[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-64711":30,"landing-articles":80},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":51,"references":53,"score":58,"epss_score":59,"epss_percentile":60,"is_kev":46,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":61,"attack_mappings":71,"exploits":78},75063,"CVE-2025-64711","EUVD-2025-150355","PrivateBin vulnerable to malicious filename use for self-XSS \u002F HTML injection locally for users\n\n## Summary\n\nDragging a file whose filename contains HTML is reflected verbatim into the page via the drag-and-drop helper, so any user who drops a crafted file on PrivateBin will execute arbitrary JavaScript within their own session (self-XSS). This allows an attacker who can entice a victim to drag or otherwise attach such a file to exfiltrate plaintext, encryption keys, or stored pastes before they are encrypted or sent.\n\n**Note 1:** as the malicious filename must contain the `>` character, the victim must not be using Windows for this to work, since this OS simply forbids this character in filenames.\n\n**Note 2:** most PrivateBin instances use the Content-Security-Policy header to prevent most use-cases of this vulnerability. This report will describe the impact as if this header had been disabled by the PrivateBin instance owner.\n\n## Affected versions\n\nPrivateBin versions since 1.7.7 and before 2.0.3.\n\n## Conditions\n\n* Only macIOS or Linux users are affected, due to the way the `>` character is treated in a file name on Windows.\n* The PrivateBIn instance needs to have file upload enabled.\n* An attacker needs to have access to the local file system or somehow convince the user to create (or download) a malicious file (name).\n* An attacker needs to convince the user to attach that malicious file to PrivateBin.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny Mac \u002F Linux user who can be tricked into dragging a maliciously named file into the editor is impacted; code runs in the origin of the PrivateBin instance they are using. Attackers can steal plaintext, passphrases, or manipulate the UI before data is encrypted, defeating the zero-knowledge guarantees for that victim session, assuming counter-measures like Content-Security-Policy (CSP) have been disabled.\n\nIf CSP is not disabled, similar HTML injection attacks as described in CVE-2025-62796 may be possible - like redirecting to a foreign website, phishing etc.\n\n### Real-life impact\n\nAs the whole exploit needs to be included in the file name of the attached file and only affects the local session of the user (aka it is neither persistent nor remotely executable) _and_ that user needs to interact and actively attach that file to the paste, the impact is considered to be practically low.\n\n## Technical Description\n\nWhen a file is dropped, `readFileData` collects all filenames and calls `printDragAndDropFileNames`:\n\n```js\nconst fileNames = loadedFiles.map((loadedFile => loadedFile.name));\nprintDragAndDropFileNames(fileNames);\n```\n\n`printDragAndDropFileNames` then renders those names:\n\n```js\n        function printDragAndDropFileNames(fileNames) {\n            $dragAndDropFileNames.html(fileNames.join('\u003Cbr>'));\n        }\n```\n\nThis will insecurely render the user-submitted filenames as HTML.\n\nThis vulnerability has been introduced in [this commit](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fcommit\u002F095a5be0b6390a6e47b97d3668a23f6edec95c15) (introduced in 1.7.7).\n\nThe previous render method was using `.text()`:\n\n```js\n$dragAndDropFileName.text(loadedFile.name);\n```\n\n## Reproduction Steps\n\n1. On a Unix-like system, create a file with an HTML\u002FJS payload in its name, e.g. by running `touch '\">\u003Cimg src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>.txt'`.\n2. Deploy or use any PrivateBin instance with attachments enabled (including https:\u002F\u002Fprivatebin.net\u002F).\n3. Open the UI in a browser and start a new paste.\n4. Drag the crafted file anywhere on the page\n5. As soon as it is dropped, the filename is inserted into `#dragAndDropFileName` as HTML and the onerror handler fires (assuming CSP is disabled), showing the alert.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nPrivateBin strongly recommends users to **upgrade to the latest release**. However, here are some workarounds that may help users to mitigate this vulnerability without upgrade:\n\n* Update the [CSP in your configuration file](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fwiki\u002FConfiguration#cspheader) to the latest recommended settings and check that it isn't getting reverted or overwritten by the web server, reverse proxy or CDN, i.e. using [PrivateBin's offered check service](https:\u002F\u002Fprivatebin.info\u002Fdirectory\u002Fcheck).\n   **Note:** Users should check the CSP independently, even if they've upgrade to a fixed version.\n* Deploying PrivateBin on a separate domain may limit the scope of the vulnerability to PrivateBin itself and thus, as described in the “Impact” section, effectively prevent any damage by the vulnerability to other resources users are hosting.\n* As explained in the impact assessment, disabling attachments also prevents this issue.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue has been patched in version 2.0.3.\n\n## Credits\n\nPrivateBin would like to thank [Benoit Esnard](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fesnard), who reported this vulnerability.\n\nIn general, PrivateBin would like to thank everyone reporting issues and potential vulnerabilities.\n\nIf a user thinks they have found a vulnerability or potential security risk, [PrivateBin would kindly ask you to follow our security policy](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002FSECURITY.md) and report it. PrivateBin will then assess the report and will take the necessary actions to address it.\n\n## Timeline\n\n- 2025-11-09 Received report via GitHub Security Advisory\n- 2025-11-10 Discussed and reproduced issue, created a patch\n- 2025-11-11 Further work on patch\n- 2025-11-12 Released patch with PrivateBin 2.0.3","2025-11-14T20:33:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":42,"availabilityImpact":45,"privilegesRequired":42,"confidentialityImpact":42},"UNCHANGED","3.1",3.9,"LOCAL","LOW","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:R\u002FS:U\u002FC:L\u002FI:L\u002FA:N","REQUIRED","NONE",false,[48],"CWE-79",[50],"cpe:2.3:a:privatebin:privatebin:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[52],"Privatebin Privatebin",[54,55,56,57],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fcommit\u002Ff9550e513381208b36595ee2404e968144bba78b","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-r9x7-7ggj-fx9f","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-64711","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin",0.35,0.00129,0.02552,{"timestamp":62,"automatable":63,"tech_impact":64,"exploitation":65,"cisa_decision":66,"cisa_remediation_timeline":70},"2025-11-13T14:28:32.150477Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":67,"decision":68,"priority":69},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T07:42:50.003137\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[72],{"name":73,"source":74,"tactics":75,"technique_id":77},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[76],"privilege-escalation","T1068",[79],{"link":55},{"count":81,"next":82,"previous":6,"results":83},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[84,92,100],{"id":85,"title":86,"summary":87,"published_at":88,"type":89,"link":90,"image_url":91},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":93,"title":94,"summary":95,"published_at":96,"type":97,"link":98,"image_url":99},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":101,"title":102,"summary":103,"published_at":104,"type":105,"link":106,"image_url":107},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]