[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-68778":30,"landing-articles":58},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":37,"cwes":38,"cpes":39,"technologies":40,"references":41,"score":47,"epss_score":48,"epss_percentile":49,"is_kev":37,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":50,"attack_mappings":56,"exploits":57},61668,"CVE-2025-68778","EUVD-2026-2322","In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: don't log conflicting inode if it's a dir moved in the current transaction\n\nWe can't log a conflicting inode if it's a directory and it was moved\nfrom one parent directory to another parent directory in the current\ntransaction, as this can result an attempt to have a directory with\ntwo hard links during log replay, one for the old parent directory and\nanother for the new parent directory.\n\nThe following scenario triggers that issue:\n\n1) We have directories \"dir1\" and \"dir2\" created in a past transaction.\n   Directory \"dir1\" has inode A as its parent directory;\n\n2) We move \"dir1\" to some other directory;\n\n3) We create a file with the name \"dir1\" in directory inode A;\n\n4) We fsync the new file. This results in logging the inode of the new file\n   and the inode for the directory \"dir1\" that was previously moved in the\n   current transaction. So the log tree has the INODE_REF item for the\n   new location of \"dir1\";\n\n5) We move the new file to some other directory. This results in updating\n   the log tree to included the new INODE_REF for the new location of the\n   file and removes the INODE_REF for the old location. This happens\n   during the rename when we call btrfs_log_new_name();\n\n6) We fsync the file, and that persists the log tree changes done in the\n   previous step (btrfs_log_new_name() only updates the log tree in\n   memory);\n\n7) We have a power failure;\n\n8) Next time the fs is mounted, log replay happens and when processing\n   the inode for directory \"dir1\" we find a new INODE_REF and add that\n   link, but we don't remove the old link of the inode since we have\n   not logged the old parent directory of the directory inode \"dir1\".\n\nAs a result after log replay finishes when we trigger writeback of the\nsubvolume tree's extent buffers, the tree check will detect that we have\na directory a hard link count of 2 and we get a mount failure.\nThe errors and stack traces reported in dmesg\u002Fsyslog are like this:\n\n   [ 3845.729764] BTRFS info (device dm-0): start tree-log replay\n   [ 3845.730304] page: refcount:3 mapcount:0 mapping:000000005c8a3027 index:0x1d00 pfn:0x11510c\n   [ 3845.731236] memcg:ffff9264c02f4e00\n   [ 3845.731751] aops:btree_aops [btrfs] ino:1\n   [ 3845.732300] flags: 0x17fffc00000400a(uptodate|private|writeback|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)\n   [ 3845.733346] raw: 017fffc00000400a 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff9264d978aea8\n   [ 3845.734265] raw: 0000000000001d00 ffff92650e6d4738 00000003ffffffff ffff9264c02f4e00\n   [ 3845.735305] page dumped because: eb page dump\n   [ 3845.735981] BTRFS critical (device dm-0): corrupt leaf: root=5 block=30408704 slot=6 ino=257, invalid nlink: has 2 expect no more than 1 for dir\n   [ 3845.737786] BTRFS info (device dm-0): leaf 30408704 gen 10 total ptrs 17 free space 14881 owner 5\n   [ 3845.737789] BTRFS info (device dm-0): refs 4 lock_owner 0 current 30701\n   [ 3845.737792] \titem 0 key (256 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160\n   [ 3845.737794] \t\tinode generation 3 transid 9 size 16 nbytes 16384\n   [ 3845.737795] \t\tblock group 0 mode 40755 links 1 uid 0 gid 0\n   [ 3845.737797] \t\trdev 0 sequence 2 flags 0x0\n   [ 3845.737798] \t\tatime 1764259517.0\n   [ 3845.737800] \t\tctime 1764259517.572889464\n   [ 3845.737801] \t\tmtime 1764259517.572889464\n   [ 3845.737802] \t\totime 1764259517.0\n   [ 3845.737803] \titem 1 key (256 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16111 itemsize 12\n   [ 3845.737805] \t\tindex 0 name_len 2\n   [ 3845.737807] \titem 2 key (256 DIR_ITEM 2363071922) itemoff 16077 itemsize 34\n   [ 3845.737808] \t\tlocation key (257 1 0) type 2\n   [ 3845.737810] \t\ttransid 9 data_len 0 name_len 4\n   [ 3845.737811] \titem 3 key (256 DIR_ITEM 2676584006) itemoff 16043 itemsize 34\n   [ 3845.737813] \t\tlocation key (258 1 0) type 2\n   [ 3845.737814] \t\ttransid 9 data_len 0 name_len 4\n   [ 3845.737815] \titem 4 key (256 DIR_INDEX 2) itemoff 16009 itemsize 34\n   [ 3845.737816] \t\tlocation key (257 1 0) type 2\n   [\n---truncated---","2026-01-13T16:15:00Z",{},false,[],[],[],[42,43,44,45,46],"https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F266273eaf4d99475f1ae57f687b3e42bc71ec6f0","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F7359e1d39c78816ecbdb0cb4e93975794ce53973","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Fa35788ddf8df65837897ecbb0ddb2896b863159e","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Fd478f50727c3ee46d0359f0d2ae114f70191816e","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Fd64f3834dffef80f0a9185a037617a54ed7f4bd2",0,0.00202,0.09992,{"timestamp":6,"automatable":51,"tech_impact":52,"exploitation":53,"cisa_decision":54,"cisa_remediation_timeline":55},"no","partial","none",{},"FSU",[],[],{"count":59,"next":60,"previous":6,"results":61},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[62,70,78],{"id":63,"title":64,"summary":65,"published_at":66,"type":67,"link":68,"image_url":69},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":71,"title":72,"summary":73,"published_at":74,"type":75,"link":76,"image_url":77},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":79,"title":80,"summary":81,"published_at":82,"type":83,"link":84,"image_url":85},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]