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CVE-2025-62703

ExploitedNVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2025-199646 · Published Nov 25, 2025

Fugue is Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution by Pickle Deserialization via FlaskRPCServer

Summary

The Fugue framework implements an RPC server system for distributed computing operations. In the core functionality of the RPC server implementation, I found that the _decode() function in fugue/rpc/flask.py directly uses cloudpickle.loads() to deserialize data without any sanitization. This creates a remote code execution vulnerability when malicious pickle data is processed by the RPC server.The vulnerability exists in the RPC communication mechanism where the client can send arbitrary serialized Python objects that will be deserialized on the server side, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code on the victim's machine.

Details

_decode() function in fugue/rpc/flask.py directly uses cloudpickle.loads() to deserialize data without any sanitization.

PoC
  • Step1:
    The victim user starts an RPC server binding to open network using the Fugue framework. Here, I use the official RPC server code to initialize the server.

  • Step2:
    The attacker modifies the _encode() function in fugue/rpc/flask.py to inject malicious pickle data:

<img width="740" height="260" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6064516b-e1a6-45fa-a91c-8e276bc4a106" />

In this example, attacker modifies _encode to let the victim execute command “ls -l”

  • Step 3:
    The attacker then uses the RPC client to send the malicious request

Fugue gives a demo video and the PoC in the attachment, along with modified flask.py. When users reproduce this issue, in the server side (as an victim), users can run python rpc_server.py. In the client side (as an attacker), users can first replace fugue/rpc/flask.py in pip site-packages with provided flask.py in the attachment and then run rpc_client.py.

Impact

Remote code execution in the victim's machine. Once the victim starts the RPCServer with network binding (especially 0.0.0.0), an attacker on the network can gain arbitrary code execution by connecting to the RPCServer and sending crafted pickle payloads. This vulnerability allows for:

  • Complete system compromise
  • Data exfiltration
  • Lateral movement within the network
  • Denial of service attacks
  • Installation of persistent backdoors
Mitigation
  1. Replace unsafe deserialization: Replace pickle.loads() with safer alternatives such as:

    • JSON serialization for simple data structures
    • Protocol Buffers or MessagePack for complex data
    • If pickle must be used, implement a custom Unpickler with a restricted find_class() method that only allows whitelisted classes
  2. Network security:

    • If the service is intended for internal use only, bind to localhost (127.0.0.1) instead of 0.0.0.0
    • Implement authentication and authorization mechanisms
  3. Security warnings: When starting the service on public interfaces, display clear security warnings to inform users about the risks.

Attachment: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1y8bBBp7dnWoT_WHBtdB0Fts4NRUIfdWi/view?usp=sharing

Technologies

Fugue-Project FugueFugue Fugue

Weaknesses

CWE-502CWE-78

CVSS scores

  • v3.18.8CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticalyesterday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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