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CVE-2026-17053

NVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2026-90880 · Published Oct 1, 2026 · 3w ago

The SMBus driver API exposed smbus_smbalert_remove_cb() and smbus_host_notify_remove_cb() as Zephyr syscalls. Their verifiers in drivers/smbus/smbus_handlers.c validated only the dev argument with K_SYSCALL_OBJ(dev, K_OBJ_DRIVER_SMBUS) and forwarded the caller-supplied struct smbus_callback *cb pointer into kernel-mode driver code without any K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_READ/K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE validation. A companion change in 2023 had already removed the matching smbus_smbalert_set_cb() / smbus_host_notify_set_cb() syscalls for this reason, but the two removal syscalls were left exposed.

On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE=y, CONFIG_SMBUS=y and a driver implementing the callback operations (drivers/smbus/intel_pch_smbus.c with CONFIG_SMBUS_INTEL_PCH_SMBALERT/CONFIG_SMBUS_INTEL_PCH_HOST_NOTIFY, or drivers/smbus/smbus_stm32.c with CONFIG_SMBUS_STM32_SMBALERT), any user-mode thread that has been granted the SMBus device object can invoke these syscalls with an arbitrary pointer. The value reaches smbus_callback_remove() in drivers/smbus/smbus_utils.h, which uses it as a node identity against the kernel's sys_slist_t of registered callbacks.

The consequence is that an unprivileged thread can unregister an SMBALERT or Host Notify callback that a supervisor-mode component registered, silently disabling alert handling for the rest of the system; because Zephyr images have fixed symbol addresses and the syscall returns 0 on a hit versus -ENOENT on a miss, the target address is both derivable and searchable. In builds with CONFIG_ASSERT=y the __ASSERT(callback->handler, ...) check additionally dereferences the caller-supplied address in supervisor mode, so a bogus pointer raises a kernel-mode fault and a fatal system error, and the fault/no-fault outcome discloses which addresses are mapped.

The fix removes both syscall entry points, demoting the two functions to ordinary static inline calls so that callback list manipulation is available only to supervisor-mode code. There is no impact on builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE, and no impact on configurations that do not enable an SMBus driver with SMBALERT or Host Notify support.

Weaknesses

CWE-862

CVSS scores

  • v3.14.4CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Persistence Privilege Escalation Stealth Defense Impairment Credential Access

References

Potentially impacted assets

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Latest trending attack

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Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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