[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-32887":30,"landing-articles":81},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":45,"cwes":46,"cpes":48,"technologies":51,"references":54,"score":58,"epss_score":59,"epss_percentile":60,"is_kev":61,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":62,"attack_mappings":72,"exploits":79},20905,"CVE-2026-32887","EUVD-2026-13818","Effect `AsyncLocalStorage` context lost\u002Fcontaminated inside Effect fibers under concurrent load with RPC\n\n## Versions\n\n- `effect`: 3.19.15\n- `@effect\u002Frpc`: 0.72.1\n- `@effect\u002Fplatform`: 0.94.2\n- Node.js: v22.20.0\n- Vercel runtime with Fluid compute\n- Next.js: 16 (App Router)\n- `@clerk\u002Fnextjs`: 6.x\n\n## Root cause\n\nEffect's `MixedScheduler` batches fiber continuations and drains them inside a **single** microtask or timer callback. The `AsyncLocalStorage` context active during that callback belongs to whichever request first triggered the scheduler's drain cycle — **not** the request that owns the fiber being resumed.\n\n### Detailed mechanism\n\n#### 1. Scheduler batching (`effect\u002Fsrc\u002FScheduler.ts`, `MixedScheduler`)\n\n```typescript\n\u002F\u002F MixedScheduler.starve() — called once when first task is scheduled\nprivate starve(depth = 0) {\n  if (depth >= this.maxNextTickBeforeTimer) {\n    setTimeout(() => this.starveInternal(0), 0)       \u002F\u002F timer queue\n  } else {\n    Promise.resolve(void 0).then(() => this.starveInternal(depth + 1)) \u002F\u002F microtask queue\n  }\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F MixedScheduler.starveInternal() — drains ALL accumulated tasks in one call\nprivate starveInternal(depth: number) {\n  const tasks = this.tasks.buckets\n  this.tasks.buckets = []\n  for (const [_, toRun] of tasks) {\n    for (let i = 0; i \u003C toRun.length; i++) {\n      toRun[i]()  \u002F\u002F ← Every fiber continuation runs in the SAME ALS context\n    }\n  }\n  \u002F\u002F ...\n}\n```\n\n`scheduleTask` only calls `starve()` when `running` is `false`. Subsequent tasks accumulate in `this.tasks` until `starveInternal` drains them all. The `Promise.then()` (or `setTimeout`) callback inherits the ALS context from whichever call site created it — i.e., whichever request's fiber first set `running = true`.\n\n**Result:** Under concurrent load, fiber continuations from Request A and Request B execute inside the same `starveInternal` call, sharing a single ALS context. If Request A triggered `starve()`, then Request B's fiber reads Request A's ALS context.\n\n#### 2. `toWebHandlerRuntime` does not propagate ALS (`@effect\u002Fplatform\u002Fsrc\u002FHttpApp.ts:211-240`)\n\n```typescript\nexport const toWebHandlerRuntime = \u003CR>(runtime: Runtime.Runtime\u003CR>) => {\n  const httpRuntime: Types.Mutable\u003CRuntime.Runtime\u003CR>> = Runtime.make(runtime)\n  const run = Runtime.runFork(httpRuntime)\n  return \u003CE>(self: Default\u003CE, R | Scope.Scope>, middleware?) => {\n    return (request: Request, context?): Promise\u003CResponse> =>\n      new Promise((resolve) => {\n        \u002F\u002F Per-request Effect context is correctly set via contextMap:\n        const contextMap = new Map\u003Cstring, any>(runtime.context.unsafeMap)\n        const httpServerRequest = ServerRequest.fromWeb(request)\n        contextMap.set(ServerRequest.HttpServerRequest.key, httpServerRequest)\n        httpRuntime.context = Context.unsafeMake(contextMap)\n\n        \u002F\u002F But the fiber is forked without any ALS propagation:\n        const fiber = run(httpApp as any)  \u002F\u002F ← ALS context is NOT captured or restored\n      })\n  }\n}\n```\n\nEffect's own `Context` (containing `HttpServerRequest`) is correctly set per-request. But the **Node.js ALS context** — which frameworks like Next.js, Clerk, and OpenTelemetry rely on — is not captured at fork time or restored when the fiber's continuations execute.\n\n#### 3. The dangerous pattern this enables\n\n```typescript\n\u002F\u002F RPC handler — runs inside an Effect fiber\nconst handler = Effect.gen(function*() {\n  \u002F\u002F This calls auth() from @clerk\u002Fnextjs\u002Fserver, which reads from ALS\n  const { userId } = yield* Effect.tryPromise({\n    try: async () => auth(),  \u002F\u002F ← may read WRONG user's session\n    catch: () => new UnauthorizedError({ message: \"Auth failed\" })\n  })\n  return yield* repository.getUser(userId)\n})\n```\n\nThe `async () => auth()` thunk executes when the fiber continuation is scheduled by `MixedScheduler`. At that point, the ALS context belongs to an arbitrary concurrent request.\n\n## Reproduction scenario\n\n```\nTimeline (two concurrent requests to the same toWebHandler endpoint):\n\nT0: Request A arrives → POST handler → webHandler(requestA)\n    → Promise executor runs synchronously\n    → httpRuntime.context set to A's context\n    → fiber A forked, runs first ops synchronously\n    → fiber A yields (e.g., at Effect.tryPromise boundary)\n    → scheduler.scheduleTask(fiberA_continuation)\n    → running=false → starve() called → Promise.resolve().then(drain)\n       ↑ ALS context captured = Request A's context\n\nT1: Request B arrives → POST handler → webHandler(requestB)\n    → Promise executor runs synchronously\n    → httpRuntime.context set to B's context\n    → fiber B forked, runs first ops synchronously\n    → fiber B yields\n    → scheduler.scheduleTask(fiberB_continuation)\n    → running=true → task queued, no new starve()\n\nT2: Microtask fires → starveInternal() runs\n    → Drains fiberA_continuation → auth() reads ALS → gets A's context ✓\n    → Drains fiberB_continuation → auth() reads ALS → gets A's context ✗ ← WRONG USER\n```\n\n## Minimal reproduction\n\n```typescript\nimport { AsyncLocalStorage } from \"node:async_hooks\"\nimport { Effect, Layer } from \"effect\"\nimport { RpcServer, RpcSerialization, Rpc, RpcGroup } from \"@effect\u002Frpc\"\nimport { HttpServer } from \"@effect\u002Fplatform\"\nimport * as S from \"effect\u002FSchema\"\n\n\u002F\u002F Simulate a framework's ALS (like Next.js \u002F Clerk)\nconst requestStore = new AsyncLocalStorage\u003C{ userId: string }>()\n\nclass GetUser extends Rpc.make(\"GetUser\", {\n  success: S.Struct({ userId: S.String, alsUserId: S.String }),\n  failure: S.Never,\n  payload: {}\n}) {}\n\nconst MyRpc = RpcGroup.make(\"MyRpc\").add(GetUser)\n\nconst MyRpcLive = MyRpc.toLayer(\n  RpcGroup.toHandlers(MyRpc, {\n    GetUser: () =>\n      Effect.gen(function*() {\n        \u002F\u002F Simulate calling an ALS-dependent API inside an Effect fiber\n        const alsResult = yield* Effect.tryPromise({\n          try: async () => {\n            const store = requestStore.getStore()\n            return store?.userId ?? \"NONE\"\n          },\n          catch: () => { throw new Error(\"impossible\") }\n        })\n        return { userId: \"from-effect-context\", alsUserId: alsResult }\n      })\n  })\n)\n\nconst RpcLayer = MyRpcLive.pipe(\n  Layer.provideMerge(RpcSerialization.layerJson),\n  Layer.provideMerge(HttpServer.layerContext)\n)\n\nconst { handler } = RpcServer.toWebHandler(MyRpc, { layer: RpcLayer })\n\n\u002F\u002F Simulate two concurrent requests with different ALS contexts\nasync function main() {\n  const results = await Promise.all([\n    requestStore.run({ userId: \"user-A\" }, () => handler(makeRpcRequest(\"GetUser\"))),\n    requestStore.run({ userId: \"user-B\" }, () => handler(makeRpcRequest(\"GetUser\"))),\n  ])\n\n  \u002F\u002F Parse responses and check if alsUserId matches the expected user\n  \u002F\u002F Under the bug: both responses may show \"user-A\" (or one shows the other's)\n  for (const res of results) {\n    console.log(await res.json())\n  }\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n| Symptom | Severity |\n|---------|----------|\n| `auth()` returns wrong user's session | **Critical** — authentication bypass |\n| `cookies()` \u002F `headers()` from Next.js read wrong request | **High** — data leakage |\n| OpenTelemetry trace context crosses requests | **Medium** — incorrect traces |\n| Works locally, fails in production | Hard to diagnose — only manifests under concurrent load |\n\n## Workaround\n\nCapture ALS-dependent values **before** entering the Effect runtime and pass them via Effect's own context system:\n\n```typescript\n\u002F\u002F In the route handler — OUTSIDE the Effect fiber (ALS is correct here)\nexport const POST = async (request: Request) => {\n  const { userId } = await auth()  \u002F\u002F ← Safe: still in Next.js ALS context\n\n  \u002F\u002F Inject into request headers or use the `context` parameter\n  const headers = new Headers(request.headers)\n  headers.set(\"x-clerk-auth-user-id\", userId ?? \"\")\n  const enrichedRequest = new Request(request.url, {\n    method: request.method,\n    headers,\n    body: request.body,\n    duplex: \"half\" as any,\n  })\n\n  return webHandler(enrichedRequest)\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F In Effect handlers — read from HttpServerRequest headers instead of calling auth()\nconst getAuthenticatedUserId = Effect.gen(function*() {\n  const req = yield* HttpServerRequest.HttpServerRequest\n  const userId = req.headers[\"x-clerk-auth-user-id\"]\n  if (!userId) return yield* Effect.fail(new UnauthorizedError({ message: \"Auth required\" }))\n  return userId\n})\n```\n\n## Suggested fix (for Effect maintainers)\n\n### Option A: Propagate ALS context through the scheduler\n\nCapture the `AsyncLocalStorage` snapshot when a fiber continuation is scheduled, and restore it when the continuation executes:\n\n```typescript\n\u002F\u002F In MixedScheduler or the fiber runtime\nimport { AsyncLocalStorage } from \"node:async_hooks\"\n\nscheduleTask(task: Task, priority: number) {\n  \u002F\u002F Capture current ALS context\n  const snapshot = AsyncLocalStorage.snapshot()\n  this.tasks.scheduleTask(() => snapshot(task), priority)\n  \u002F\u002F ...\n}\n```\n\n`AsyncLocalStorage.snapshot()` (Node.js 20.5+) returns a function that, when called, restores the ALS context from the point of capture. This ensures each fiber continuation runs with its originating request's ALS context.\n\n**Trade-off:** Adds one closure allocation per scheduled task. Could be opt-in via a `FiberRef` or scheduler option.\n\n### Option B: Capture ALS at `runFork` and restore per fiber step\n\nWhen `Runtime.runFork` is called, capture the ALS snapshot and associate it with the fiber. Before each fiber step (in the fiber runtime's `evaluateEffect` loop), restore the snapshot.\n\n**Trade-off:** More invasive but provides correct ALS propagation for the fiber's entire lifetime, including across `flatMap` chains and `Effect.tryPromise` thunks.\n\n### Option C: Document the limitation and provide a `context` injection API\n\nIf ALS propagation is intentionally not supported, document this prominently and provide a first-class API for `toWebHandler` to accept per-request context. The existing `context?: Context.Context\u003Cnever>` parameter on the handler function partially addresses this, but it requires callers to know about the issue and manually extract values before entering Effect.\n\n## Related\n\n- Node.js `AsyncLocalStorage` docs: https:\u002F\u002Fnodejs.org\u002Fapi\u002Fasync_context.html\n- `AsyncLocalStorage.snapshot()`: https:\u002F\u002Fnodejs.org\u002Fapi\u002Fasync_context.html#static-method-asynclocalstoragesnapshot\n- Next.js uses ALS for `cookies()`, `headers()`, `auth()` in App Router\n- Similar issue pattern in other fiber-based runtimes (e.g., ZIO has `FiberRef` propagation for this)\n\n\n## POC replica of my setup\n\n```\n\u002F\u002F Create web handler from Effect RPC\n\u002F\u002F sharedMemoMap ensures all RPC routes share the same connection pool\nconst { handler: webHandler, dispose } = RpcServer.toWebHandler(DemoRpc, {\n  layer: RpcLayer,\n  memoMap: sharedMemoMap,\n});\n\n\u002F**\n * POST \u002Fapi\u002Frpc\u002Fdemo\n *\u002F\nexport const POST = async (request: Request) => {\n  return webHandler(request);\n};\n\nregisterDispose(dispose);\n```\n\n### Used util functions\n\n```\n\n\u002F**\n * Creates a dispose registry that collects dispose callbacks and runs them\n * when `runAll` is invoked. Handles both sync and async dispose functions,\n * catching errors to prevent one failing dispose from breaking others.\n *\n * @internal Exported for testing — use `registerDispose` in application code.\n *\u002F\nexport const makeDisposeRegistry = () => {\n  const disposeFns: Array\u003C() => void | Promise\u003Cvoid>> = []\n\n  const runAll = () => {\n    for (const fn of disposeFns) {\n      try {\n        const result = fn()\n        if (result && typeof result.then === \"function\") {\n          result.then(undefined, (err: unknown) => console.error(\"Dispose error:\", err))\n        }\n      } catch (err) {\n        console.error(\"Dispose error:\", err)\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  const register = (dispose: () => void | Promise\u003Cvoid>) => {\n    disposeFns.push(dispose)\n  }\n\n  return { register, runAll }\n}\n\nexport const registerDispose: (dispose: () => void | Promise\u003Cvoid>) => void = globalValue(\n  Symbol.for(\"@global\u002FRegisterDispose\"),\n  () => {\n    const registry = makeDisposeRegistry()\n\n    if (typeof process !== \"undefined\") {\n      process.once(\"beforeExit\", registry.runAll)\n    }\n\n    return registry.register\n  }\n)\n```\n\n### The actual effect that was run within the RPC context that the bug was found\n\n```\nexport const getAuthenticatedUserId: Effect.Effect\u003Cstring, UnauthorizedError> =\n  Effect.gen(function*() {\n    const authResult = yield* Effect.tryPromise({\n      try: async () => auth(),\n      catch: () =>\n        new UnauthorizedError({\n          message: \"Failed to get auth session\"\n        })\n    })\n\n    if (!authResult.userId) {\n      return yield* Effect.fail(\n        new UnauthorizedError({\n          message: \"Authentication required\"\n        })\n      )\n    }\n\n    return authResult.userId\n  })\n ```","2026-03-20T20:34:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":42,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":42},"UNCHANGED","3.1",7.4,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:N","NONE",true,[47],"CWE-362",[49,50],"cpe:2.3:a:effectful:effect:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:effect:effect:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[52,53],"Effectful Effect","Effect Effect",[55,56,57],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FEffect-TS\u002Feffect\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-32887","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FEffect-TS\u002Feffect",0.72,0.0028,0.20322,false,{"timestamp":63,"automatable":64,"tech_impact":65,"exploitation":66,"cisa_decision":67,"cisa_remediation_timeline":71},"2026-03-25T13:36:39.114796Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":68,"decision":69,"priority":70},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T03:36:50.487424\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[73],{"name":74,"source":75,"tactics":76,"technique_id":78},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[77],"initial-access","T1190",[80],{"link":55},{"count":82,"next":83,"previous":6,"results":84},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[85,93,101],{"id":86,"title":87,"summary":88,"published_at":89,"type":90,"link":91,"image_url":92},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":94,"title":95,"summary":96,"published_at":97,"type":98,"link":99,"image_url":100},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":102,"title":103,"summary":104,"published_at":105,"type":106,"link":107,"image_url":108},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]