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CVE-2026-105932

NVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2026-107469 · Published Oct 21, 2026 · 4d ago

The Apache Pulsar broker admin REST API provides endpoints to read, set and remove the topic-level entry filter policy of a topic. For persistent topics these endpoints check that the caller is authorized for the entry filters topic policy operation. The corresponding endpoints for non-persistent topics (/admin/v2/non-persistent/{tenant}/{namespace}/{topic}/entryFilters) do not perform this authorization check. The only authorization check these endpoints perform is an indirect lookup permission check, made while the topic's partition metadata is retrieved; it is present in all affected versions. As a result, when authentication and authorization are enabled, an authenticated user who has been granted produce or consume permission on a non-persistent topic, or on its namespace, but not permission to manage the topic's policies can read, replace or remove the topic-level entry filter policy of that topic. These operations should be restricted to users with the tenant admin role or the superuser role. This impact analysis assumes that Pulsar has been configured with the default authorization provider. For custom authorization providers, the impact could be slightly different. The practical impact is limited by two broker configuration requirements, neither of which is met by default: - Entry filters must have been installed by the operator. Entry filter implementations are loaded only at broker startup from the broker's entry filters directory, which is empty by default. A request can only select among entry filters the operator has already deployed; setting any other filter name is rejected. The issue does not allow a caller to install or load entry filter code or to run arbitrary code in the broker. - Topic-level entry filter policies must be allowed to override the broker-level configuration (allowOverrideEntryFilters, which is disabled by default). When this setting is disabled, the topic-level entry filter policy has no effect on message dispatch. In deployments where both conditions are met, an unauthorized user can remove the topic-level entry filter policy of a non-persistent topic, for example one used to restrict which messages are delivered to consumers, or apply a different installed entry filter that withholds messages from subscriptions of that topic. Removing it makes the topic fall back to the namespace-level or broker-level entry filters, which are not removed. A changed policy affects only subscription dispatchers created after the change, for example for new subscriptions or when a subscription is re-created after all of its consumers have disconnected; dispatchers that already exist keep the entry filters they were created with. Because non-persistent topics do not store messages, messages withheld by an entry filter are not delivered. Reading the policy discloses only the names of the configured entry filters. The issue does not allow reading message contents, and entry filters cannot modify message payloads. Persistent topics and namespace-level entry filter policies are not affected. Apache Pulsar versions before 3.3.0 are not affected, because in those versions the entry filters topic policy check is made in code shared by the persistent and non-persistent endpoints. This issue affects Apache Pulsar versions from 3.3.0 before 4.0.14 and from 4.1.0 before 4.2.5. - 3.3.x and 4.0.x version users should upgrade to at least 4.0.14. - 4.1.x and 4.2.x version users should upgrade to at least 4.2.5. Users operating versions prior to those listed above should upgrade to the aforementioned patched versions or newer versions. The currently supported Apache Pulsar release lines are 4.0.x and 5.0.x. The supported versions schedule is available at https://pulsar.apache.org/contribute/release-policy/. Users who cannot upgrade immediately and have deployed entry filters should keep allowOverrideEntryFilters at its default value of false, so that topic-level entry filter policies do not affect message dispatch.

Weaknesses

CWE-862

CVSS scores

  • v4.02.3CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Initial Access Persistence Stealth Defense Impairment Credential Access

References

Potentially impacted assets

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Latest trending attack

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Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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