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CVE-2026-21861

ExploitedNVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2026-17255 · Published Mar 31, 2026

baserCMS has OS Command Injection Leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE)

Summary

In the core update functionality of baserCMS, some parameters sent from the admin panel are passed to the exec() function without proper validation or escaping. This issue allows an authenticated CMS administrator to execute arbitrary OS commands on the server (Remote Code Execution, RCE).

This vulnerability is not a UI-level issue such as screen manipulation or lack of CSRF protection, but rather stems from a design that directly executes input values received on the server side as OS commands. Therefore, even if buttons are hidden in the UI, or even if CakePHP's CSRF/FormProtection (SecurityComponent) ensures that only legitimate POST requests are accepted, an attack is possible as long as a request containing a valid token is processed within an administrator session.


Vulnerability Information

Item Details
CWE CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command
Impact Remote Code Execution (RCE)
Severity Critical
Attack Requirements Administrator privileges required
Reproducibility Reproducible (confirmed multiple times)
Test Environment baserCMS 5.2.2 (Docker / development environment)

Affected Areas

  • Controller
    • PluginsController::get_core_update()
  • Service
    • PluginsService::getCoreUpdate()
  • Affected Endpoint
    • /baser/admin/baser-core/plugins/get_core_update

Technical Details

Vulnerable Code Flow
PluginsController::get_core_update()
  ↓ Retrieves php parameter from POST data
PluginsService::getCoreUpdate($targetVersion, $php, $force)
  ↓ Concatenates $php into command string without validation or escaping
exec($command)
Relevant Code (Excerpt)

PluginsController.php

$service->getCoreUpdate(
    $request->getData('targetVersion') ?? '',
    $request->getData('php') ?? 'php',
    $request->getData('force'),
);

PluginsService.php

$command = $php . ' ' . ROOT . DS . 'bin' . DS . 'cake.php composer ' .
           $targetVersion . ' --php ' . $php . ' --dir ' . TMP . 'update';

exec($command, $out, $code);

The $php parameter is user input, and none of the following countermeasures are in place:

  • Restriction via allowlist
  • Validation via regular expression
  • Escaping via escapeshellarg() or similar

Attack Scenario

  1. The attacker logs in as a CMS administrator
  2. Sends a POST request to the core update functionality in the admin panel
  3. Specifies a string containing OS commands in the php parameter
  4. exec() is executed on the server side, running the arbitrary OS command
Example Attack Input (Conceptual)
php=php;id>/tmp/rce_test;#

Verification Results (PoC)

Execution Result
$ docker exec bc-php cat /tmp/rce_test
uid=1000(www-data) gid=1000(www-data) groups=1000(www-data)

The above confirms that OS commands can be executed with www-data privileges.

Additional Notes
  • Reproducible through the legitimate flow in the admin panel (browser)
  • Succeeds even with CSRF/FormProtection tokens included in a legitimate request
  • Failure cases (400/403) have also been investigated and differentiated
  • Confirmed reproducible via resending HTTP requests with tools such as curl (resending the same request containing valid tokens)

Impact

If this vulnerability is exploited, the following becomes possible:

  • Retrieval of server information
  • Reading/writing arbitrary files
  • Retrieval of application configuration information (DB credentials, etc.)
  • OS-level operations beyond application permission boundaries

Although administrator privileges are required, this is a design issue where the impact extends from the application layer to the OS layer, and the impact is considered significant.


Recommended Fix

Primary Recommendation
  • Do not accept the PHP executable path from user input
  • Fix the PHP executable on the server side using the PHP_BINARY constant
$php = escapeshellarg(PHP_BINARY);
Supplementary Fix Recommendations
  • Apply escapeshellarg() escaping to other command-line arguments (version number, directory, etc.) as well
  • If possible, consider using execution methods that do not involve shell interpretation (array format, Process class, etc.)
Alternative (Not Recommended)
  • Allowlist validation for the PHP executable path
  • Combined use of regex validation and escapeshellarg()

However, from the perspective of reducing the attack surface, a design that eliminates user input entirely is recommended.


Additional Notes

  • This issue is independent of UI display controls (showing/hiding buttons)
  • As long as the endpoint exists, an attack is possible if a request containing valid tokens is processed
  • This is a problem stemming from the design-level handling of input, and cannot be prevented by CSRF or UI controls alone

Conclusion

Due to a design issue in baserCMS's core update functionality where user input is passed to exec() without validation, Remote Code Execution (RCE) is achievable with administrator privileges. This vulnerability can be fixed through input validation and design review, and prompt remediation is recommended.

This advisory was translated from Japanese to English using GitHub Copilot.

Technologies

Basercms BasercmsBaserproject Basercms

Weaknesses

CWE-78

CVSS scores

  • v3.19.1CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Initial Access

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticalyesterday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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