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CVE-2026-34726

ExploitedNVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2026-18495 · Published Apr 1, 2026

Copier _subdirectory allows template root escape via parent-directory traversal

Summary

Copier's _subdirectory setting is documented as the subdirectory to use as the template root. However, the current implementation accepts parent-directory traversal such as .. and uses it directly when selecting the template root.

As a result, a template can escape its own directory and make Copier render files from the parent directory without --UNSAFE.

Details

The relevant code path is:

  1. the template defines _subdirectory
  2. Copier renders that string
  3. template_copy_root returns self.template.local_abspath / subdir
  4. Copier walks that directory as the template root

Relevant code:

The effective sink is:

subdir = self._render_string(self.template.subdirectory) or ""
return self.template.local_abspath / subdir

There is no check that the resulting path stays inside the template directory.

The documentation for _subdirectory describes it as:

Subdirectory to use as the template root when generating a project.

and explains it as a way to separate template metadata from template source code:

https://github.com/copier-org/copier/blob/7aa7021bd73797c982492bac3535515d4484fdb7/docs/configuring.md#L1582-L1646

That description fits values like template or poetry, but not ...

PoC
PoC 1: _subdirectory: .. escapes to the parent directory
mkdir -p root/template dst
echo 'loot' > root/loot.txt
printf '%s\n' '_subdirectory: ..' > root/template/copier.yml

copier copy --overwrite root/template dst
find dst -maxdepth 3 -type f | sort
cat dst/loot.txt

Expected output includes:

dst/loot.txt
dst/template/copier.yml
loot

This shows Copier is rendering from root/ rather than from root/template/.

Impact

If a user runs Copier on an untrusted template, that template can change the effective template root and make Copier render files from outside the intended template directory.

Practical impact:

  • template-root escape via ..
  • rendering of parent-directory files that were not meant to be part of the template
  • possible without --UNSAFE

Technologies

Copier-Org CopierCopier Copier

Weaknesses

CWE-22

CVSS scores

  • v3.14.4CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Privilege Escalation

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticalyesterday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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