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CVE-2026-27891

NVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2026-30808 · Published May 7, 2026

FacturaScripts Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Zip Slip in Plugin Upload Mechanism

Summary

A Critical vulnerability exists in the Plugins::add() function. The system fails to properly validate the file paths within uploaded ZIP archives. This allows an attacker to perform a Zip Slip attack, leading to Arbitrary File Write and Remote Code Execution (RCE) by overwriting sensitive .php files outside the designated plugins directory.

Details

The vulnerability is located in Plugins.php. While the testZipFile function attempts to validate that the ZIP contains only one root folder, it does not sanitize or validate the individual file paths within that folder.

// Vulnerable logic in Plugins.php
for ($index = 0; $index < $zipFile->numFiles; $index++) {
    $data = $zipFile->statIndex($index);
    $path = explode('/', $data['name']);
    if (count($path) > 1) {
        $folders[$path[0]] = $path[0];
    }
} 

An attacker can bypass this check by naming a file ValidPluginName/../../shell.php. The explode function will see ValidPluginName as the root folder, satisfying the count($folders) != 1 check. However, during extraction, the ../../ sequence triggers a path traversal, allowing the file to be written anywhere the web server has permissions the root directory.

PoC

Prepare Malicious ZIP: Use a tool (like evilarc) or a script to create a ZIP file where one of the entries is named: MyPlugin/../../rce.php
Inject Payload: Inside rce.php, put a simple shell:
<?php system($_GET['cmd']); ?>
Upload: Navigate to the "Add Plugin" section in FacturaScripts and upload the malicious ZIP.
Execution: Access the shell via https://target.com/rce.php?cmd=whoami.

Impact

Confidentiality: High (Attacker can read all database configs and files).
Integrity: High (Attacker can modify any file on the server).
Availability: High (Attacker can delete the entire installation).

https://github.com/ZeroXJacks/CVEs/blob/main/2026/CVE-2026-27891.md

Technologies

Facturascripts Facturascripts

Weaknesses

CWE-20CWE-434

CVSS scores

  • v3.17.2CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Initial Access Execution Stealth

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticalyesterday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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