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CVE-2026-33497

ExploitedNVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2026-14877 · Published Mar 20, 2026

langflow: /profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name} endpoint file reading

Vulnerability

Path Traversal in GET /api/v1/files/profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name}

The download_profile_picture function in src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/files.py constructed file paths by directly concatenating the user-supplied folder_name and file_name path parameters without sanitization or boundary validation. The resulting path was passed to the filesystem without verifying it remained within the intended directory.

An unauthenticated attacker could supply traversal sequences (e.g. ../secret_key) to navigate outside the profile pictures directory and read arbitrary files on the server filesystem.

This exposed the server to:

  • Sensitive file disclosure — any file readable by the application process could be retrieved
  • Secret key exfiltration — the application's secret_key file, used as JWT signing material, could be read directly via ../secret_key
  • Authentication bypass — with the secret_key in hand, an attacker can forge valid JWT tokens and authenticate as any user, including administrators

Proof of Concept

curl --path-as-is 'http://<host>:7860/api/v1/files/profile_pictures/../secret_key'

A successful response returns the raw secret key value used to sign all JWT authentication tokens in the instance.


Fix

The fix was applied in src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/files.py (PR #12263).

Two layers of defense were introduced:

1. Typed path validation — the folder_name and file_name parameters were changed from plain str to ValidatedFolderName and ValidatedFileName annotated types that reject traversal characters at the FastAPI input layer.

2. Path containment check — Path.name is used to strip any directory component from the inputs before path construction, and Path.is_relative_to() verifies the resolved path remains within the allowed base directory. This replaces the previous startswith() check, which was susceptible to prefix-ambiguity bugs.

 @router.get("/profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name}")
 async def download_profile_picture(
-    folder_name: str,
-    file_name: str,
+    folder_name: ValidatedFolderName,
+    file_name: ValidatedFileName,
     settings_service: Annotated[SettingsService, Depends(get_settings_service)],
 ):
-        file_path = (config_path / "profile_pictures" / folder_name / file_name).resolve()
+        safe_folder = Path(folder_name).name
+        safe_file = Path(file_name).name
+        file_path = (config_path / "profile_pictures" / safe_folder / safe_file).resolve()

         allowed_base = (config_path / "profile_pictures").resolve()
-        if not str(file_path).startswith(str(allowed_base)):
-            raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Profile picture not found")
+        if not file_path.is_relative_to(allowed_base):
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Profile picture not found")

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, restrict network access to the /api/v1/files/profile_pictures/ endpoint at the reverse-proxy or firewall level. Rotating the secret_key is strongly recommended if exposure cannot be ruled out.


Acknowledgements

We thank the security researcher who responsibly disclosed this vulnerability.

Technologies

Langflow Langflow

Weaknesses

CWE-22

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticalyesterday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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