\n`.\u002Fmagick -size 4000x4000 xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:`\n\n\u003Cimg width=\"776\" height=\"49\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002F63a7cec5-616b-4aa5-87f3-a546a87e6625\" \u002F>\n\n→ Much larger memory usage; process appears to be aggressively consuming cache and address space.\n\n`.\u002Fmagick -size 8000x8000 xc:black -clahe 0x0 null:`\n\n\u003Cimg width=\"748\" height=\"46\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002F48b3aac8-98b3-4fbb-a5ca-4e7936bca44b\" \u002F>\n\n→ Memory usage escalates further and begins exhausting available cache. If left running, the process is likely to crash (DoS) after sustained allocation attempts.\n\n### **Division-by-zero**\n\n**Environment:** ASan\u002FUBSan-enabled build.\n\n```c\nexport UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1\nexport ASAN_OPTIONS=abort_on_error=1:allocator_may_return_null=1:detect_leaks=0\n```\n\n**Command**\n\n```bash\n.\u002Fmagick -size 16x2 gradient: -type TrueColor -depth 8 -clahe 0x0! null:\n```\n\n**Output**\n\n\u003Cimg width=\"1915\" height=\"818\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002Fcfe44432-b429-49e4-8673-2ed55ba9a961\" \u002F>\n\n**Notes:** Without sanitizers, the process may terminate with just `Aborted` (still DoS).\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\n- Primary: Denial-of-Service — crash or sustained resource exhaustion (memory\u002Fcache thrash) when processing crafted parameters or small images via CLI or API. Attackers can trivially trigger via `clahe 0x0!` or by uploading very small images to services using ImageMagick.\n- Secondary (theoretical): OOB memory accesses and memory corruption could potentially be combined with other vulnerabilities to achieve more severe outcomes; however, no reliable code execution was demonstrated from these PoCs alone.\n\n---\n\n## Suggested concrete patch snippets\n\nApply in `CLAHEImage()` after `tile_info` is computed but **before** any division\u002Fmodulus\u002Fpointer arithmetic:\n\n```c\nif (exact_tiles_requested && (tile_info.width == 0 || tile_info.height == 0)) {\n  ThrowMagickException(exception, GetMagickModule(), OptionError,\n                       \"CLAHEInvalidTile\", \"%lux%lu\",\n                       (unsigned long) tile_info.width,\n                       (unsigned long) tile_info.height);\n  return (Image *) NULL;\n}\n\nif (!exact_tiles_requested) {\n  tile_info.width  = (tile_info.width  == 0) ? MagickMax((size_t)1, image->columns >> 3) : tile_info.width;\n  tile_info.height = (tile_info.height == 0) ? MagickMax((size_t)1, image->rows    >> 3) : tile_info.height;\n}\n\nif (tile_info.width == 0 || tile_info.height == 0) {\n  ThrowMagickException(exception, GetMagickModule(), OptionError,\n                       \"CLAHEInvalidTile\", \"%lux%lu\",\n                       (unsigned long) tile_info.width,\n                       (unsigned long) tile_info.height);\n  return (Image *) NULL;\n}\n\nssize_t tile_h_minus1 = (ssize_t)tile_info.height - 1;\nif (tile_h_minus1 \u003C 0) {\n  ThrowMagickException(exception, GetMagickModule(), OptionError,\n                       \"CLAHEInvalidTile\", \"%lux%lu\",\n                       (unsigned long) tile_info.width,\n                       (unsigned long) tile_info.height);\n  return (Image *) NULL;\n}\np += (ptrdiff_t) clahe_info->width * tile_h_minus1;\n```\n\nNotes about `exact_tiles_requested`: if the CLI\u002FWand parser already exposes whether `!` was present, use it. If not, add a parse-time flag so CLAHEImage can know whether `0` is literal or auto.\n\n---\n\n## Credit\n\n### Team Whys \n\n**Bug Hunting Master Program, HSpace\u002FFindthegap**\n\n**Youngmin Kim** \nkunshim@naver.com\n\n**Woojin Park**\n\n[@jin-156](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjin-156)\n[1203kids@gmail.com](mailto:1203kids@gmail.com)\n\n**Youngin Won**\n\n[@amethyst0225](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Famethyst0225)\n[youngin04@korea.ac.kr](mailto:youngin04@korea.ac.kr)\n\n**Siyeon Han**\n\n[@hanbunny](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhanbunny)\n[kokosyeon@gmail.com](mailto:kokosyeon@gmail.com)\n\n**Shinyoung Won**\n\n[@yosiimich](yosimich123@gmail.com)\n[yosimich123@gmail.com](mailto:yosimich123@gmail.com)","2025-10-27T23:33:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":46,"availabilityImpact":46,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",4.7,"LOCAL","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:R\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H","NONE","REQUIRED","HIGH",false,[49,50,51],"CWE-191","CWE-119","CWE-369",[53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77],"cpe:2.3:a:imagemagick:imagemagick:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-openmp-x64:magick.net-q16-hdri-openmp-x64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-x64:magick.net-q16-hdri-x64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-openmp-arm64:magick.net-q16-hdri-openmp-arm64:14.9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-openmp-x64:magick.net-q16-openmp-x64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-openmp-x64:magick.net-q16-hdri-openmp-x64:14.9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-arm64:magick.net-q16-hdri-arm64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-x64:magick.net-q16-hdri-x64:14.9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-openmp-arm64:magick.net-q16-hdri-openmp-arm64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-x64:magick.net-q8-x64:14.9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-x64:magick.net-q16-x64:14.9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-arm64:magick.net-q16-arm64:14.9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-openmp-x64:magick.net-q8-openmp-x64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-x64:magick.net-q16-x64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-x64:magick.net-q8-x64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-openmp-arm64:magick.net-q16-openmp-arm64:14.9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-openmp-arm64:magick.net-q8-openmp-arm64:14.9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-arm64:magick.net-q16-arm64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-openmp-arm64:magick.net-q8-openmp-arm64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-hdri-arm64:magick.net-q16-hdri-arm64:14.9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-arm64:magick.net-q8-arm64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-openmp-x64:magick.net-q8-openmp-x64:14.9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-openmp-x64:magick.net-q16-openmp-x64:14.9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q16-openmp-arm64:magick.net-q16-openmp-arm64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:magick.net-q8-arm64:magick.net-q8-arm64:14.9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91],"Imagemagick Imagemagick","Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-X64 Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-X64","Magick.Net-Q16-Openmp-Arm64 Magick.Net-Q16-Openmp-Arm64","Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Openmp-Arm64 Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Openmp-Arm64","Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Arm64 Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Arm64","Magick.Net-Q8-X64 Magick.Net-Q8-X64","Magick.Net-Q8-Openmp-X64 Magick.Net-Q8-Openmp-X64","Magick.Net-Q16-Openmp-X64 Magick.Net-Q16-Openmp-X64","Magick.Net-Q16-Arm64 Magick.Net-Q16-Arm64","Magick.Net-Q8-Openmp-Arm64 Magick.Net-Q8-Openmp-Arm64","Magick.Net-Q8-Arm64 Magick.Net-Q8-Arm64","Magick.Net-Q16-X64 Magick.Net-Q16-X64","Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Openmp-X64 Magick.Net-Q16-Hdri-Openmp-X64",[93,94,95,96],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FImageMagick\u002FImageMagick\u002Fcommit\u002F7b47fe369eda90483402fcd3d78fa4167d3bb129","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FImageMagick\u002FImageMagick\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-wpp4-vqfq-v4hp","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-62594","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FImageMagick\u002FImageMagick",0.39,0.00369,0.30506,{"timestamp":101,"automatable":102,"tech_impact":103,"exploitation":104,"cisa_decision":105,"cisa_remediation_timeline":109},"2025-10-27T20:23:10.571151Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":106,"decision":107,"priority":108},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T06:12:46.169191\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[111],{"name":112,"source":113,"tactics":114,"technique_id":116},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[115],"privilege-escalation","T1068",[118],{"link":94},{"count":120,"next":121,"previous":6,"results":122},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[123,131,139],{"id":124,"title":125,"summary":126,"published_at":127,"type":128,"link":129,"image_url":130},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":132,"title":133,"summary":134,"published_at":135,"type":136,"link":137,"image_url":138},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":140,"title":141,"summary":142,"published_at":143,"type":144,"link":145,"image_url":146},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]