[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-64525":30,"landing-articles":86},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":52,"references":54,"score":61,"epss_score":62,"epss_percentile":63,"is_kev":64,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":65,"attack_mappings":75,"exploits":82},87547,"CVE-2025-64525","EUVD-2025-175298","Astro vulnerable to URL manipulation via headers, leading to middleware and CVE-2025-61925 bypass\n\n## Summary\n\nIn impacted versions of Astro using [on-demand rendering](https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.astro.build\u002Fen\u002Fguides\u002Fon-demand-rendering\u002F), request headers `x-forwarded-proto` and `x-forwarded-port` are insecurely used, without sanitization, to build the URL. This has several consequences the most important of which are:\n\n- Middleware-based protected route bypass (only via `x-forwarded-proto`)\n- DoS via cache poisoning (if a CDN is present)\n- SSRF (only via `x-forwarded-proto`)\n- URL pollution (potential SXSS, if a CDN is present) \n- WAF bypass\n\n## Details\n\nThe `x-forwarded-proto` and `x-forwarded-port` headers are used without sanitization in two parts of the Astro server code. The most important is in the `createRequest()` function. Any configuration, including the default one, is affected: \n\n[https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fwithastro\u002Fastro\u002Fblob\u002F970ac0f51172e1e6bff4440516a851e725ac3097\u002Fpackages\u002Fastro\u002Fsrc\u002Fcore\u002Fapp\u002Fnode.ts#L97](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fwithastro\u002Fastro\u002Fblob\u002F970ac0f51172e1e6bff4440516a851e725ac3097\u002Fpackages\u002Fastro\u002Fsrc\u002Fcore\u002Fapp\u002Fnode.ts#L97)\n[https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fwithastro\u002Fastro\u002Fblob\u002F970ac0f51172e1e6bff4440516a851e725ac3097\u002Fpackages\u002Fastro\u002Fsrc\u002Fcore\u002Fapp\u002Fnode.ts#L121](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fwithastro\u002Fastro\u002Fblob\u002F970ac0f51172e1e6bff4440516a851e725ac3097\u002Fpackages\u002Fastro\u002Fsrc\u002Fcore\u002Fapp\u002Fnode.ts#L121)\n\nThese header values are then used directly to construct URLs.\n\nBy injecting a payload at the protocol level during URL creation (via the `x-forwarded-proto` header), the entire URL can be rewritten, including the host, port and path, and then pass the rest of the URL, the real hostname and path, as a query so that it doesn't affect (re)routing.\n\nIf the following header value is injected when requesting the path `\u002Fssr`:\n\n```\nx-forwarded-proto: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.malicious-url.com\u002F?tank=\n```\n\nThe complete URL that will be created is: `https:\u002F\u002Fwww.malicious-url.com\u002F?tank=:\u002F\u002Flocalhost\u002Fssr`\n\nAs a reminder, URLs are created like this:\n\n```\nurl = new URL(`${protocol}:\u002F\u002F${hostnamePort}${req.url}`);\n```\n\nThe value is injected at the beginning of the string (`${protocol}`), and ends with a query `?tank=` whose value is the rest of the string, `:\u002F\u002F${hostnamePort}${req.url}`.\n\nThis way there is control over the routing without affecting the path, and the URL can be manipulated arbitrarily. This behavior can be exploited in various ways, as will be seen in the PoC section.\n\nThe same logic applies to `x-forwarded-port`, with a few differences.\n\n> [!NOTE]\n> The `createRequest` function is called every time a non-static page is requested. Therefore, all non-static pages are exploitable for reproducing the attack.\n\n## PoC\n\nThe PoC will be tested with a minimal repository:\n\n- Latest Astro version at the time (`2.16.0`)\n- The Node adapter\n- Two simple pages, one SSR (`\u002Fssr`), the other simulating an admin page (`\u002Fadmin`) protected by a middleware\n- A middleware example copied and pasted from the official Astro documentation to protect the admin page based on the path\n\n[Download the PoC repository](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fzhero-web-sec\u002Fastro-app)\n\n### Middleware-based protected route bypass - x-forwarded-proto only\n\nThe middleware has been configured to protect the `\u002Fadmin` route based on [the official documentation](https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.astro.build\u002Fen\u002Fguides\u002Fauthentication\u002F):\n\n```ts\n\u002F\u002F src\u002Fmiddleware.ts\nimport { defineMiddleware } from \"astro\u002Fmiddleware\";\n\nexport const onRequest = defineMiddleware(async (context, next) => {\n  const isAuthed = false; \u002F\u002F auth logic\n  if (context.url.pathname === \"\u002Fadmin\" && !isAuthed) {\n    return context.redirect(\"\u002F\");\n  }\n  return next();\n});\n```\n\n1. When tryint to access `\u002Fadmin` the attacker is naturally redirected :\n   ```sh\n   curl -i http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:4321\u002Fadmin\n   ```\n   \u003Cimg width=\"620\" height=\"102\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002F15a7bffc-ee56-4ed9-84b2-091cf4d78351\" \u002F>\n\n2. The attackr can bypass the middleware path check using a malicious header value:\n   ```sh\n   curl -i -H \"x-forwarded-proto: x:admin?\" http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:4321\u002Fadmin\n   ```\n   \u003Cimg width=\"1348\" height=\"159\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002Fd9d9ac1a-5efa-452b-981e-efea8a08d089\" \u002F>\n\n#### How ​​is this possible?\n\nHere, with the payload `x:admin?`, the attacker can use the URL API parser to their advantage:\n\n- `x:` is considered the protocol\n- Since there is no `\u002F\u002F`, the parser considers there to be no authority, and everything before the `?` character is therefore considered part of the path: `admin`\n\nDuring a path-based middleware check, the *path* value begins with a `\u002F`: `context.url.pathname === \"\u002Fadmin\"`. However, this is not the case with this payload; `context.url.pathname === \"admin\"`, the absence of a slash satisfies both the middleware check and the router and consequently allows us to bypass the protection and access the page.\n\n### SSRF\n\nAs seen, the request URL is built from untrusted input via the `x-forwarded-protocol` header, if it turns out that this URL is subsequently used to perform external network calls, for an API for example, this allows an attacker to supply a malicious URL that the server will fetch, resulting in server-side request forgery (SSRF).\n\nExample of code reusing the \"origin\" URL, concatenating it to the API endpoint :\n\n\u003Cimg width=\"601\" height=\"418\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002F9c374b2c-841c-48d6-98f1-3b3f5b060802\" \u002F>\n\n### DoS via cache poisoning\n\nIf a CDN is present, it is possible to force the caching of bad pages\u002Fresources, or 404 pages on the application routes, rendering the application unusable.\n\nA `404` cab be forced, causing an error on the `\u002Fssr` page like this : `curl -i -H \"x-forwarded-proto: https:\u002F\u002Flocalhost\u002Fvulnerable?\" http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:4321\u002Fssr`\n\u003Cimg width=\"998\" height=\"108\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002F4bab58e5-3045-4e25-9aa2-2f72a0832d86\" \u002F>\n\nSame logic applies to `x-forwarded-port` : `curl -i -H \"x-forwarded-port: \u002Fvulnerable?\" http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:4321\u002Fssr`\n\n#### How ​​is this possible?\n\nThe router sees the request for the path `\u002Fvulnerable`, which does not exist, and therefore returns a `404`, while the potential CDN sees `\u002Fssr` and can then cache the `404` response, consequently serving it to all users requesting the path `\u002Fssr`.\n\n### URL pollution\n\nThe exploitability of the following is also contingent on the presence of a CDN, and is therefore cache poisoning.\n\nIf the value of `request.url` is used to create links within the page, this can lead to Stored XSS with `x-forwarded-proto` and the following value:\n\n```\nx-forwarded-proto: javascript:alert(document.cookie)\u002F\u002F\n```\n\nresults in the following URL object:\n\n\u003Cimg width=\"444\" height=\"202\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002Fc2990626-da5b-4868-9093-dbb9b34780ba\" \u002F>\n\nIt is also possible to inject any link, always, if the value of `request.url` is used on the server side to create links.\n\n```\nx-forwarded-proto: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.malicious-site.com\u002Fbad?\n```\n\n**The attacker is more limited with `x-forwarded-port`**\n\nIf the value of `request.url` is used to create links within the page, this can lead to broken links, with the header and the following value:\n\n```\nX-Forwarded-Port: \u002Fnope?\n```\n\nExample of an Astro website: \n\u003Cimg width=\"1627\" height=\"298\" alt=\"Capture d’écran 2025-11-03 à 22 07 14\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002F02de5e67-f48d-4bf4-810d-6b0714ad2c12\" \u002F>\n\n### WAF bypass\n\nFor this section, Astro invites users to read previous research on the React-Router\u002FRemix framework, in the section \"Exploitation - WAF bypass and escalations\". This research deals with a similar case, the difference being that the vulnerable header was `x-forwarded-host` in their case:\n\n[https:\u002F\u002Fzhero-web-sec.github.io\u002Fresearch-and-things\u002Freact-router-and-the-remixed-path](https:\u002F\u002Fzhero-web-sec.github.io\u002Fresearch-and-things\u002Freact-router-and-the-remixed-path)\n\nNote: A section addressing DoS attacks via cache poisoning using the same vector was also included there.\n\n### CVE-2025-61925 complete bypass\n\nIt is possible to completely bypass the vulnerability patch related to the `X-Forwarded-Host` header.\n\nBy sending `x-forwarded-host` with an empty value, the `forwardedHostname` variable is assigned an empty string. Then, during [the subsequent check](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fwithastro\u002Fastro\u002Fblob\u002F7a5f28006e9b1f6ad77c7884991ba551ca9ff35b\u002Fpackages\u002Fastro\u002Fsrc\u002Fcore\u002Fapp\u002Fnode.ts#L107), the condition fails because `forwardedHostname ` returns `false`, its value being an empty string:\n\n```\nif (forwardedHostname && !App.validateForwardedHost(...))\n\n```\n\nConsequently, the implemented check is bypassed. From this point on, since the request has no `host` (*its value being an empty string*), the path value is retrieved by the URL parser to set it as the `host`. This is because the `http\u002Fhttps` schemes are considered special schemes by the [WHATWG URL Standard Specification](https:\u002F\u002Furl.spec.whatwg.org\u002F#scheme-state), requiring an `authority state`.\n\nFrom there, the following request on the example SSR application (astro repo) yields an SSRF:\n\u003Cimg width=\"1878\" height=\"456\" alt=\"Capture d’écran 2025-11-06 à 21 18 26\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002Fc5cca89c-9c65-46f6-bf70-cd7a90a9e0d9\" \u002F>\n*empty `x-forwarded-host` + the target `host` in the path*\n\n## Credits\n\n- Allam Rachid ([zhero;](https:\u002F\u002Fzhero-web-sec.github.io\u002Fresearch-and-things\u002F))\n- Allam Yasser (inzo)","2025-11-13T22:46:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":44,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":45},"UNCHANGED","3.1",6.5,"NETWORK","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:L\u002FA:L","LOW","NONE",true,[48],"CWE-918",[50,51],"cpe:2.3:a:astro:astro:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:astro:astro:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[53],"Astro Astro",[55,56,57,58,59,60],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fwithastro\u002Fastro\u002Fblob\u002F970ac0f51172e1e6bff4440516a851e725ac3097\u002Fpackages\u002Fastro\u002Fsrc\u002Fcore\u002Fapp\u002Fnode.ts#L121","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fwithastro\u002Fastro\u002Fblob\u002F970ac0f51172e1e6bff4440516a851e725ac3097\u002Fpackages\u002Fastro\u002Fsrc\u002Fcore\u002Fapp\u002Fnode.ts#L97","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fwithastro\u002Fastro\u002Fcommit\u002Fdafbb1ba29912099c4faff1440033edc768af8b4","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fwithastro\u002Fastro\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-hr2q-hp5q-x767","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-64525","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fwithastro\u002Fastro",0.68,0.01245,0.69096,false,{"timestamp":66,"automatable":67,"tech_impact":68,"exploitation":69,"cisa_decision":70,"cisa_remediation_timeline":74},"2025-11-13T16:15:07.067807Z","yes","partial","poc",{"vector":71,"decision":72,"priority":73},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:Y\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T07:43:37.674546\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[76],{"name":77,"source":78,"tactics":79,"technique_id":81},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[80],"initial-access","T1190",[83,84],{"link":58},{"link":85},"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fprojectdiscovery\u002Fnuclei-templates\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fhttp\u002Fcves\u002F2025\u002FCVE-2025-64525.yaml",{"count":87,"next":88,"previous":6,"results":89},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[90,98,106],{"id":91,"title":92,"summary":93,"published_at":94,"type":95,"link":96,"image_url":97},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":99,"title":100,"summary":101,"published_at":102,"type":103,"link":104,"image_url":105},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":107,"title":108,"summary":109,"published_at":110,"type":111,"link":112,"image_url":113},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]